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<article article-type="research-article" dtd-version="1.3" xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xml:lang="ru"><front><journal-meta><journal-id journal-id-type="publisher-id">govandpol</journal-id><journal-title-group><journal-title xml:lang="ru">Управление и политика</journal-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Governance and Politics</trans-title></trans-title-group></journal-title-group><issn pub-type="ppub">2782-7062</issn><issn pub-type="epub">2782-7070</issn><publisher><publisher-name>MGIMO University</publisher-name></publisher></journal-meta><article-meta><article-id pub-id-type="doi">10.24833/2782-7062-2025-4-3-21-28</article-id><article-id custom-type="elpub" pub-id-type="custom">govandpol-117</article-id><article-categories><subj-group subj-group-type="heading"><subject>Research Article</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="ru"><subject>МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ ПОЛИТИКА</subject></subj-group><subj-group subj-group-type="section-heading" xml:lang="en"><subject>INTERNATIONAL POLITICS</subject></subj-group></article-categories><title-group><article-title>Влияние внешнеполитической стратегии КНР на развитие и процесс евроинтеграции Западных Балкан (на примере Сербии)</article-title><trans-title-group xml:lang="en"><trans-title>Impact of China’s Foreign Policy Strategy on Development and the European Integration Process in the Western Balkans: the Case of Serbia</trans-title></trans-title-group></title-group><contrib-group><contrib contrib-type="author" corresp="yes"><name-alternatives><name name-style="eastern" xml:lang="ru"><surname>Церович</surname><given-names>М.</given-names></name><name name-style="western" xml:lang="en"><surname>Cerovich</surname><given-names>M.</given-names></name></name-alternatives><bio xml:lang="ru"><p>Милосава Церович – заместитель директора по научно-богословской работе; главный специалист по внешнеэкономическим связям, Благотворительный фонд «АБС Электро»</p><p>107031, Москва, ул. Большая Лубянка, 19, стр. 1.</p></bio><bio xml:lang="en"><p>Milosava Cerovich, Deputy Director for Science and Theology; Chief Specialist for Foreign Economic Relations, ABS Electro Charitable Foundation</p><p>Bolshaya Lubyanka St., 19, Bldg. 1, Moscow, 107031</p></bio><email xlink:type="simple">cerovicmila@mail.ru</email><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff-1"/></contrib></contrib-group><aff-alternatives id="aff-1"><aff xml:lang="ru"><institution>Сретенская духовная академия</institution><country>Россия</country></aff><aff xml:lang="en"><institution>Sretensky Theological Academy of the Russian Orthodox Church</institution><country>Russian Federation</country></aff></aff-alternatives><pub-date pub-type="collection"><year>2025</year></pub-date><pub-date pub-type="epub"><day>12</day><month>11</month><year>2025</year></pub-date><volume>4</volume><issue>3</issue><fpage>21</fpage><lpage>28</lpage><permissions><copyright-statement>Copyright &amp;#x00A9; Церович М., 2025</copyright-statement><copyright-year>2025</copyright-year><copyright-holder xml:lang="ru">Церович М.</copyright-holder><copyright-holder xml:lang="en">Cerovich M.</copyright-holder><license xml:lang="ru" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.</license-p></license><license xml:lang="en" license-type="creative-commons-attribution" xlink:href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" xlink:type="simple"><license-p>This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.</license-p></license></permissions><self-uri xlink:href="https://www.gp-mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/117">https://www.gp-mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/117</self-uri><abstract><p>Усиление деятельности Китая на Западных Балканах является результатом геоэкономической и политической логики. Основная цель Пекина – использовать регион в качестве шлюза и коммерческой платформы для Западной Европы, где реальные интересы Китая находятся в его стремительном поиске рынков, технологий и знаний. Китай стремится занять позиции в странах, которые находятся за пределами ЕС, но имеют перспективу стать его частью (страны Западных Балкан), таким образом, чтобы стать частью системы ЕС. При этом это подрывает доверие ЕС к Западным Балканам, которых там начинают рассматривать в качестве «троянского коня». Следует ожидать, что в перспективе Сербии придется делать политический выбор: или полностью поддержать интеграцию в ЕС, или продолжать тесную кооперацию с Китаем, и этот момент может стать поворотным моментом для дальнейшего развития как отношений с Китаем, так и для дальнейшей европейской интеграции и потенциального членства Сербии в ЕС. На данный момент Сербия не обязана проводить согласованную политику с Брюсселем, а степень гармонизации Сербии с внешнеполитическими декларациями ЕС невысока.</p></abstract><trans-abstract xml:lang="en"><p>China’s increased involvement in the Western Balkans is the result of geoeconomic and political logic of its foreign policy. Beijing’s primary goal is to use the region as a gateway and commercial platform for Western Europe, where China’s real interests lie in its rush for markets, technology, and knowledge. China seeks to establish itself in countries outside the EU but with potential to become the part of it (the Western Balkans), thereby becoming part of the EU system. This undermines the EU’s trust in the Western Balkans, which are beginning to be viewed as a «Trojan horse». Serbia is expected to face a political choice in the future: either fully support EU integration or continue close cooperation with China. This could become a turning point for the further development of relations with China, as well as for further European integration and Serbia’s potential EU membership. Currently, Serbia is not obligated to pursue a coordinated policy with Brussels, and the degree of its alignment with EU foreign policy declarations is still low.</p></trans-abstract><kwd-group xml:lang="ru"><kwd>китайская инвестиционная политика на Балканах</kwd><kwd>сотрудничество «16+1»</kwd><kwd>ЕС</kwd><kwd>Западные Балканы</kwd><kwd>Сербия</kwd></kwd-group><kwd-group xml:lang="en"><kwd>Chinese investment policy in the Balkans</kwd><kwd>16+1 Cooperation</kwd><kwd>EU</kwd><kwd>Western Balkans</kwd><kwd>Serbia</kwd></kwd-group></article-meta></front><back><ref-list><title>References</title><ref id="cit1"><label>1</label><citation-alternatives><mixed-citation xml:lang="ru">Энтина Е.Г. (2016). Международный контекст Евроинтеграции Западных Балкан. 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