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Aim and Scope

The aim of the Journal is to publish the results of research in the field of political science. The journal is focused on political theory, problems and transformation of political institutions and processes, political ideology as well as public administration. G&P publishes manuscripts of high quality and novelty covering fundamental theoretical and empirical findings in these subject areas. The journal is published in English, insofar as it considers integration of international academic political science community as its strategic purpose; it encourages international academic dialogue among political scientists. Authors from all over the world are invited to publish in the Journal the results of their research. G&P embraces a wide geography of authors and reviewers as well as the members of the Editorial Board.

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Журнал издается на английском языке, преследуя цель интеграции международного академического политологического сообщества и развития научного диалога. Авторы из всех стран мира приглашаются к опубликованию в журнале результатов своих исследований. G&P охватывает широкую географию авторов и рецензентов, а также членов редколлегии.

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Contents

Editor-in-Chief Address.....	7
<i>Henry Sardaryan</i>	

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

An Assessment of Neoliberal Coups: the 1973 Chilean Military Coup and the 1980 Turkish Military Coup.....	8
<i>Nilay Ökten, Meral Balci</i>	

CURRENT DEBATES

Governance, Politics, and Economic Development: Some African Perspectives.....	29
<i>Augustin Kwasi Fosu</i>	

COUNTRY IN FOCUS

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Slovakia: Why Do Results for the First and Later Phases Differ so Much?.....	50
<i>Juraj Nemec</i>	
Russia's Sovereignty and Emergence of Pragmatic Polycentrism	63
<i>Ladislav Zemánek</i>	

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

BRICS in Global Governance: A Gradual but Steady Expansion.....	100
<i>Rajan Kumar, Biju Thomas</i>	
Abstracts in Russian.....	114
Brief Author's Guide	119

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You are holding in your hands the first issue of the “Governance and Politics” academic peer-reviewed journal. The political and philosophical essence of state power and issues of state effectiveness have been substantially debated since the development of various forms of self-organization. Modern world is evolving towards multipolarity, and it is still the work in progress, since a new multipolar

world has to consider civilizational and cultural differences of each society searching for models and ideological foundations of state power that are most consistent with its established axiology and social institutions. Universal solutions and one-size-fits-all approaches are replaced by the analysis of social and cultural cleavages between and within nations. The journal aims to contribute to such efforts and become an international scholarship platform for academic debates and expert knowledge in the realm of public administration, political philosophy, comparative politics and various related fields. We welcome leading scholars from various countries of the world in the Editorial Board and the team of authors who are making this academic venture a reality.

Henry Sardaryan

March 2022

An Assessment of Neoliberal Coups: the 1973 Chilean Military Coup and the 1980 Turkish Military Coup

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Abstract

The article attempts to identify the changes caused by military coups, one of the means of spreading neoliberal ideology, on the political economy of countries and discusses the place of the US hegemony in this context. The influence of armies on the political economy of countries is examined based on the examples of the Chilean military coup of 1973 and the Turkish military coup of 1980, and the place of the army element in the histories of these countries is discussed. Even if a hegemon power has enough economic, military and political power to intervene directly, it can use less costly and more legitimate tools for indirect intervention than a direct one. The policy of instrumentalizing local military forces and exporting neoliberalism to countries, which the US hegemony preferred to apply in the Cold War era and generally in the last quarter of the 20th century, is clearly seen in the examples of Chile and Turkey. Therefore, the main topic of this study is the use of armies as a tool by the neoliberal hegemon USA, and it argues that the military coups of Chile and Turkey were indirect foreign interventions, and that they were the products of the US hegemony as events that served to declare the victory of neoliberalism.

Key words

Neoliberalism, US Hegemony, Chile, Turkey, Military Coups

For citation

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The authors declare the absence of conflict of interest

This study focuses on the method that the US hegemony developed as a means of indirectly intervening in domestic politics by using the military elements of the countries, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly. The US sought to spread neoliberal ideology in new areas by establishing multinational companies and international structures there, and to open new markets to the capitalist economy. The study examines the 1973 Chilean and 1980 Turkish military coups as examples, and determines the place of the armies in the economic-political history of these two countries and the level of domestic politics on democracy and democratic consolidation. The USA sees the bottlenecks, gaps and ineffectiveness of the domestic political structures of the target countries as an opportunity and uses the armies of these countries to strengthen its own hegemony and to ensure the continuation of the international system it has built. In this direction, first of all, the concept of hegemony and the features of the international system and neoliberal ideology established by the US hegemony are introduced, and in the following sections, the place of the army factor in this system is discussed together with the examples of Chile and Turkey. There are noteworthy parallels between the democracy interruption experienced by Chile, a country from the Latin American territory right next to the hegemon, seen as the “backyard” of the USA and exposed to thousands of direct or indirect interventions, and the 1980 coup in Turkey which is located thousands of kilometers away near the lands of the Middle East which the US hegemony has its eye on. It seems quite plausible that Turkey is used to regulate the gap between west and east in a way that serves the interests of the western hegemon. Therefore, the introduction takes a close look at the concept of hegemon and the institutional/structural and ideological basis of US hegemony.

Hegemony is defined by Gramsci as the cultural, moral and ideological leadership of an actor, a group, a subject over other actors. Although the concept of hegemony was previously used by Marxist thinkers to emphasize the political leadership of the working class in a revolution, Gramsci gave a deeper meaning to the concept of hegemony in his Prison Notebooks (Anderson, 1976, p. 15-20). Marxism predicted that socialist revolution was inevitable in capitalist societies. However, at the beginning of the 20th century, such a revolution did not take place in the most developed countries, and on the contrary capitalism strengthened its hand. Gramsci argued that capitalism maintains control

not only through violence and political-economic repression, but also through ideology, and he broadened the concept considerably. According to Gramsci, the bourgeois class has established a hegemonic culture in order to spread its own values and norms, and has created domination to turn this set of values and norms into values for the sake of all humanity. The concept of “good” as understood by all groups has turned into the bourgeoisie’s understanding of “good”, and the concept of “bad” has turned into the bourgeoisie’s understanding of “bad”. Thus, revolts that threatened the status quo became “bad” things. It is necessary to oppose the imposition of the bourgeoisie’s own values on every segment of society as natural and normal values. The working class should not corrupt its own culture, and realize that it cannot achieve political hegemony without establishing its cultural hegemony. Gramsci does not believe that any class can become the dominant power simply by advancing its economic interests, and he also emphasizes that it cannot achieve this dominant position simply by coercion. By establishing intellectual and moral leadership, it must achieve consensus through alliances and thus influence various forces. This consensus will persuade the class that establishes hegemony over the unity of forces to its own social order through institutions, social relations and ideas. (Sassoon, 1991, pp. 230-231). When read in this context, the bourgeoisie protects some of the interests of the lower classes and gets their support, and establishes its hegemony in this consent-coercion relationship.

Throughout history, the hegemonic position was first experienced by the Genoese in the 17th century, by the Netherlands in the 18th century, by England in the 19th century, and finally by the USA in the 20th century. The hegemonic center produces cheaply and, when necessary, protects its profits with coercive force. As Giovanni Arrighi explains, the 20th century was a revolutionary period of integrated world market, new developments in technology and information. However, it is wrong to consider the 1970s as the time of the establishment of the integrated single market; indeed, such an integration among markets was witnessed in the 1870s (Arrighi, March-April 2005). As Hobsbawm argues, the English domestic market provided a foundation for the industrial economy and provided incentives for the improvement of transport, the coal industry, and technological innovation. The Industrial Revolution took place after the 1740s, when local economic growth combined with the expansion of the international

economy (Hobsbawm, 1999, pp. 34-78). Arrighi states that British hegemony was not a global blind market. There was a British hegemony in the European balance of power, British leadership in liberalizing trade and empire building in the non-Western world. However, this golden age of British hegemony was undermined by a serious crisis of deflation in 1873-1896. According to Wallerstein, British hegemony ended in 1873 (Wallerstein, 1974b, p. 411). After this date, while the hegemony of America started to rise, Germany was in a worse situation after its defeat in the First World War. After the Second World War, America reached the level that Britain had reached in the 1800s. Due to the Cold War, the USA could not be included in the Eastern European and Chinese markets. Therefore, it focused on Western Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa (Wallerstein, 1991, p. 28). Since the natural resources of Latin America were no longer in the hands of the British, America turned its eyes to this region for raw material resources.

Since Britain was in debt at the end of World War I, hegemony shifted to the USA. The period of US hegemony was very different from British hegemony. Although the most powerful tool of US hegemony is its military power and it maintains its influence especially in Latin America with the threat of direct intervention, it has been quite successful in intervening with indirect means and using its weight in the international system that it has built. The hegemony of the USA uses many methods such as embargo practices in economic and commercial matters and the implementation of isolation policies by undermining other bilateral relations of the country to which the embargo applies. It changes the economic, political and social structures of countries without opposition through authoritarian rule under army/military regimes. It starts a civil war by supporting local guerrilla elements or conflict groups in many areas such as equipment, education, financing. It changes regimes that it deems "dangerous" by supporting these groups and intervening in governments. It has repeatedly applied these methods, and has made indirect intervention a favorite foreign policy tool, in the belief that indirect intervention will not create opposition in its domestic politics, will not cause social reaction and will be less costly. The military coup in Chile in 1973 and the military coup in Turkey in 1980 are the outcome of the US hegemony's goal of globalizing neoliberal policies, and the next section focuses more closely on examples by examining Chile and the army factor.

US intervention: the 1973 Chilean military coup and the army of neoliberalism

As stated in the introduction, the story of US hegemony's interventionism began many years ago in Latin America and has been experienced more frequently and extensively than anywhere else in the world. It is useful to mention the events in which US intervention in the continent took place using the army factor; the structure of the military coup that Chile experienced in 1973 will be more meaningful in this way. Blockages, conflicts and instability create a very favorable environment for military regimes, and coups are frequently experienced when the legislative-executive organs are locked in function.

Allende in Chile, Belaunde in Peru and Zelaya in Honduras were brought down with a military coup in these unstable environments (Yetiş, 2014, p. 305). In the 20th century, there were five military coups in Argentina, three in Brazil and Chile, nine in Bolivia; between 1968-80, Peru was under a military regime and Paraguay between 1954-93 (Aknur & Durakçay, 2019, p. 70). Although there was no military regime in any country in Latin America in 1990, it was very difficult to maintain limited democracy. In the 21st century, the army still made its presence felt with coups in Venezuela in 2002, Honduras in 2009, Paraguay in 2012, and coup attempts in Bolivia in 2009 and Ecuador in 2010. The army always keeps the threat of a coup fresh and uses this perception to its advantage (Aknur & Durakçay, 2019, pp. 46-47).

When Latin American countries gained their independence in the 19th century, their political structures emerged as oligarchies (Wiarda & Kline, 2007, p. 37). A middle class arose out of tradesmen and small entrepreneurs in the Latin American region, where a commercial dependency was established within the framework of the import of consumer goods and industrial products from North America and Europe. It took a long time for this class to participate in the government of the country and they obtained their voting rights very late. In the 1920s, an inward-looking economic social structure became widespread and workers' rights expanded with military coups, economic bottlenecks and the import substitution industrialization model. Populist workers' parties and coalitions came to power. But these worker-populist governments had an au-

thoritarian tendency towards the landed and property-owning classes and capitalist circles; therefore, there was no movement that provided democratization (Skidmore & Smith, 2005, pp. 43-44).

The import substitution industrialization model eventually created unrest in the political economy and deepened social divisions and inequalities; as a result, in the 1970s, there was a regime change with military coups. In Chile and Brazil, workers' parties were closed down and eliminated with political bans. The political economic structure tended to integrate into the world economy, borrowing from international institutions acquired a chronic structure, and new dependencies emerged through borrowing. The neoliberal free market economy, imposed by the Washington Consensus, emerged in the 1980s as the political economic system that Latin American countries were compelled to follow after borrowing. In order to attract foreign capital within this system, free market conditions had to be provided, and thus the authoritarian oppressive environment had to be abandoned, which led to the emergence of democratization movements. The emergence of the civilian ruling class and efforts to establish democracy were intermittently interrupted by the element of military tutelage in Latin American countries. Latin American democracies, which were very new, naturally fragile and had little confidence due to deepening economic inequality, poverty and corruption, were not consolidated (Skidmore & Smith, 2005, p. 61; Wiarda & Kline, 2007, p. 40). The United States sent a large military force to suppress the military uprising in the Dominican Republic in 1965, after the murder of the fascist dictator Trujillo. Fearing a second Cuban scenario, the USA announced the doctrine that the American nations would never allow this to happen again, and that communism would not be established on the continent (Rabe, 2006, pp. 47-49). The 1960s and 1970s were a time when the military dictatorships of the Latin American countries prevailed, and it was inevitable for the USA to continue its interventionist presence in the region with the influence of these regimes.

The most striking event of this period was the military coup against socialist leader Salvador Allende in 1973. The concerns of the administration of US President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that a socialist regime established in Chile could create a domino effect and influence other countries in the region led the US to carry out a military coup in Chile, which was financed and

directed with a large budget, aiming to weaken and eventually overthrow the Allende government (Lewis, 1975, p. 35; Livingstone, 2009, p. 56; Wise, 1975, p. 181). In this process, the USA gave great support to General Pinochet and Chile, as the country served as an experiment for the formation of a neoliberal state (Harvey, 2007, p. 27). Nicaragua was another scenario that kept the US's fear of communism alive. The overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship with the Sandinista movement in 1979 in the 42nd year of the dictatorship alarmed the USA, and the fact that the FSLN, the Sandinista National Liberation Front, brought the country into a period of radical changes with Marxist reforms as soon as it came to power made the danger of the spread of communism very real for the USA. The US President at the time, Ronald Reagan, planned to suppress the Sandinista regime by choosing indirect means, blaming them for the defeat in Vietnam and other events. For example, the Iranian Revolution and the Nicaraguan Revolution were caused by previous administrations underestimating national security threats, and Reagan saw direct military intervention as political suicide owing to domestic political concerns. The US tried to support the counter-guerrilla movements in the country, i.e. to make a proxy intervention. Accordingly, anti-communist groups were financed, trained and used to overthrow revolutionary regimes (Livingstone, 2009, p. 77). Grenada, which experienced a bloodless revolution with the New Jewel Movement in 1979, paid the price of its new regime with Marxist tendencies, this time with the direct intervention of the USA. Maurice Bishop was overthrown and killed in a coup in 1983, and then the USA landed on the island, justifying this move on the grounds that this would stop the country from falling into the hands of the Soviets, and that order would be maintained.

When we look closely at the military and US relations, it would be quite reasonable to say that the US hegemony carried out a massacre through military coups on Latin American soil; there was no limit to the intervention of the USA using military elements in these lands. In this context, the 1976 Argentine junta is considered the bloodiest in Latin American history. Tens of thousands of workers were massacred in the US and CIA-backed Bolivian junta. In the history of Bolivia, there have been 190 military coups supported by the USA and the CIA since 1825. In Brazil, the US-backed junta of 1964, led to one of the bloodiest periods in the country's history, and the Death Squads, which were established in

partnership with the CIA, massacred thousands of people. In El Salvador, known as the land of murders, thousands of people were killed during the indigenous uprisings, and after 1979 the death squads established by the CIA and the Arena Party killed 70,000 people. In Grenada, the USA overthrew the socialist-oriented government in 1979 and murdered its leaders, and kept the country under occupation until 1985. In Guatemala, the leader of the Arbenz government, which tried to expel US companies from the country and nationalized their assets on its territory, was overthrown by a CIA coup, leading to a period of chaos that lasted for decades. Civil war and death squads killed 100,000 people. The USA, which occupied Haiti in 1915, caused the murder of tens of thousands of people under the juntas it supported in the next period. In Colombia, hundreds of thousands of people were killed by the junta and a series of murders was initiated by the CIA on the demands of United Fruit Company and Standard Oil. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) movement aimed to end the presence of the USA in the country, but the USA called for it to be declared a terrorist organization (Vanden & Prevost, 2002, p. 247). With its direct presence in the suppression of the Mexican Revolution, the US government prevented the country from recovering for many years, with a series of juntas and unstable governments. Nicaragua, which sought independence with the Sandino movement after years of US occupation, was ruled by the US-backed Somoza junta for years, but was overthrown by the 1979 Sandinista movement (Vanden & Prevost, 2002, p. 243). Until 1985, thousands of people were killed by counter-attacks and the entire economy of the country was overturned. Tens of thousands of people were killed in Chile after Dictator Pinochet came to power in 1973 in a CIA coup at the insistence of US multinational companies, and the junta administration ruined the country's economy despite major support from the USA and the IMF. The USA, which was directly involved in the elections in Uruguay with the cooperation of the police and the army, caused the country to experience a series of military dictatorships and massacres from 1964 to 1990 (Yilmaz, 2017, pp. 440-442). In Peru, Panama and other Latin American countries, US interventionism marked the Cold War years and turned the political, economic and social orders of the regional states upside down.

When looking at US-Latin America relations, it should be noted that this is a history of interventionism and control of the Latin American lands. Since

1823, the US has reinforced its role as a hegemon power, exercising interventionist policies in the region from time to time through different tools and changing discourses using every political, economic and social means. It is also tragic that the US justifies this with various manipulations such as the threat of communism, economic instability, drug trafficking, the war on terrorism, and ensuring democracy, so much that the main threat to the region for two centuries has been the US itself.

The 1973 US-backed Chilean military coup needs to be focused on more closely; because of this coup Chile is called the laboratory of neoliberalism. Salvador Allende, who founded the government in Chile in 1970, was a socialist-leaning president who was thought to be uncontrollable by the United States. When the Popular Front (Unidad Popular) coalition, formed by radicals, communists, socialists and left-wing Christian parties, elected Allende as president, the possibility of a second Cuban scenario nearby caused alarm (Debray & Gossens, 1972, p. 48-51).

After a democratic election, Salvador Allende's government embodied its socialist tendencies by making agrarian reform and carrying out expropriation of the copper mines. This caused great concern for the USA, which was quite reckless about exploiting Chile's mines for the USA's own hegemony (Valenzuela, 1995, p. 45-50). These socialist regulations disturbed the economic elite in the country. After Allende came to power, he implemented the program "Chile's Road to Socialism", nationalizing the copper mines in the hands of the USA, putting the banks, health and education systems under state control, and realizing social projects through land reform and redistribution. Real wages increased during Allende's rule, and the wages of blue-collar workers were increased to create a wage equilibrium with white-collar workers; public expenditure also increased (Larrazin & Meller, 1991, pp. 175-180).

The close relations established by the Allende administration with Cuba and the Soviet Union also caused the USA, the exporter of neoliberalism, to feel threatened by communism. In particular, the planned commercial cooperation with the Soviet Union and the investments promised by the Soviets to Chile were a hot topic in the year of the military coup (Mujal-Leon, 1989, p. 357); it was almost obvious that the coup was going to happen, because it was a coup of neoliberalism.

Copper mines were of great importance for the economy of Chile as well as for the USA. Anaconda Copper Mining Co and Kennecott Copper Co companies controlled most of the country's copper mines until the socialist Allende government came to power in 1970. They shared the mines of Chile, from which they had earned 4 billion dollars in 50 years, and operated them in cooperation. Although their investment in the country was not more than 800 million dollars, some of the money were from the country's own resources. Moreover, while earning so much from Chile, they did not spare even one-sixth of its foreign investments to Chile (Galeano, 2020, pp. 189-190). Of course, it was the cheap labor provided by Chilean workers that made production in Chile so profitable. Chilean workers, who worked at only one-eighth of the wages of the US Kennecott refineries, provided these companies with incredible profits (Galeano, 2020, p. 191). The Allende government nationalized the copper mines according to socialist policies, and the USA reacted strongly to this situation. The USA, increasing the flow of training, weapons and money to the Chilean army, used all commercial and diplomatic relations to deepen economic instability and encouraged mass actions by supporting opposition groups and officers who favored a coup in order to sabotage the economic plans of the government (Qureshi, 2009, pp. 85-100).

The socialist government's land reform, nationalization of the mines and the projects of the Allende government to create a fair social income distribution disturbed the landed capital class and US multinational companies that carried the flag of neoliberalism. These two groups tried in every way to sabotage the economy and caused the economy to become unstable with international boycotts. The USA supported these groups and encouraged the opposition group with financial aid (Galeano, 2020, pp. 189-198) and tried every means to undermine the socialist policies of the Allende government; it cut off loans, stopped shipments such as machinery and spare parts, and sabotaged all infrastructure works in industry, agriculture and transportation. Kissinger admits in his memoir, entitled *White House 1968-1973*, that the USA immediately started to prepare a military coup plan against Allende's government. Nixon tried very hard to prevent the Allende government from coming to power and even allocated a budget of 10 million dollars to overthrow Allende (Rojas, 1985, p. 251). Chile's capitalist class boycotted the distribution of food and consumer goods,

and created a black market and long queues so that the government could be blamed for everything. Additionally, these groups stated that national security was under threat from a military coup, that separatist actions should have been prevented, and turmoil should have been suppressed by bringing in soldiers (Rojas, 1985, p. 252).

In 1973, General Augusto Pinochet seized the government in a military coup and suspended constitutional and institutional arrangements by declaring himself the head of state. Allende was killed during the coup, and there was a period of terror in which tens of thousands of people lost their lives; this was primarily because the putschists feared pressure from an opposition organization (Silva, 2002, pp. 454-455). The USA had no hesitation in implementing its neoliberal agenda to the letter, abandoned socialist policies immediately and put the rules of the neoliberal free market economy into play (Ensalaco, 2010, pp. 203-205). All expropriations made were withdrawn. Meanwhile, the United States poured capital into the country and accelerated the transfer of funds in order to keep the economic foundation of the neoliberal ideology solid.

However, the biggest handicap is that the elements such as democracy, democratization, human rights and social stability that neoliberalism claims to support are abandoned in Third World countries, political stability and authoritarian governments are supported through military regimes, and inhumane events are ignored; over time, this situation destroyed the grounds for the legitimacy of US hegemony and caused a great loss of prestige. While neoliberalism constructs a free/liberal game only in the economic field, it provides the political stability required to comply with the rules of this game in an authoritarian, oppressive and non-oppositional manner, and with military regimes whose purpose is only to provide the necessary political stability for the implementation of neoliberal economic policies. Elements such as freedom/free trade, leaving the market to operate of its own accord, privatization, and free entry of foreign investments are the only areas where neoliberal political economy is liberal; in the political arena, all that is needed is stability and a usable administration.

Of course, the people of Chile were the greatest losers in this game, and the supporters of Allende were massacred. Concentration camps were set up in desert lands and Patagonia, and there were horrific human rights violations. Many

Chileans were exiled³ (Dinges, 2005, pp. 160-175). During the 15-year military regime that lasted until 1988, Chile became a region that fully served the neo-liberal political economy of the US hegemony. In this process, the USA declared Chile as its ally in the region, made the country a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and made it fully adapt to neoliberal policies through bilateral trade agreements (Dinges, 2005).

One of the important economic elements of the military regime period was the establishment of a technocrat group called the “Chicago Boys” authorized to carry out neoliberal policies. Minimizing the state in the economic field, establishing an export-oriented free market economy and, of course, attracting multinational companies to invest in the country became the biggest goals of the period. Half of the industrial monopolies nationalized during the Allende period were given back to the old companies and half were sold. The Firestone national tire factory and pulp factory were acquired by Parsons and Whittemore (Galeano, 2020, p. 340). During the military regime, Chile was turned into a laboratory where experiments could be carried out easily and presented to the hegemony of the US, the exporter of neoliberalism.

As a result, in the interests of the US hegemony the 1973 Chilean coup was carried out in order to export neoliberalism by overthrowing a socialist government and its practices, and to construct Chile as a step and example on the way to US global hegemony by transforming the country into a neoliberalism experimental laboratory. It is quite clear that the coup was the result of Chile’s use of its national bourgeoisie initially to exert economic pressure, and later to use its army to bring political stability that could ensure the purely neoliberal order.

A neoliberal coup: the 12 September 1980 military coup

The place of coups in Turkish politics is defined as the product of the internal conflicts of the bourgeois class or the suppression of the working class. While May 27 was a coup to solve the internal problems of the bourgeoisie (Savran, 2016, p. 196), March 12 was the direct transmission of the demands of

³ “It is estimated that at least 200,000 Chileans left the country after the military coup.” (Lievesley & Ludlam, 2012, p. 306)

the capitalist class to the political power or the reaction of the industrial bourgeoisie (Keyder, 1987, p. 51), while September 12 was the counterattack of the capital (Boratav, 2003, p. 148). When we look at the political and economic history of the Republic of Turkey, it is possible to say that there is a history of transitions between the model in which the state is at the center of the economy and the liberal economic model in which the market is decisive. The system was dominated by the statist economy in the 1930s, which as stated in the previous sections originated from a political-economic basis, and this statist approach continued until the years when the struggle between classes changed weight. After the years of the Democrat Party, which tended towards a liberal economic policy, political economy assumed an import-substituting identity under the rule of the statist elite, in which the military coup promoted a policy in their favor. The breaking point of this was undoubtedly the 1980s, marked by the January 24 Decisions, and the political economy of the Republic of Turkey was built on an export-oriented neoliberal approach in which the market is critical.

When we look at the market-centered liberal economy, the role and influence of the state in the economy is reduced to a minimum and the market is the determining actor. It should be said that this political economy model based on the principle of privatization and the self-functioning of the market tends to get ahead of the public debt of the state (Öniş, 1996, p. 164). With the adoption of the free trade principle, the main feature of the liberal market economy is the abandonment of policies protecting the domestic market and the development of an export-oriented approach, as well as efforts to attract foreign investments to the country and the liberalization of the financial sector, and to bring in foreign capital (Öniş, 1996, p. 163).

In the Republic of Turkey, statist economic policies were implemented until the 1980s, a period in which the importance of international free trade was emphasized with the January 24 Decisions (Başkaya, 1986, p. 251). This is a neoliberal economic model, in which the state does not intervene in markets, stays away from production and marketing processes, and adopts the duty of providing the appropriate environment by removing the obstacles faced by the institutional structure (Harvey, 2005, s. 2). This becomes applicable in an environment of political stability, and the economic stabilization package can only be supported by political stability through a military regime.

In the period up to 1980, four development plans were put into effect, but the last one was left unfinished due to the January 24 1980 Decisions and the subsequent military coup. The period from 1961 to 1976 saw a system in which surplus value was developed in favor of industry and on the other hand, domestic terms of trade favored the agricultural sector, and so the agricultural property owners did not lose profits. The proprietary farmer class became rich, and the claims of the Justice Party that it represented farmers created the perception that the farmers were in power. The industrial bourgeoisie also benefited greatly from the planned policies of the period and became rich through the SPO's resource transfer. The increase in real wages increased the purchasing power of the working class, turning it into a class of consumers under domestic market dynamics. However, this situation later became uncomfortable for the employer-capital circles and they required a political move against the legal regulations of the working class such as organizing and union rights; the 1971 Memorandum was also the product of this tension (Bahçe & Eres, 2019, p. 43).

The import substitution industrialization model was blocked due to the internal tension and nature of the capitalist system, so much so that dependency on imports increased at the end of each plan period and current account deficit became chronic. The balance of payments crisis of the late 1960s brought a new devaluation. The oil crisis of the 1970s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the stagnation of the international system made this period more problematic and Turkey's export market shrank. In this period, when dependency on imports already reached its peak, the contraction in exports increased the current account deficit. The need for external resources reached very serious dimensions.

The CHP, located on the left of center, established the 40th government of the Republic of Turkey in 1977 under the leadership of Ecevit. The bourgeoisie started to voice their demands on real wages and prices and expected a response to these demands from the Ecevit government, which came to power with the support of the workers, seen as political suicide by the Ecevit government (cited by Boratav, Bahçe & Eres, 2019, p. 49). The main reason for this is that if the demands of the bourgeoisie are met, the real wages of the working class will decrease, the purchasing power will decrease, and the commodity prices will rise in the market. The Ecevit government, supported by the working class,

could not afford this situation and before the expectations and demands of the working class could be fulfilled, the government resigned. The major problems of the period, such as the doubling of the foreign debt, the currency crisis, and the second oil crisis, were also the subject of great debate among these class conflicts, and both the January 24 Decisions and the military coup showed that these problems were actually imminent (Bahçe & Eres, 2019, p. 50).

The unsustainability of the import substitution industrialization model emerged with many successive crises, and the new liberalism period began in 1980. The January 24 Decisions, as an economic policy program prepared by the SPO and implemented by people who had undergone SPO training, especially Turgut Özal, were also interesting because they were a program prepared by the state's economic control and supervisory body, aiming to minimize the state control. The demands of the capital-owning environment/bourgeoisie were fulfilled with the decisions to devalue, reduce labor costs, abolish the industrialization program, and transfer public resources to capital groups, and the political economic structure ruled in favor of capital (Ekinçi, 1998, p. 7). The Confederation of Employers' Unions said after the 1980 military coup that if the workers had always been the ones to laugh in the past, now it was the employers' turn, also revealing the relationship between the capitalist class and the military/bureaucratic elite. With the 1982 Constitution, the economic policy area seemed to be arranged for a certain group, with issues such as the narrowing of workers' rights, the limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms, and the prohibition of politics/apoliticization. This statist industrialization and labor promotion environment, which was ensured by the 1961 Constitution in terms of workers' rights and union rights, changed in the 1980s. The 1982 Constitution, in which rights were limited, changed the status of workers and became very restrictive in terms of collective bargaining, strike and union rights. This provided the government with greater legal regulations over the unions, and strengthened supervisory mechanisms.

It is important to examine the structure and political position of the economic elite class in Turkey. While state support was important when the national economy was maturing, and capital owners were formally organized under the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB) organization in 1971, with the establishment of the Turkish Industry and Business Associa-

tion (TÜSİAD), the balance between the capital groups changed (Alkan, 1998, p. 45). In the private sector, which develops in a state-dependent manner, with the formation of the bourgeois class, and industrialization as the main actor of the state, state-capital group relations have a structure in which the state has a dominant role. The capital group tries to reduce its dependence on the state by promoting economic development through means such as external financial links and foreign partnerships. This situation causes the capitalist circles to tend to minimize the state over time and to separate themselves from the state in terms of running an autonomous agenda. These circles believe that role of the state should be reduced to providing the necessary institutional order for a stable market (Öniş & Türem, 2001, p. 97). TÜSİAD was established in this direction with the aim of creating the agenda of the capitalist circles, which was developed with the encouragement and support of the state, to protect class interests.

As stated above, it should be said that the main purpose of these capital groups is their emphasis and sensitivity towards ensuring political stability in order to stabilize the market. In this direction, in the 1970s, when the import substitution economic approach was adopted, and in the 1980s, when the liberal free market economy was adopted, its basic discourse was based on the need to provide an environment of stability. While defying political authority in situations that would conflict with its class interests, it also followed an approach that supported the interventionist and authoritarian identity of the state against movements aimed at disrupting the status quo (Öniş & Türem, 2001, p. 98).

To summarize, as factors such as the 1974 Cyprus Operation and the oil crisis negatively affected the domestic market, the import substitution industrialization model rapidly made the transition to the neoliberal market. Export-oriented reforms, plans aimed at attracting foreign capital, and prioritizing reducing inflation rates came to the fore. The January 24 Decisions were declared as a rescuing stabilization package that also offered the IMF's support in order to implement this agenda (Aren, 1986, p. 24; Kazgan, 2009, p. 121). The January 24 Decisions, which announced the liberalization of foreign exchange markets, trade liberalization, abandonment of price controls and abandonment of statism (Aren, 1986, p. 31), aimed at an open economy, but they opened the door to a period in which the country fell into the grip of foreign borrowing and financial dependence. This period, in which the public and private sectors grew

with foreign borrowing, saw budget deficits increase (Eğilmez, 2019, p. 152). Within the scope of the stabilization program, devaluation was made, freedom in exports was introduced, incentives such as tax reductions were applied to exporters, namely the capitalist class, support for agriculture was reduced, and the prices of consumer goods were increased. It enabled large capital groups to strengthen their hand to protect their class interests through suppressing political power by swallowing small capital (Keyder, 1983, p. 1072). As a matter of fact, the implementation of the January 24 Decisions by the military regime with the 1980 coup serves as an important indicator when analyzing the relations between the capital class-military, and the capital class-state.

In this context, September 12 can be read as a military/bureaucrat movement that instrumentalized the coup in order to keep economic resources and political power under the control of the elitist capital environment. It is important to look at the military's impact on Turkey's political economy, because the coup of 12 September 1980 was a coup of neoliberalism, in which the military element was used to ensure the political stability necessary for the implementation of the January 24 neoliberal decisions. Under the military coup, the political pillar of the January 24 stability program gained a mechanism that could be easily moved (Gülalp, 1993, p. 41). Therefore, it would be reasonable to emphasize the tension inherent in the liberties of neoliberalism that turn a blind eye to authoritarian regimes and often work with them together in secret. The January 24 Decisions were not important because they announced an environment of political stability, but because political stability was achieved through military intervention in order to implement these decisions. As a matter of fact, the decisions were implemented within the scope of the authoritarian nature of the military regime and a revolutionary movement was created in economic policies. This is why the capitalist class, especially TÜSİAD, supported the coup regime in order to protect their interests in capital accumulation. It is possible to say that the capitalist class, which supports and demands the abolition of the provisions of labor rights laws, union rights, and social rights of the Constitution, does not have a concern for democracy, but only for capital accumulation, and for this reason, it is possible to say that there is no problem in the regime being authoritarian or militarized. For this reason, September 12 is read as a political move that takes into account the economic concerns and interests of the bourgeoisie.

Conclusion

This study focuses on the 1973 Chile and 1980 Turkey military coups to investigate neoliberal coups and identifies the expansionism of neoliberalism through the military element. It examines the place of the armies in the political economic history of these two countries and the level of domestic politics in democracy and democratic consolidation, and reveals the fact that US sees the bottlenecks, gaps and inoperability of the domestic political structures as an opportunity, and uses the armies of the countries to strengthen their own hegemony and to ensure the continuation of the international system it has built. There are noteworthy parallels between the democracy interruption experienced by Chile, a country from the Latin American territory right next to the hegemon, seen as the “backyard” of the USA and exposed to thousands of direct or indirect interventions, and the 1980 coup in Turkey, which is located thousands of kilometers away, near the lands of the Middle East which the US hegemony has its eye on. It seems quite plausible that Turkey may be used to regulate the gap between west and east in a way that serves the interests of the western hegemon. The policy of instrumentalizing local military forces and exporting neoliberalism to countries, which the US hegemony preferred to apply in the Cold War era and generally in the last quarter of the 20th century, is clearly seen in the examples of Chile and Turkey. Therefore, the main problem of this study is the use of armies as a tool by the neoliberal hegemon of the USA, and it argues that the military coups of Chile and Turkey are an indirect foreign intervention, and that they are the products of the US hegemony as events that serve to declare the victory of neoliberalism.

Considering the political economy experience of both countries, it is seen that the economy had an import substitution/statist approach before the coup. While the Allende government in Chile implemented this in the context of a more advanced socialist policy, in the case of Turkey, there was a system in which statist principles were adopted but capital groups were not excluded. However, the striking factor in both examples is the social classes that intersect at a point when they both disturb these groups and make them stronger. In both the Chilean political economy and Turkish political economy, it is seen that workers’

rights and the rights of farmers who make a living from agriculture have been relatively strengthened, and public expenditures, social policies and real wages have been improved. On the other hand, in both examples, capital groups were disturbed by these practices due to the transfer of public resources to social policies, and the receipt of capital from the private sector through State Economic Enterprises and nationalized resources. The fact is that the state control in the market was quite high and foreign capital could not enter the market for this reason, and they were not satisfied with the economic policies, and demanded changes. Another point where the examples of Chile and Turkey intersect is the military regime as a tool to implement the neoliberal free market economy and make this agenda a state policy. Both coups were carried out by ensuring the political stability of an authoritarian oppressive regime with the aim of implementing a neoliberal agenda, and this neoliberal agenda was implemented to the letter throughout the military rule. Therefore, the 1973 Chilean military coup and the 1980 Turkish military coup, which have many political, economic and social aspects in common, went down in history as coups of neoliberalism.

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Governance, Politics, and Economic Development: Some African Perspectives

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Abstract

The article documents the evolution of governance measures in Africa during post-independence: economic freedom, electoral competitiveness, political rights and civil liberties, executive constraint, and polity2. It examines their implications for economic development, considers political instability (PI) in the form of coups d'état and civil wars on the premise that PI results from poor governance. In addition, the article sheds light on the links between the more recent measures of governance – the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) – and economic development outcomes among African countries. The article concludes by paying special attention to potential governance/institutional instruments that might reflect "good governance", and highlights the implicit risks faced by African countries in their efforts to sustain the continent's recent economic gains within the current political economy framework.

Key words

Governance, Africa, Economic Development, Economic Freedom, Electoral Competitiveness, Political Rights, Polity

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The importance of *governance* for growth and development in Africa has increasingly gained attention since the generally dismal economic performance of African countries during the “lost decade” of the 1980’s and early 1990’s. The suspicion that governance may have been a major culprit behind this performance came to light in the late 1970’s when African economies began to suffer major setbacks during post-independence.²

A 1981 study commissioned by the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs), the “Berg Report” (Berg, 1981), flagged weak governance as perhaps the main culprit responsible for Africa’s dismal economic performance. The report proposed that “economic governance” should be improved significantly.

However, effective economic governance required support by the political system. Many African countries therefore undertook reforms, partially in support of economic governance, but also in response to donors’ demands for such reforms in exchange for external aid.

These political-governance reforms were primarily democratic in nature, and were highlighted as the key to economic growth in the study by the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) “Explaining African Economic Growth” (the Growth Project; see: Ndulu et al., 2008a, 2008b).³ This project concluded that poor governance had spawned growth-inhibiting “policy syndromes”, which led to the dismal growth record of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA).⁴ Conversely, improved governance resulted in greater prevalence of growth-enhancing “syndrome-free” regimes (Ndulu et al., 2008a, 2008b). Furthermore, in a more recent study of country cases globally (Fosu, 2013d), “good governance” was identified as a key strategy for achieving economic successes in the developing world. Indeed, for African countries, the study finds that democratic governance has been critical in promoting growth, as in the cases of Botswana, Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa.

In the article I define the terms “governance” and “economic development”. Based on the extant literature, the research documents the evolution of several governance measures in Africa during post-independence, and draws out their

² This period is often approximated as post-1960.

³ The Growth Project was conducted over 1998-2004 and resulted in the two volumes, Ndulu et al (2008a, 2008b).

⁴ In the article, “sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)” is used synonymously with “Africa”.

implications for economic development outcomes.⁵ In addition, I shed some light on the association between the more recent measures of governance – the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) – and economic development outcomes among the African countries. The article concludes with an emphasis on the critical role of governance, paying attention to a governance/institutional instrument that may reflect “good governance”, and highlighting the implicit risks faced by African countries in their efforts to sustain the continent’s recent economic gains within the current political-economy framework.

What are “governance” and “economic development”?

The World Bank WGI project defines “governance” as the “*traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised*” (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 3). By this definition, governance could be viewed as encompassing institutions, but with reference to authority.⁶ In this regard, therefore, one might further dichotomize the nature of “authority” as economic and political, resulting in “economic governance” and “political governance”, respectively. Further, the type of governance that influences “economic development” (ED) may be termed as “developmental governance” (DG), with ED defined as an increase in the material well-being of a society. The ED definition is synonymous with improvements in “human development” or “economic welfare”. Various measures include: rise in per capita income or in the human development index (HDI), reduction in poverty, and attenuation of extreme inequality.⁷

According to Alence (2004), DG would comprise: “economic policy coherence (free-market policies), public-service effectiveness, and limited corruption”. More broadly, DG should entail six WGI components: government

⁵ Aron (2000) tackles this issue of growth and governance/institutions in some detail, reviewing a number of studies on the subject. That work is rather outdated, however, for it does not shed light on more recent improved performance of African economies, which is an important focus of the present paper.

⁶ It is often difficult to delineate between “institutions” and “governance”. Following North (1990), for instance, while institutions are the “rules of the game”, governance refers to the setup that carries out these rules. However, “governance” is often used rather loosely in the literature, and also in the present writing, to actually refer to the exercise of the rules, rather than to the structure of organizations per se. I sometimes employ “governance” and “institutions” interchangeably here in the present writing.

⁷ As is well understood in the literature, economic growth is not necessarily translated into ED. For example, inequality plays a critical role in transforming growth into poverty reduction (see for instance: Adams, 2004; Bourguignon, 2003; Fosu, 2008b, 2009, 2010a, 2011, 2015a, 2017, 2018c; Kalwij & Verschoor, 2007; Ravallion, 1997, 2001; Thorbecke, 2013).

effectiveness, control of corruption, regulatory quality, the rule of law, political stability, and voice and accountability. These variables are closely related to institutional quality (IQ), including those defining the economic and political spaces: economic and political governance, respectively. The importance of such measures derives from the fact that they affect the incentives for generating desirable economic outcomes (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2008).⁸

According to the above definition, governance might be formal or traditional. The former could be viewed as the one defined under the modern state, while the latter governs interactions based on tradition. These two types of governance may be contradictory or complementary. For example, certain traditional settings might find gift-giving in exchange for a favor to be normal, which can indeed violate the rules governing public provision in a modern environment that is required to limit corruption. In addition, traditional authority emanating from a chieftaincy system of government may deviate from that in a democratic framework where the electorate is the presumed authority based on the electoral process. Yet both the traditional and modern may view political stability and government effectiveness as desirable tenets.

Since the modern African state usually constitutes a set of ethnic groups which are likely to have disparate norms, the governance outcomes should be reflective of the interactions between the traditional and the modern norms of operation. In this article, I focus on the latter, but it must be kept in view that the governance outcomes as measured by the WGI would often reflect interactions between these two forms. The basic question is: what types of governance are likely to generate optimal developmental outcomes? To answer this question, I attempt to identify various measures of governance that are considered in the literature as positively influencing growth and development, particularly in Africa, and to document the extent to which inter-temporal changes of these measures in Africa might be consistent with the observed economic development outcomes. Furthermore, I cite evidence from extant studies involving possible association between the WGI measures and economic development outcomes.

⁸ Obviously, economic outcomes may also influence governance (Lipset, 1959), although the latter tends to change relatively slowly. Furthermore, Bates et al. (2013) find unidirectional causality from governance to economic growth in Africa, though bidirectional causation for their global sample.

Measures of Governance and Implications for Economic Development Outcomes

I present in this section some evidence on the evolution of different types of governance during Africa's post-independence, as well as their implications for economic development. The typology of governance comprises the economic one, as represented by "economic freedom", and the political one, measured by electoral competitiveness, constraint on the government executive, and polity2. The evidence on the role of political instability as an indicator of institutional/governance quality is also assessed.

I focus on governance measures for which there are available data spanning the period that includes the 1970's, as well as the more recent period beginning in the mid-1990's when Africa as a whole has undergone reforms and has been performing relatively well economically. Thus, I am able to distinguish the role of governance between two sub-periods: pre- and post-reform.

As the WGI database begins in the mid-1990's, I am unable to provide evidence for these governance measures for the prior period. However, I shed light on their role during the latter period based on data from World Bank.⁹

I further review in this section the implications of political instability (PI) as an indicator of governance for Africa's economic development. PI, which involves both elite PI in the form of coups d'état and civil wars, has been a key feature of the African environment during post-independence.

Economic Governance

Economic Freedom. As a measure of economic governance, economic freedom (EF) comprises indicators of the size of government (expenditures, taxes and enterprises), legal structure and security of property rights, access to sound money, freedom to exchange with foreigners, and regulation of credit, labor, and business. EF has improved appreciably in SSA, similarly to that of the world (Figure 1). From a value of 4.4 in 1980, it increased to 6.2 in 2015 (range: 0-10).¹⁰


⁹ World Bank (2018). World Governance Indicators, Washington, DC: World Bank.

¹⁰ There also appears to be a slight convergence with the world, especially within the last decade.

The steady increases began in the mid-1980's and accelerated in the 1990's. There also appears to be a narrowing gap with the world.

Higher levels of EF tend to yield larger economic growth (de Haan & Sturm, 2000). Furthermore, EF may offer direct utility to individuals, as they enjoy the freedom to exchange (Friedman, 1962; Sen, 1999). According to Friedman (1962), moreover, EF is a precursor to political freedom, which in turn yields further utility to individuals (Sen, 1999). Thus, the upward trend of EF in Africa should presage improved economic welfare.

Figure 1. Economic Freedom, Africa vs World, 1970-2015 [0-10]



Source: Gwartney et al., 2017.


Political Governance

This section sheds light on the evolution of (democratic) governance in post-independence Africa. The following indexes are discussed: (1) electoral competitiveness; (2) political rights and civil liberties; (3) constraint on the executive branch of government; and (4) polity2, which reflects the degree of democracy vs autocracy. In addition, political instability is analyzed as a key element of the African environment, on the premise that it is an outcome of weak governance.

Electoral Competitiveness. The index of electoral competitiveness (IEC), computed as the first principal component of the executive index of electoral competitiveness (EIEC) and legislative index of electoral competitiveness (LIEC), has risen markedly (Figure 2), from 3.3 in 1980 to 6.1 by 2015

(range: 1-7).¹¹ Indeed, SSA's IEC gap with the world has virtually closed, decreasing from as much as 2.2 in 1990 to 0.1 by 2015.

**Figure 2. Index of Electoral Competitiveness (IEC) [1-7],
Africa vs World (1975-2015)**



Source: Database of Political Institutions. Washington, DC: World Bank

Note: IEC is the first principal component of the legislative index of electoral competitiveness (LIEC) and executive index of electoral competitiveness (EIEC), with respective weights of 0.51 and 0.49 and explaining over 90 percent of the variance (Fosu, 2008a).

At a sufficiently high level of IEC, African countries, on average, could be characterized as having achieved growth-enhancing “advanced-level democracy” (ALD)¹² (Fosu, 2008a). Figure 2 shows that IEC rose in the early 1990’s, from a value of 3.5 in 1990 to 4.6 by 1993. This value just exceeds the threshold of 4.4 required for attaining ALD in Africa (Fosu, 2008a). It is noteworthy that the period coincides with that for Africa’s growth and development resurgence.¹³

Furthermore, based on sufficiently high levels of EIEC (6 or 7), Bates et al. (2013) present causal evidence in support of the hypothesis that improved political governance has enhanced economic outcomes at both the macro- and micro-levels in Africa. At the macro level, the authors observe that political reform Granger-caused per capita GDP growth. They further present micro-level

¹¹ The first principal component has the respective weights of 0.49 and 0.51 for EIEC and LIEC, and explains over 90 percent of the variance (Fosu, 2008a).


¹² Fosu (2008a) estimates the threshold for this regime as the level of the index of electoral competitiveness in excess of 4.4 (0.0–7.0 range).

¹³ Indeed, the threshold occurred in approximately 1993, when not only did the African growth resurgence actually begin but also when the poverty rate began to fall (see: Fosu, 2021).

evidence showing that greater democratic dispensation at the national level has served to raise total factor productivity (TFP) in agriculture. In addition, the fact “that Africa’s electorate is largely rural further suggests that the movement to majoritarian institutions has served to attenuate the ‘Batesian’ urban-bias policies of the past where governments pursued policies favoring (urban) consumers at the expense of the (rural) producers of agricultural products (Bates, 1981).” (Fosu, 2013c, p. 492) These results are, therefore, consistent with the New Institutional Economics (NIE), extolling the virtues of governance/institutions.

Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Additional measures of democratic governance are political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL): they range from 1 to 7. In the original Freedom House source, a higher value of an index indicates less democracy; however, for ease of interpretation, I have reversed these values, using the transformation $[8-x]$, where x is the original index, so that a higher value of the index indicates a greater level of democracy. These measures are graphed in Figure 3a for 1973-2016, for which data was available.

Figure 3a. Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL), SSA, 1973-2016




Source: Freedom House (2018), with the range of 1 to 7.

Note: In the original Freedom House source, a higher value of an index demonstrates less democracy. For ease of interpretation, however, these numbers have been reversed, using the transformation $[8-x]$, where x is the original index; thus a higher value of this transformed index shows a greater level of democracy.

As apparent in Figure 3a, PR and CL co-move closely over time, with PR slightly lower than CL generally. Both indices rose steadily, as of the late 1980's, consistent with the above observation for IEC.

Figure 3b. Combined Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL), SSA vs World, 1973-2016



Note: Following Fosu (2011), combined political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL) are the first principal component of the two variables, with the respective PR and CL weights of 0.725 and 0.275. The range is (1-7), with higher values signifying greater levels of democracy; for further details, see the note accompanying Figure 3a.


As measures of democracy, PR and CL have also been observed to exhibit U-shaped relationships with economic growth, similarly to the case of electoral competitiveness (Fosu, 2011). That is, democratization at low levels (“intermediate level-democracy”) tends to be growth-inhibiting, while at a sufficiently high level of democracy (“advanced-level democracy”), it is growth-enhancing. The threshold was in 1991 for the combined PR and CL index. These results are very similar to those based on the IEC indicators, where the threshold was generally met by 1993.¹⁴

In effect, the African evidence suggests that it is only when the level is sufficiently high that one could expect democracy to lead to greater growth, which could in turn be translated into a higher level of economic development. Remarkably, this result holds whether the measure of democracy is EIEC, LIEC, IEC, PR, CL or PR&CL.

¹⁴ For details, see: Fosu (2021).

Executive Constraint. Similarly, the degree of constraint on the executive branch of government (XCONST)¹⁵ has risen steadily in recent years in Africa (Figure 4). XCONST began to accelerate around 1990. The SSA gap with the world was widest in 1989, but narrowed markedly by 2000. Africa has therefore made considerable progress on executive constraint since about 1990, consistent with the period of growth resurgence and poverty reduction. Nonetheless, the gap is currently about the same as that in the 1960s.

Figure 4. Executive Constraint (XCONST) [1-7], Africa vs World (1960-2016)



Source: Polity IV Project: Polity IV Project (2016), *Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions*. URL: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>


Note: XCONST is a measure of the constraint on the executive of government

However, what is the importance of XCONST in the growth and development process? Alence (2004), for instance, argues that democratic institutions in Africa greatly improve “developmental governance”: economic policy coherence (free-market policies), public-service effectiveness, and limited corruption. The author also observes that while “restricted political contestation” (with limited executive constraints) has little direct impact on developmental governance, executive restraints improve developmental governance even if there is little political contestation (Fosu, 2010d, p. 68).

¹⁵ XCONST measures the degree of constraint on the executive branch of government, and it takes on values of 0-7, where 7 is for “strict rules for governance”, 1 means “no one regulates the authority”, 0 signifies “perfect incoherence”, etc. (for details, see: Fosu, 2013b).

Moreover, XCONST can accentuate the prevalence of a “syndrome-free” (SF) regime,¹⁶ independently or by mitigating the potentially pernicious effect of ethnicity (Fosu, 2013b). In turn, SF has been observed to be necessary for sustaining growth and constitutes “virtually a sufficient condition for avoiding short-run growth collapses” (Fosu and O’Connell, 2006, p. 31; see also: Collier & O’Connell, 2008). Furthermore, growth collapses have historically reduced Africa’s annual per-capita GDP growth by about 1.0 percentage point (Arbache & Page, 2007). This estimate is twice the average per capita growth rate of 0.5 percent for African economies during 1960-2000 and equals the growth gap with the rest of the world (Fosu, 2010d). Avoiding growth collapses is therefore, crucial. Thus, attaining high levels of XCONST is critical for African countries, for it might promote developmental governance, accentuate the prevalence of SF regimes, and provide an antidote for preventing growth collapses.

Figure 5. Polity2 Score, Average SSA, 1960-2016



Source: Polity IV (Polity IV Project 2016), *Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions*. URL: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm>

Note: Polity2 score ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic)

Polity2. Polity2 represents another indicator of democracy. Its scores of -10 and +10 represent complete autocracy and complete democracy, respectively. For Africa, the polity score trended downward from its value of about -4

¹⁶ “Syndrome-free” regime means a “combination of political stability with reasonably market-friendly policies” (Fosu & O’Connell, 2006, p. 54).

to nearly -6 by 1989, indicating increasing autocratic nature of African governments during this period. However, the score rose substantially thereafter, reaching well above zero in the 2000's; by 2016, it was nearly +4.0. As the case with the other governance indicators presented above, the rise in this index also precedes Africa's resurgence in economic growth and development.

McMillan and Harttgen (2014) observe that this indicator of political governance appears to have promoted structural change in Africa since 2000, by reducing the share of employment in the relatively low-productivity agricultural sector. The result may occur directly, or via interaction with price changes.

Political Instability. Political instability (PI) – including military coups and civil wars – is likely to reflect poor governance quality, with implications for economic development outcomes. Employing Knack and Keefer's (1995) measure of "good governance" (GG) – (a) freedom from government repudiation of contracts, (b) freedom from expropriation, (c) rule of law and (d) bureaucratic quality – Easterly (2001), for example, finds that GG is capable of attenuating ethnic conflicts.

Meanwhile, civil wars in Africa have been observed to be growth-inhibiting (Collier, 1999; Gyimah-Brempong & Corley, 2005). Collier (1999) estimates that the incidence of a civil war could reduce annual per capita growth by as much as two percentage points. A similar estimate is obtained by Fosu and O'Connell (2006) for "state breakdown" (civil war or severe political instability). Furthermore, the incidence of elite PI, involving military coups, has been deleterious to growth in SSA (Fosu, 1992, 2001, 2002a, 2003). PI could also reduce the rate at which growth is translated into human development in Africa (Fosu, 2002b, 2004).


Fortunately, the prevalence of PI in its various forms seems to be declining in Africa. For instance, the frequency of civil wars fell from as high as 18 in 1991 to 8 in 2008 (Figure 6). Similarly, the incidence of military coups shows a downward trend from the early 1990's (Figure 7). Such attenuations in PI might therefore have contributed to the observed improvements in economic and development outcomes on the continent since the mid-1990's.

Figure 6. Incidence of Armed Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-2008



Source: Strauss (2012)

Figure 7. Frequency of Elite PI in Africa - Coups d'état, SSA, 1960-2016



Source: This was computed using data from Centre for Systemic Peace (CSP), 2016 (Centre for Systemic Peace (2016), Coups d'Etat, 1946-2016: URL: <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html>)

Note: "Total coups" equals the sum of the frequencies of "successful" and "failed" coups d'état that occurred in the year of record

The Worldwide Governance Indicators

The literature on the importance of recent governance measures produced by the World Bank, WGI, for growth and development is not vast. Nonetheless, the paltry extant evidence points to favorable impacts of these indicators. For example, Fayissa and Nsiah (2013) find that the governance measures exert positive effects on economic growth in the African countries. Using a global sample of developing countries, Tebaldi and Mohan (2010) also observe that the measures tend to reduce poverty, while another argues that the poverty reduction is the result of increasing income rather than improvement in income distribution (Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017). Similarly, Han et al. (2015, p. 1) find, based on these governance indicators and a global sample, that “good governance is associated with both a higher level of per capita GDP as well as higher rates of GDP growth over time.”


While they do not help us explain the historical performance of the African countries on the aggregate, given their limited temporal coverage (1996-present), these measures can nevertheless be useful in accounting for some of the variation in economic performance, particularly among the African states since the mid-1990s, corresponding to the period of resurgence in their growth and development.

Using zero-order correlation coefficients, Fosu (2019) finds, among the six WGI measures, that Government Effectiveness (GE) is the most highly associated with both per capita GDP growth and poverty reduction. This result is further corroborated using an updated global sample (see: Fosu & Gafa, 2022). Thus, I present in Figures 8a and 8b the evolution of GE in SSA as a whole, and it is also compared with other regions globally.

As apparent from Figure 8a, SSA's GE is much lower than the global average (zero scale). Furthermore, it declined appreciably from 1996 to 2014 by some 14%, before rising slightly (4%) between 2014 and 2020. Compared with other regions, SSA's GE is by far the lowest, followed by South Asia (SA), Middle East and North Africa (MENA), East Asia and Pacific (EAP) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), with Europe and Central Asia (ECA) exhibiting by far the highest GE values. Interestingly, while ECA's performance has remained stably high, EAP's GE has improved since about 2013, LAC's GE has worsened during the same period, and MENA's GE began deteriorating even earlier, from about

2010. How these inter-regional disparities might be specifically translated into inter-regional differences in economic outcomes remains to be explored in future studies.


Figure 8a. Government effectiveness, SSA average (1996-2020)



Source: World Development Indicators Online, Washington DC: World Bank

Note: The indicator ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with the lowest representing the worst performance, where 0 is the world average

Figure 8b. Government effectiveness across regions, Average (1996-2020)



Source: World Development Indicators Online, Washington DC: World Bank

Note: The indicator ranges from -2.5 to 2.5, with the lowest representing the worst performance, where 0 is the world average. EAP = East Asia and Pacific, ECA= Europe and Central Asia, SA= South Asia, LAC= Latin America and Caribbean, MENA= Middle East and North Africa, SSA= Sub-Saharan Africa

Conclusion

The account presented in the foregoing sections suggests that governance, as measured by economic freedom, electoral competitiveness, political rights and civil liberties, as well as political stability, has improved generally in Africa, especially since the late 1980's. Further, improvements in these governance measures tend to enhance economic development outcomes, consistent with the observed post-mid-1990's growth resurgence and accompanying economic development in Africa.

Nonetheless, Rodrik (2018) calls into question the "African growth miracle" (Young, 2012), attributing the recent African economic progress primarily to the favorable external environment: high commodity prices and low interest rates in the 2000's. Therefore, Rodrik argues, reversals of these external variables may render the gains episodic.

Under the new institutional economics framework, however, institutions are primary (Rodrik et al., 2004; see also: Haggard et al., 2008). If so, then pessimism about growth sustainability might also be premature, provided that institutions, and therefore governance, are sufficiently strong (Fosu, 2018b). Indeed, the recent relative resiliency of African economies to shocks is attributed to institutional/governance improvements (Fosu, 2013a). Therefore, institutional/governance fortification is *sine qua non*.

Unfortunately, political considerations render such institutional strengthening challenging. Under the current democratic framework adopted by many African countries, democratically elected governments are unlikely to undertake certain growth-enhancing policies that may be unpopular with the electorate, and would show a propensity to spend more and tax less, resulting in unsustainable fiscal deficits (Bates, 2006). These imbalances are likely to be exacerbated by the tendency for the central government to more or less freely supply local public goods in order to win elections, resulting in "politico-economic disequilibrium" (Fosu, 2018a). Without effective decentralization that allows localities to attain significant revenue autonomy and constrains their demand for local public goods, however, such fiscal imbalances might result in debt burdens

that could prove harmful not only for growth (see Fosu, 1996, 1999), but also for social-sector resource allocation (Fosu, 2007, 2008c, 2010e).

Furthermore, consistent with Kimenyi (2006), “the existence of ethnically based interest groups is likely to result in sub-optimal provision of public goods” (Fosu et al., 2006). Indeed, there is a school of thought that ethnicity has been a major culprit for the dismal growth performance in African countries (Easterly and Levine, 1997), suggesting that one must pay attention to the nature of multiparty democracy being adopted in many African countries.

As discussed above, “good governance” – (a) freedom from government repudiation of contracts, (b) freedom from expropriation, (c) rule of law and (d) bureaucratic quality – is capable of resolving ethnic conflicts (Easterly, 2001). For Africa, this is critical, given its very high ethnolinguistic characteristic. In addition, government effectiveness has been flagged as a key governance variable for enhancing growth and reducing poverty. How is “good governance” attained, though?

Fortunately, through its ability to attenuate the prevalence of policy syndromes, executive constraint (XCONST) may provide an important policy instrument for mitigating the potentially deleterious impact of ethnicity within the African setting. XCONST is a relatively achievable policy mechanism, as compared with the above highly comprehensive weighted governance variables. Furthermore, XCONST is positively and significantly associated with all the six WGI measures for Africa. In particular, its zero-order correlation coefficient with Government Effectiveness (t-value in parentheses) is 0.414 (13.30), which is thus highly significant with a p-value of 0.000.¹⁷ A similar finding holds globally as well.¹⁸ Thus, XCONST represents a potentially potent policy instrument for achieving “good governance”.

Meanwhile, the “politico-economic disequilibrium” with the implied mismanagement of the economy,¹⁹ coupled with possible political disorder that

¹⁷ The African sample comprises 47 countries in 2018, the latest year for which data for both XCONST and WGI were available.

¹⁸ The correlation coefficient in a global sample – 170 countries, including both developed and developing countries – is computed similarly (t ratio in parentheses) as: 0.514 (33.00), and with p=0.000.

¹⁹ Bates (2008a, p. 387) argues that the recent political reforms in Africa may have actually resulted in macroeconomic mismanagement, as “governments in competitive systems tend to spend more, to borrow more, to print money, and to postpone needed revaluations of their currencies than do those not facing political competition.” See also Humphreys and Bates (2002).

tends to initially accompany the adoption of multiparty democracy (Bates, 2008b), may pose a risk for growth sustainability (Fosu, 2018a). As already observed, however, for long-term growth and development, “advanced-level” democracy is required, which implies that democratic consolidation must be earnestly pursued in Africa.

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The COVID-19 Pandemic and Slovakia: Why Do Results for the First and Later Phases Differ so Much?

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Abstract

Slovakia, a small country in Central Europe, was among the most successful countries in combatting COVID-19 during the first phase of the pandemic in the spring of 2020. However, it appeared to be among the least successful states in later COVID-19 phases. The aim of the article is to highlight the specifics of the Slovak COVID-19 case. Why did Slovakia handle the COVID-19 outbreak effectively in the initial phase, and why did it fail later? The positive anti-epidemic results in the first phase were determined by effective government policies (realized during a time of government change) and catalyzed by the high level of compliance demonstrated by citizens. The failures Slovakia faced later are connected with the limited long-term politico-administrative capacity of the state, and politicization of the pandemic that resulted in social non-compliance. Short term success was possible with the mobilization of all actors, but long term success in this country seems to be "mission impossible".

Key words

governance, COVID-19, pandemic, Slovakia, public policy, social policy, health sector

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The COVID-19 pandemic has caused more than three hundred million cases of contamination and millions of deaths worldwide. During this tough time, government approaches and capacities to tackle the pandemic and its socio-economic consequences have varied significantly between countries. Additionally, the differences in COVID-19-connected mortality and morbidity are quite striking.

Given the massive impact of COVID-19, the number of publications relating to the COVID-19 pandemic is no doubt growing exponentially. Many studies try to explain the varying (temporary) success rates of anti-pandemic policies implemented by national governments (national morbidity and mortality ratios), mostly in separate case studies. These studies propose different core factors determining a state's success or failure in fighting the pandemic. Christensen and Læg Reid (2020) argue that a collaborative decision-making style with the involvement and participation of stakeholders is crucial, as well as cooperation between governmental actors and citizens. Some other papers stress the opposite, arguing that a centralized top-down approach limiting certain democratic rights of citizens was the key success factor in Asia (Ang, 2020). Bouckaert et al. (2020) mention the importance of contingencies, national administrative standard operating procedures in preparation for crisis situations, dynamic learning, fast feedback and accountability mechanisms. As for public policy-related factors influencing the extent of the spread of the pandemic we may mention, for example, Liu and Saltman (2020) who propose that timing and compliance are core factors determining the severity of the epidemic situation. Hale et al. (2020) mapped government responses to COVID-19 across countries and time, and revealed that timing and scale of measures appeared to be critical. Concerning the required scale and scope of preventive measures, Nicola et al. (2020) propose the following: case isolation at home, voluntary home quarantine, social distancing and closure of schools and universities. Nussbaumer-Streit et al. (2020) analyzed and confirmed the effects of quarantine measures combined with other prevention and control means, including school closures and travel restrictions.

There are also many papers covering the issue of COVID-19 in the Slovak Republic from different perspectives. For example, Černěnko et al. (2021) and Čajková et al. (2021) assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the

budget of local Slovak governments. Bardovič and Gašparík (2021) focus on enablers of participatory budgeting in Slovakia. Skorková et al. (2021) analyze the impact of crisis management competencies on team performance, etc. However, an analysis of political aspects of a greater magnitude of infection is still lacking, possibly because of the high sensitivity of the topic.

It is necessary to fill the gap in the data. The goal of this paper is to highlight the specifics of the Slovak COVID-19 case from the standpoint of public policy. The study answers two questions: why did Slovakia handle the COVID-19 outbreak very effectively, with limited mortality and morbidity and almost no impact on vulnerable communities? Why did Slovakia handle the later phase of COVID-19 pandemic so poorly, with extreme relative mortality and morbidity?


The author employs a qualitative research method and relies on secondary publicly available data to answer these questions.

Effective fight against the COVID-19 outbreak

Slovakia, which was founded on January 1, 1993 after the friendly split of the former Czechoslovak Republic, has an area of 49 036 km² and approximately 5.45 million inhabitants with a population density of 111 people/km². It is a member of the European Union and NATO, a unitary state with a relatively high degree of territorial decentralization. The President is directly elected, with functions largely of a ceremonial nature. Governments have always been formed by coalitions, and are sometimes rather fragile. Local self-government is extremely fragmented: Slovakia has almost 3 000 municipalities. Public expenditure to GDP is approx. 40%. The economy is fully open and dependent on import and export, especially with other European Union countries.

In terms of health in 2020, Slovakia was doing quite well – most media stated that Slovakia was the most successful country in Europe in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic. By May 27, 2020, Slovakia had registered only 1,515 cases and 28 deaths. By the end of May 2020 Slovakia had had less than 200 active cases. These figures were comparatively positive, especially from the global perspective, but also in relation to Slovakia's neighbors (Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland) (Figure 1).

**Figure 1. Relative COVID-19 outbreak on 26.05.2020
(number of cases per 100,000 inhabitants)**



Source: author, based on data published by Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center.
URL: <https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html>

Why was Slovakia initially so successful in fighting the spread of COVID-19 in the country? According to analyses (such as Klimovský et al., 2021), two core factors should be mentioned: the very swift and comprehensive anti-pandemic measures realized by the government and citizens' compliance.

No government in the world was fully prepared to cope with the COVID-19 pandemic. This was also the case in Slovakia, which had never coped with any major infection before. Slovakia did not react immediately to the pandemic risk in early 2020 when the outbreak occurred in China (beyond having general emergency plans and resources). However, when the risks became evident, the Slovak government made a swift and severe response.

The first actions to combat the possible risks of COVID-19 were announced before the pandemic reached the country. For example, on 14 February, 2020, a special system was introduced on Slovak borders to identify people who were ill. On February 27, 2020, the Security Council announced the first specific anti-pandemic measures – health status border controls at all Slovak airports and selected border crossings, especially at the border with Austria, and purchases of necessary protective aids. The most important decision at this meeting was the activation of the Crisis Staff, located at the Ministry of Health.

The first meeting of the Crisis Staff during the COVID-19 pandemic was called on March 6, 2020, the same day when the first case of infection was detected in Slovakia. The measures adopted were relatively mild: restriction of visits

in hospitals, social care institutions and prisons, recommendation for voluntary quarantine for those arriving in Slovakia. Cities and non-profit organizations were restricted in organizing mass events, and churches in organizing religious events. The only “hard” measure was the cancellation of all international trips of public officials and prohibiting all flights from Italy to Slovakia. Emergency contact phone numbers were announced for all the regions.

Even before the next meeting of the Crisis Staff, regional self-governments voluntarily decided to close secondary schools and universities and switched to online education (the formal state decision to close all schools and preschool facilities was announced on March 12).

Two Crisis Staff meetings on March 9 and March 12, 2020 were followed by comprehensive sets of anti-pandemic measures, mirroring the successful approaches employed by China and other Asian countries. A state of emergency was formally announced on March 11, 2020, much earlier than in the majority of the European countries. The scale of emergency was restricted to the health-care sector and social care service for the elderly, and an “emergency regime” was announced for the rest of the country.

The other core measures were as follows – with the exception of special groups, anyone arriving in Slovakia after March 12, 2020 was required to stay in home quarantine for 14 days. From March 16, almost all retail shops and services were closed; exemptions were granted for food stores and drugstores (food stores and drugstores were later also closed on Sundays). In shops permitted to open, only one customer was allowed for every 25 sq m of sales space. All shops were required to provide disinfection means or gloves at the entrance, and guarantee distance between people of a minimum of two meters, including in the checkout area.

Sport facilities were closed from March 13, 2020, and sports, social and cultural events were prohibited from March 9, 2020. Planned operations and other non-urgent treatment in the health care sector were also postponed. Selected hospitals were expected to construct drive-through points to test people in their cars for COVID-19. Specialized hospitals to treat COVID-19 were established in all regions. Public worship was prohibited for all churches in Slovakia; border crossings were closed from March 12, 2020; international public transport (trains, buses, boats) was restricted from the next day.

Due to the continuing spread of COVID-19 in late March and early April, the Crisis Staff decided upon stricter anti-pandemic measures. From March 25, 2020, citizens were required to wear protective masks in public spaces and advised to stay at home as much as possible and to limit any kind of mobility. The most sensitive measure was the decision concerning compulsory state-organized quarantine after April 6, 2020: a law was passed to track the location of mobile phones. A curfew was put in place during the Easter holidays, with limited exemptions such as shopping, travelling to work, health purposes, and individual recreation in the surrounding forests and countryside.

Special attention to vulnerable groups

All involved state bodies devoted specific attention to vulnerable groups, such as the Roma minority, elderly people and the homeless. The group that was “handled” most successfully were the Roma people (this minority may represent 5-10% of Slovak inhabitants; exact figures are not available). A large proportion of Roma still live in slums and their living conditions are very poor: large families of more than 10 persons in a small shack without permanent heating and hot water. The Slovak Government passed the “Plan for Solving the COVID-19 pandemic in Marginalized Roma Communities” on April 2, 2020 as a government resolution, because of the size of the group and the risk level. The Plan identified 819 municipalities in Slovakia with a marginalized Roma community and defined 1 044 localities with 260 000 inhabitants as the focus of specific anti-epidemic measures. The need to deal with these settlements in a special way was linked to two problems – poor living conditions and the fact that approximately 1 400 Roma had returned home from abroad (especially from the United Kingdom) and many of them were infected. Since real home quarantine was not possible in Roma settlements, these specific measures were necessary.

The state decided to test all Roma who had returned from abroad and also everybody with respiratory symptoms living in defined areas. As the spread of COVID-19 was confirmed in some settlements, the Crisis Staff isolated five Roma settlements in three municipalities (Krompachy, Bystrany and Zehra) on April 8, 2020. The inhabitants were not allowed to leave their settlements, and supplies were delivered by the state bodies (partly for free). Two weeks later, the isolation of the settlements in Krompachy and Bystrany was lifted, after negative testing of all inhabitants. The isolation of part of the community in Zehra had

to continue, as COVID-19 was found there again – the infected individuals and their families were later moved to a specially built quarantine area close to the municipality, and the isolation was lifted for the rest of the settlement. The fact that COVID-19 disappeared without any specific treatment in all communities living in slums calls for specific medical investigations (do difficult living conditions increase immunity?).

The ban on visiting care facilities for the elderly and also specific hours designated for elderly in shops were introduced in order to protect pensioners. However, despite these strict protective measures, there were cases of COVID-19 in three care facilities. Data indicates that of 28 COVID-19 related deaths in Slovakia by the end of May 2020, more than 20 were clients of two care facilities in Pezinok and Martin.

Municipalities organized special services for homeless people living within their borders – some municipalities even managed to test the homeless or build designated quarantine areas. The spread of COVID-19 within this group has not been confirmed.

Citizen's compliance

It has to be said that Slovak citizens behaved responsibly in the first phase of COVID-19. Except for a few isolated cases, the public reaction to the strict measures was positive. The slogan “Stay at Home” was promoted and accepted; face masks were used regularly. Some Western media (such as *The Guardian* on May 5, 2020) assumed that the very limited spread of COVID-19 in post-communist countries is related to the limited performance of national health care systems and related low trust in the chance of receiving effective treatment.² The author does not agree with this argument. For example, according to the recent KPMG study³ Slovak consumers ranked industries in order of trustworthiness. The top three were: Healthcare providers (60%), Banking providers (59%), and Technology companies (54%). Bottom three: Wealth management (37%), Government (37%) and Advertising (26%).

It seems that the high level of compliance should be related to other factors – especially path-dependence, fear and specific immunity. The path-de-

² The Guardian, 5 May, 2020. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/theguardian/2020/may/05> (accessed: 15.02.2022)

³ Growth Promise Indicators. KPMG, 2018. URL: https://assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/be/pdf/2018/01/KPMG_GPI_Report_v12.pdf (accessed: 12.02.2022)

pendence factor relates to 40 years' experience of living in a centralized non-democratic regime where citizens were expected to "serve the state" and not the other way around ("the state is here to serve citizens and businesses"). Even 30 years after the change of regime, the past influences the present reality on the both sides (government and citizens). Governments like "to give orders" and people prefer to comply and not to protest (see for example Holmes, 2006).

The specific Slovak element is fear. In the early days of COVID-19 in Slovakia, the Institute for Health Policy (a policy unit at the Ministry of Health) published the first forecast for the spread of the pandemic in the country. It said that the total number of infected under a "laissez-faire" policy was expected to reach almost 50% of the population. This was broadly publicized by the media, and this critical message probably influenced the citizens' behavior.

The investigation of the issue of specific immunity is the "path" for medical specialists – some of them expressed the opinion that comprehensive immunization could play a visible role.

The smooth political "takeover" during the COVID-19 outbreak

The specific political situation for Slovakia is connected to the fact that national elections were held on February 29, 2020; the opposition parties won these elections. The change of government overlapped with the initial days of the outbreak of the pandemic in the country. The first COVID-19 case in Slovakia was identified on March 6, 2020, and the new coalition government was appointed by the President on March 21. In this situation, the first steps to fight the pandemic were taken by Prime Minister Peter Pellegrini and his (predominantly left-wing) government led by the SMER party, but Prime Minister Igor Matovič and his mixed government of four "newcomer" political parties (OLANO, Sme Rodina, SAS and Za ľuďi) were responsible for coping with it later.

Pellegrini, the departing Prime Minister, managed the crisis in office very well and tried to make the "takeover" smooth – for example, during the last days of the Pellegrini government, Prime Minister-elect Matovič was invited to participate in all the meetings of the Crisis Staff. In the times of a real pandemic crisis, politics were set very much aside and political fights significantly downsized.


The opposition led by SMER voted in favor of most of the laws proposed by the newly elected government – laws focusing on the fight against the pan-

demic. The only exemption was the law to track the location of mobile phones, which SMER not only voted against, but even sent the law to be reviewed by the Constitutional Court (the Constitutional Court found some aspects of the law to be non-constitutional). On the other hand, ministers (not surprisingly) tend to blame the previous government for late and ineffective actions, although in many cases they were not at fault, and for fiscal irresponsibility.

Limited success of anti-pandemic measures after the summer of 2020

The positive picture of the first wave of the pandemic was later “replaced” by critical figures showing excessive relative mortality and morbidity in Slovakia after the summer of 2020 (Figure 2). For some periods Slovakia was on the top of the list of countries for relative morbidity and mortality. By January 17, 2022, Slovakia was ranked number 10 worldwide for COVID-19 deaths per one million people.⁴

Figure 2. Graph illustrating the development of the number of newly infected cases in Slovakia



Source: authors, based on national COVID-19 data

⁴ Statista data. URL: <https://www.statista.com> (accessed 16.02.2022)

In late July 2020 the pandemic situation in Slovakia worsened, when the number of infected started to increase once again. The number of newly infected cases reached critical levels in autumn, with the first peak on October 29; after the Christmas holidays these figures rocketed. The summer of 2021 was a short “peaceful” period, with almost no new infections, but in autumn the situation was critical again. As in the winter of 2021, hospitals were overcrowded by infected patients with complications, and the death toll escalated. Some possible reasons for this are given below.

Collaborative governance

During the later phases of COVID-19 pandemic, it became fully evident that Slovak leaders were not able or perhaps even unwilling to engage all the relevant stakeholders (especially experts) and to listen to them. Expert opinions and advice were rejected mostly because of populist reasons and protective measures, or strategies were even declared without any consultations with stakeholders. Critical stakeholders in both countries, especially local and regional self-governments, civil society, and professional organizations, were not only insufficiently consulted, but also not accepted as real partners, and a top-down approach in decision-making dominated. Without any consultation, the central government pressed sub-national governments to implement chaotic and non-strategic measures, regardless of their protests or warnings.

The Slovak case of blanket testing in late autumn 2020, may serve as a good mirror of the situation. Testing was initiated directly by Prime Minister Matovič, who continually argued that this testing served as a “nuclear weapon” against the spread of COVID-19. Citizens’ participation in testing was secured by the rule that without a negative test people would have to stay at home and could go to work or to the countryside. Most experts were strongly against such an experiment, arguing especially about the high social and economic costs, the limited capacities of medical personnel required to provide testing, the risk of spreading the virus while waiting for treatment and its results, and also by the very limited reliability of results of antigen testing in cold weather. To “win” his argument, apart from unfairly blaming his opponents, the Prime Minister also publicly announced: “Either testing, or my resignation”. Today it can be stated that the experience from the first round of blanket testing definitively proves that the Prime Minister’s expectations for “his nuclear weapon” did not materialize.

Miscommunication

The quality of communication from government to citizens and all relevant stakeholders suffered from many shortcomings. Two problems can be singled out: “too much information was not effective” and “information was frequently chaotic”.

Additionally, Slovak Prime Minister Matovič in late autumn and winter crossed acceptable boundaries in his style of communication. He regularly insulted experts, politicians or other actors with opposing views. His statement on January 13, 2021 at an official press conference related to the second phase of blanket testing may serve as a representative example of this: “If any expert now says that we need vaccination and not blanket testing, then this person is a fool and not an expert”.

Unsurprisingly, trust in the Prime Minister and his party dropped significantly (to approx. 10% in the end of 2022). Matovič was forced to resign in March 2021, and the governing coalition nominated Eduard Heger to replace him. However, Matovič was simply moved to the position of the Minister of Finance, and his unacceptable style of communication still influences the daily life of Slovak citizens.

Political fights

The situation significantly changed from the summer of 2020 in comparison to the first phase of the pandemic, when most political actors tried to work together and compliance and solidarity were high.

Almost any COVID-19 policy proposal by the government was used as an excuse for political battles, and it is not only the opposition that “automatically” fought any proposal by the government coalition. In Slovakia, the situation within the coalition was especially critical. In winter 2020 and spring 2021 the most visible fight was between the Prime Minister (OLANO) and the Minister of Economy (SaS). The “apex” of this fight was the press conference by the Prime Minister on January 11, when Matovič directly accused Richard Sulík of causing 4 300 preventable deaths by ignoring the order to purchase antigen tests. More recently, another coalition party, Sme Rodina, began to oppose some proposals prepared by OLANO. The fact that the governing coalition does not perform as a single bloc certainly limits chances for effective COVID-19-related policy making.

The political parties in the opposition began to exploit the rather limited popularity of anti-pandemic measures to increase their ratings. Two nationalist parties in parliament (Republika and LSNS) openly opposed such measures as wearing protective masks or even vaccination. SMER, the party of the former Prime Minister Robert Fico, criticized almost any government activities relating to COVID-19, and the party also organized several protest meetings. On December 16, 2021, Fico was arrested by the police for a few hours just before one of these protests began – this caused his popularity to increase, especially as the police were acting illegally.

Conclusions

This article documents the almost ideal reaction by the Slovak government to the first wave of COVID-19 and highlights factors which made Slovakia appear to be one of the most successful countries worldwide in combatting the pandemic in the spring of 2020. However, it also indicates the extremely poor performance of the country during the later phases of the pandemic and tries to suggest the factors “responsible” for such a shift.

In winter 2021/2022 Slovakia was among the most infected countries. It also had an extremely low relative level of vaccination – in Europe only Bulgaria remains significantly behind it. Voluntary compliance with anti-pandemic measures disappeared.

This article argues that the limited quality of public policy making, when evidence-based policy was replaced with party politics, was a critical factor in this drastic development. Slovak (and not only Slovak) politicians pursue their own political interests at the cost of the population’s health, so people react by non-compliance. How long can this situation continue – assuming that COVID-19 does not suddenly disappear?

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Russia's Sovereignty and Emergence of Pragmatic Polycentrism

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Abstract

The article researches Russia's concept of comprehensive sovereignty that is a cornerstone of the official state paradigm. Sovereignty is analyzed in its internal as well as external dimension, both synchronically and diachronically. The concept is interconnected with national security expanding into different realms. Sovereignty-based securitization tendencies are examined through methods of discursive analysis based upon constructivist assumptions. The present study puts emphasis on conceptual constructions and discursive practices significantly affecting individual perceptions, interpretation and *Weltanschauung* of political leadership as a whole, thereby shaping behavior, strategies and policies of individual actors concerned. The analysis reveals an affinity between concepts and discursive practices of the actors included in the research – Russia, the United States, China, and the European Union. It manifests itself in the concepts of *comprehensive sovereignty*, *America First*, *dual circulation*, and *strategic autonomy* respectively. These strategies are examined in relation to the transformation of the global order from US-led hegemonism towards polycentrism. The author draws attention to the interactions within the "quadrilateral" consisting of Russia, China, the EU and the US in order to demonstrate the emergence and dynamics of *autonomization* or *regionalization*, which is to be regarded as a dialectical moment in the globalization process towards *glocalization* and *pragmatic polycentrism*. The author concludes that the EU's strategic autonomy is a positive feature, but requires the abandonment of Euro-Atlanticism, which thwarts restructuring the Eurasian macroregion in general, and settling Russia-Europe relations in particular.

Key words

Russia, United States, China, European Union, sovereignty, national security, polycentrism, Euro-Atlanticism, strategic autonomy, hegemonism

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“Without sovereignty, Russia cannot be a state. Some countries can do this, but not Russia.” These words were spoken by President Vladimir Putin during his address to the Federal Assembly in 2019.² Sovereignty is a crucial concept of Russia’s hegemonic paradigm. It is of a comprehensive nature, not limited to the realm of security or international policy. This concept is an analogous phenomenon to EU’s *strategic autonomy*, China’s *dual circulation* or Donald Trump’s *America First* policy. All these strategies are symptoms of the transformation of the global order towards a polycentric model, thus embodying complex dialectics of globalization and deglobalization, integration and regionalization. *Global restructuring* is of utmost relevance and significance in terms of contemporary socio-economic as well as political processes, also affecting the very concept of governance.

The present article examines Russia’s concept of sovereignty from both internal and external perspectives. A detailed discursive analysis is made focusing on basic normative documents (*Military Doctrine*, *National Security Strategy*), bilateral diplomatic agreements and declarations (*Joint Statement on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China*; *Joint Statement on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development*), as well as articles and statements of the highest-ranking representatives of the relevant sides (Vladimir Putin, Sergey Lavrov, Dmitry Medvedev, Donald Trump, Mike Pompeo, Joe Biden and Josep Borrell). The chosen method is based upon a constructivist assumption of the importance of ideas and ideology in social life including politics (Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, Alexander Wendt). The discursivity-oriented research can be effectively combined with related analyses of the interstate interactions, international relations and practical behavior of individual actors concerned. Both diachronic and synchronic methods are employed in order to shed light on the ongoing processes under investigation. In the article, a multidisciplinary attitude is adopted, making use of findings from political science and philosophy (Glenn Diesen, Alexander Lukin, Carl Schmitt, Dmitry Trenin), international relations

² Presidential Address to Federal Assembly. Kremlin, 2019, February 20. URL: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59863> (accessed 20.02.2022)

(Richard Sakwa, Alexander Sergunin, Dmitry Suslov, Ivan Timofeev), history (Richard Pipes, Andrei Tsygankov), and last but not least social anthropology (Chris Hann).

The analysis begins with the internal model of Russia's comprehensive sovereignty and its constitutive elements in different fields, proceeding to the external model. The inquiry is therefore put into the context of relations with the United States, China, and the European Union on the one hand, and of the increasingly strong move towards polycentrism on the other. The article thus presents an in-depth insight into the *status quo* of Russia's state paradigm, based upon the concept of sovereignty, contributing to a better understanding of the metamorphoses of global politics and governance.

Security dimension of sovereignty

The current state of international relations and development of the global order is characterized by growing tensions, conflicts and rivalry following from competition between the US, as the declining hegemon of the unipolar system that emerged after the end of the Cold War, and the non-Western powers, first and foremost China and Russia. The objective decline in Western states' potential and the concurrent shift of the political and economic center to the East arouse defiance in the West. From the Russian perspective, the existing system of international relations and security is unfair, discriminating against the rival emerging powers.³ Irrespective of the frictions in Russia's near neighborhood (Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus or Central Asia) and a long-term confrontational policy from the West including large-scale sanctions, the Russian leadership does not expect a full-fledged war against the country.⁴

The perception of threats plays a serious role in the leadership's decision-making. These threats are formulated in the *Military Doctrine* as a substantial part of the state's strategic planning. The current version was adopted in 2014. The most serious external threat is seen in NATO, its expansion and vest-

³ Kontseptsiiia vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (The Concept of Russian Foreign Policy). Kremlin. 2016, November 30. <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41451> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁴ Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Russia's Military Doctrine). Kremlin. 2014, December 19. <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

ing the organization with global functions regardless of the mandate of the UN.⁵ The tension between Russia and NATO is a permanent feature of international politics, which especially endangers European countries. While the Russian side is not against further enlargement of the EU in principle, perceiving the European integration project as legitimate and analogous to Eurasian integration in the post-Soviet space and even a model for the EAEU in a sense, it has rejected US-led NATO policies and activities for a long period (Sergunin, 2016, p. 154, 162). The origins of the current controversies lie in the Gorbachev era (Gvozdev & Marsh, 2014, p. 78). Boris Yeltsin allowed for expansion only if Russia itself was included (Gvozdev & Marsh, 2014, p. 211), thus anticipating future projects of a single security area comprising North America, Europe and Russia (Dmitry Medvedev) or common military systems (Vladimir Putin). From a comparative perspective, Russia respects the development of the EU while disapproving of NATO. It follows that the main obstacle for security and stability between Russia and Europe lies in Washington's hegemonic interests discursively justified by a concept of the Euro-Atlantic community.

The second major threat is seen in the destabilization of individual countries and whole regions.⁶ Undoubtedly, the Russian strategists have the practice of color revolutions in mind. This point can also be interpreted as a criticism of the export of liberal democracy which is connected with Western exceptionalism and the false self-perception of this model as a universal one that is to be established globally disregarding specific local conditions. Whereas the first defined threat regards the military practice, the second one applies to the political practice carried out by the Western countries. Another risk is seen in the deployment of military contingents on the territories of the adjacent or allied countries as well as in the expansion of missile systems, undermining agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, development of the global strike concept or militarization of outer space.⁷

The current *Military Doctrine* anticipates that nuclear weaponry will safeguard the role of deterrence and prevention of an outbreak of full-fledged as well

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Russia's Military Doctrine). Kremlin. 2014, December 19. <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁷ Ibid.

as limited military conflicts. Therefore, the Russian Federation has been interested in the maintenance of the *Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty* (New START) as the cornerstone of the stability of the international regime of nuclear arms. The Treaty was signed in Prague in 2010 as a sequel of quite a long history of negotiations between Moscow and Washington in the field of non-proliferation, control and reduction of strategic weapons, which started in the 1960s with the multilateral *Partial Test Ban Treaty* (PTBT), *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty* (NPT) and the bilateral *Interim Agreement on Offensive Arms* (SALT I) from 1972. There have been several bilateral agreements since then. The collapse of the USSR did not make Russia-US treaties irrelevant, as the Russian Federation took over a substantial part of the Soviet military arsenal. Even though overall Russia's role diminished in the newly emerged unipolar world dominated by the US as a global hegemon in the 1990s, the country remained a military great power. As such, Russia has played a crucial role in the balance and stability of international security, endeavoring to preserve the status quo.

However, the security regime was put in danger during Donald Trump's presidency. From the beginning, Trump took a stand against the bilateral agreements in the field, similarly as in the case of the multilateral *Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action*, regarding the Iranian nuclear program. In 2019, the US withdrew from the *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty* (INF Treaty) signed by Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan in 1987. This step provoked concerns about a situation when no arms control limits would be in force. Washington accused Russia of breaching the treaty, which Moscow denied.⁸ The real reason behind the US attack on the INF Treaty was, nevertheless, connected with growing tensions with China, with the allegations against Russia's "transgressions" being rather a pretext than anything else. As China was not included in the treaty, it was free to develop and deploy intermediate-range nuclear missiles.⁹

Trump attempted to establish new security regimes instead of the existing ones, which were considered disadvantageous for the US as putting other rele-

⁸ Marcus, J. INF Nuclear Treaty: US Pulls out of Cold War-era Pact with Russia. BBC, 2019, August 02. URL: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-49198565> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁹ Sanger, D. E., & Broad, W. J. U.S. to Tell Russia It Is Leaving Landmark I.N.F. Treaty. New York Times. 2019, October 19. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/russia-nuclear-arms-treaty-trump-administration.html> (accessed 20.02.2022)

vant actors, first and foremost China, aside. It was not only a question of the INF Treaty but also of the New START. The latter was to expire in February 2021. Under the circumstances when the US withdrew from the INF Treaty and added new conditions to agree with the prolongation, including a redefinition of the agreement and engaging China, it seemed very unlikely that the New START would be extended. All the more so that Washington refused Moscow's suggestions, for instance, temporary extension without any preconditions.¹⁰ When the current US President Joe Biden assumed the presidency, it was clear that there would be no quick substantial turn in the relationship with Russia. Standing as a candidate, Biden wrote about the need for countering "Putin's kleptocratic authoritarian system".¹¹ In his first presidential speech dedicated to foreign affairs, Biden accused Russia of aggression including interference in the US election, conducting cyber-attacks or poisoning its citizens¹². In spite of the confrontational policy, the new administration avoided the imminent threat of the arms race, supporting the prolongation of the New START, thus manifesting the US readiness to find common ground at least as far as most risk issues are concerned. The treaty would probably not have been extended until 2026 without Biden becoming President.

The Russian leadership has put a strong emphasis on the use of nuclear arms with regard to the deterrence policy. President Putin signed a strategic document dedicated to this area which was made public for the first time ever in 2020. In the new *Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence*, the nuclear arsenal is considered a crucial element for Russia's sovereignty.¹³ The strategy postulates a strictly defensive character of the latter. At the same time it allows the active use of nuclear arms but solely in the case of nuclear attack against the country or its allies, as well as in case

¹⁰ TASS. 2020, October 16. URL: <https://tass.ru/politika/9738037> (accessed 20.02.2022)

¹¹ Biden, J. R. Why America Must Lead Again. Rescuing U.S. Foreign Policy After Trump. Foreign Affairs, 2020, March/April. URL: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again> (accessed 20.02.2022)

¹² Biden, J. R. Remarks by President Biden on America's Place in the World. White House, 2021, February 04. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/> (accessed 20.02.2022); Crane, M. Biden Agrees Putin Is a Killer, Says He'll Pay for Meddling. Bloomberg, 2021, March 17. URL <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-17/biden-agrees-putin-is-killer-says-he-ll-pay-price-for-meddling> (accessed 20.02.2022)

¹³ Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v oblasti iadernogo sderzhivaniia (Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Area of Nuclear Deterrence). Kremlin. 2020, June 02. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/lluTKhAiabLzOBjfbSVu4q3bcl7AXd7.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

of any aggression endangering the existence of the Russian state.¹⁴ Similarly, article 22 of the *Military Doctrine* enables employing the Armed Forces in the case of aggression against Russia or allies, in the case of the decision of the UN Security Council or other collective security bodies and, last but not least, in the case of need for protection of Russian citizens abroad.¹⁵ Article 31 expands the legitimacy of the external military intervention if this is carried out in line with principles and norms of international law, international agreements and Russian legislation. These provisions might be used to active military actions abroad, making the defensive posture more offensive.

Russia's action readiness was demonstrated especially in Syria and Crimea in the last years. Russia has been endeavoring to strengthen its security, protect the sovereignty and multiply military potential through cooperation with other partners, first and foremost within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The allies *sensu stricto* are countries participating in the CSTO which is a military alliance, unlike two other multilateral institutions. The asset of the SCO lies in the fact that transcends the limited post-Soviet area including a wide array of Eurasian countries and provides the states with an opportunity to interconnect and converge national development strategies as well as grand initiatives as the Belt and Road Initiative or the Eurasian Economic Union (Kaczmarek, 2017, p. 1036). The significance of the SCO consists in the fact that the member states generate more than 20% of the global GDP, accounting for virtually 42% of the world's population. It is the most important non-Western regional organization which can contribute considerably to reshaping the global order according to the reformist agenda of the participants (Zemánek, 2020, p. 202).

Naturally, the leading role has been played by the engines of Eurasian integration – Russia and China. Moscow found common ground with Beijing as far as the fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism are concerned (China calls these threats “The Three Evils”). Security and military cooperation be-

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Voennaia doktrina Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Russia's Military Doctrine). Kremlin. 2014, December 19. <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/41d527556bec8deb3530.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

tween Russia and China have been deepening, especially after 2014. Both major powers reject the idea of establishment of the alliance, thus clearly demonstrating an innovative attitude towards interstate relations and cooperation, based on openness, overlapping interests and heterogeneous integration model, the basis of which lies in different speed and levels of integration in individual areas, sometimes even going beyond the traditional alliance (Lukin, 2018b, p. 128). Both countries are aware of the Western hegemonic ambitions, export of liberal democracy and destabilizing actions in relation to the countries with different values and political systems. The SCO, therefore, serves to the deterrence of the Western quasi-universalism and gradual transformation of the international order to be based on polycentrism, equality, inclusiveness and the principles of peaceful coexistence, the prerequisite of which is the very existence of different models and a plurality of development as well as modernization patterns. Russia's sovereignty can be protected in a more effective way through the above-mentioned institutions. Paradoxically, engagement in supranational organizations and integration, thus openness and not introversion, may become the way towards stronger sovereignty and national security for Russia.

Comprehensive sovereignty: an internal perspective

The principle of sovereignty is enshrined in strategic documents in a wide array of fields. It applies not only to national security, external relations or economy but also to the energy sector, information security or cultural policy. Its significance, therefore, cannot be overestimated, sovereignty being a quintessence of the current Russian state and hegemonic paradigm. Russia's concept of sovereignty can be interpreted as based on the threefold principle of strategic *autonomy/independence*, strategic *stability* and strategic *partnership*.¹⁶ These categories define both internal and external dimensions of the existence of the state. The *National Security Strategy* (hereinafter referred to as NSS) follows the tradition of patrimonialism and etatism (see: Pipes, 1974, p. 24) when defining the need for strengthening the power of the state to accomplish social security.

¹⁶ The 2021 *National Security Strategy* leaves the term "strategic partnership" of the 2015 NSS out, replacing it with "win-win international cooperation".

Such an attitude preserves the crucial role of the power vertical and its responsibility for addressing people's interests. The strong role of the vertical is also to secure protection against external interference which is frequently thematized in different contexts by the NSS. An emphasis is put on the threat posed by foreign intelligence services and other foreign organizations, terrorist, extremist and radical forces undermining the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political and social stability or traditional religious and moral Russian values. Besides, the strong state vertical is to protect citizens against external propaganda as well as the one carried out by "inner enemies".¹⁷ Such a strategy clearly demonstrates that the elites consider the strong state, its apparatus and institutions as a key to maintaining the country's sovereignty.

Economic sovereignty is an inseparable part of the political one. The important point is a crucial role ascribed to the state – analogous to its role in social development. A strong role of the state in the economic processes is a constant of Russian history (Tsygankov, 2014, p. 7). Neither the free market nor the Weberian protestant ethic has been characteristic of Russian society. On the contrary, economy was perceived as a secondary social institution (always subjugated either to religious principles or political and social goals) in the pre-revolutionary epoch. Even the history of the Russian socialist and communist movement is suffused with the adoration of the state and its role, despite the Marxist theory of the economic base and social superstructure. The Bolsheviks did not win because of the economic conditions – they win because of their political will, credo and quasi-religious zeal.¹⁸ The Soviet era further deepened the embedded Russian mistrust of market mechanisms and entrepreneurship. Russia's civilizational trajectory confirms the observations presented by social anthropologist Chris Hann, according to whom the Eurasian societies have been characteristic of "inclusive embeddedness", the economy being subordinated to broader social goals and needs (Hann, 2016, p. 4). Similarly, the Soviet system was nothing absolutely extraneous, but at least partially followed older traditions and developmental tendencies based on the strong role played by the Russian state.

¹⁷ Strategiya natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii (National Security Strategy). Kremlin. 2015, December 31. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201512310038.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

¹⁸ Not by coincidence, the first Soviet People's Commissar for Education Anatolii Lunacharskii propounded a specific theory of *bogostroitel'stvo*, "God-Building", emphasizing that socialism is the most religious of all religions. See: Lunacharskii (1908).

The principles of central planning, the state's control over the economic activities, priority of political goals as well as the dominant position of the state in the modernization and reforms were presented in different forms both in the pre-revolutionary Russia and the Soviet Union. One can conclude that the Soviet experiment radicalized older patterns, reinterpreting them in a modernist way. However, a different perspective also existed. Reformists Sergei Witte and Pyotr Stolypin started to pave the way for Russia with the middle class, more inclusive and participatory model with wider space for individual activities and market mechanisms. In post-Soviet Russia, Dmitry Medvedev followed this line. Amidst the economic recession in 2009, he formulated a modernization program in which the Russian President harshly criticized economic backwardness, commodity dependence, low productivity and innovations or fragility of democratic institutions. Medvedev rejected paternalism and historic forms of Russian modernization connected with Peter I and the Bolsheviks. The new program was to develop Russian democracy and establish a new, post-industrial economy.¹⁹ The liberal ethos of the three mentioned reformists did not deny local peculiarities or conservative moral values arising from the Orthodoxy but represented a more open, more liberal model of Russia's modernization as well as external behavior.

Both at the beginning of the 20th century and in the 2010s, this reformist shift was interrupted due to the external factors – the Great War, which was joined by the Russian Empire with an utter reluctance, and the color revolution in Ukraine in 2014, the subsequent anti-Russian campaign launched by the Western countries and deteriorating relations. Vladimir Putin has accentuated different elements, but the policies throughout his terms have not been incompatible with the reformist modernization agenda essentially. Putin's program has also been aimed at integration in the global economy, acceleration of the economic growth, progressive development of the national economy, support for the business environment, and the political system development. The agenda, nevertheless, gradually became more securitized and the key goal was not “mild” Westernization and building the Greater Europe anymore but protec-

¹⁹Medvedev, D. *Go Russia!* Kremlin. 2009, September 10. URL: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5413> (accessed 20.02.2022)

tion of sovereignty and Russian peculiarity, deepening of autonomy in all necessary fields and Eurasian integration where possible. Modernization, regional and interregional integration or sovereign opening up was not abandoned but modified under adverse external conditions and growing frictions worldwide (Sakwa, 2021, p. 5-6).

Safeguarding of sovereignty was accompanied by stronger emphasis on self-sufficiency and development of own systems independent of the global ones (which creates a comfortable position in the cases of crises or conflicts) in the post-2014 period. It applies to the payment system, interbank financial telecommunication system, navigation satellite system, 5G systems or the Internet. Protection of the Russian Internet against external threats should be accomplished on the basis of the act passed in 2019 in response to the US *National Cyber Strategy* which declared the ambition to spread US particular interests worldwide.²⁰ Russia's path towards information and digital sovereignty is not isolated. It has to be perceived in an international context when many actors seek the same self-protection. In general, the assertion of information sovereignty is one of the most important tasks states have in the digital era (Romashkina, 2019). Moscow introduced numerous acts in this direction, including a data localization law or a law regarding import substitution of foreign IT products. Foreign encryption protocols of the Russian Internet should be supplemented by the domestic ones in the near future and the 5G networks are to be based on Russian or Chinese technologies.²¹ One of Russia's leading media holding Gazprom-Media has started to prepare a Russian version of TikTok while a national alternative of Wikipedia is also under preparation.²² Similarly, the US, the EU and China seek digital sovereignty, trying to minimize mutual interdependence and vulnerability. Washington banned TikTok and WeChat, preventing Huawei and ZTE from

²⁰ According to President Putin, the Internet and media should be regulated not only by the positive legal norms but also by moral, natural law. Putin Calls for Internet Bound by Moral Rules, Criticizes Opposition Rallies. Reuters. 2021, March 04. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-internet-idUSKCN2AW2D4> (accessed 20.02.2022); Priniat zakon o «suverenennom internete» (Adopting Sovereign Internet Law). Gosudarstvennaia Duma. 2019, April 16. URL: <http://duma.gov.ru/news/44551/> (accessed 20.02.2022)

²¹ Chen, Q. China, Russia to Form Closer Partnership on 5G in Defiance of US. Global Times. 2020, August 24. URL: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1198654.shtml> (accessed 20.02.2022)

²² Russia to Launch Own TikTok Developed With Putin's Alleged Daughter. AFP. 2020, December 23. URL: <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/12/23/russia-to-launch-own-tiktok-developed-with-putins-alleged-daughter-a72467> (accessed 20.02.2022); Rossiiskii analog "Vikipedii" oboidetsia biudzhetu RF pochti v 2 mldr rublei (Russian analogous Wikipedia will cost 2 bln rubles). Interfax. 2019, September 26. URL: <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/677964> (accessed 20.02.2022)

doing business in the country. Trump's administration introduced the *Clean Network* program aimed at the protection of data, privacy, security and rights against "aggressive intrusions by malign actors".²³ The EU promotes the policy of strategic autonomy within which cooperation with the pioneering Chinese companies is jeopardized.²⁴ However, Russia lags behind the other major powers in many respects, and the overall competitiveness, innovative potential and technological development are not comparable to the US or China's. Therefore Russia is likely to deepen cooperation with Chinese partners to offset this considerable disadvantage.²⁵

The *National Security Strategy* is a cornerstone of Russia's official state paradigm. Unlike other strategic documents (for instance, *Military Doctrine*, *Foreign Policy Concept*, *Economic Security Strategy*, *Energetic Security Doctrine*, *Information Security Doctrine* or *Foundations of State Cultural Policy*), it deals with all these areas, synthesizing them into a comprehensive whole. Dmitry Trenin considers the 2021 NSS "the most important Kremlin strategy statement" and "a manifesto" for the present era characteristic of a deep confrontation with the Western world (Trenin, 2021). Indeed, the two last versions of the NSS were formulated under different circumstances. The preceding one was issued in response to the Ukrainian crisis, sudden deterioration of relations with the West, the pivot to the East and strong uncertainty about the impacts of the pressure and sanctions on the Russian economy and society as such. The last years showed that the country was able to withstand, transforming economic processes, diversifying external ties and deepening integration within the Greater Eurasia (Lukin & Novikov, 2021, p. 52-53). The current NSS reflects the further deterioration of relations with Europe and the US, missing them out completely. Similarly, prospects of cooperation with NATO are omitted, thus signaling that Moscow does not expect any substantial progress in the relations with the West in the upcoming years.

²³ The Clean Network. U.S. Department of State. 2020. URL: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html> (accessed 20.02.2022)

²⁴ Csernaton, R. The EU's Rise as a Defense Technological Power: From Strategic Autonomy to Technological Sovereignty. Carnegie Europe, 2021, August 12. URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/08/12/eu-s-rise-as-defense-technological-power-from-strategic-autonomy-to-technological-sovereignty-pub-85134> (accessed 20.02.2022)

²⁵ Epifanova, A. Digital Sovereignty on Paper: Russia's Ambitious Laws Conflict with Its Tech Dependence. Wilson Center. 2020, October 23. URL: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/digital-sovereignty-paper-russias-ambitious-laws-conflict-its-tech-dependence> (accessed 20.02.2022)

In this regard, the 2021 Strategy is much more skeptical and explicit as far as the confrontational actions of the US, its allies as well as transnational corporations are concerned. The illiberal wording becomes obvious when the cultural Westernization is called a fatal threat for Russia and the absolutization of freedom of individuals, egoism and immorality is criticized as proof of the West's decline while emphasizing the significance of the traditional values and norms as well as religious foundations of societies.²⁶ Such rhetoric corresponds with Putin's assessment of today's Western liberalism. In an interview given to the *Financial Times* in 2019, he refused the hegemonic ambitions of the liberal elites, castigating them for their contempt for the rights of the majority, assaults on the traditional values and silencing opponents. Russian President expressed his belief that biblical values are more universal than liberal ones.²⁷ The 2021 NSS thus embodies the conservative worldview of the Russian leadership, articulating and shaping the hegemonic discourse, which will be reflected in the adjustments of the partial doctrines in the following months and years.

The conservative character of the ruling paradigm (Diesen, 2021, p. 205) is confirmed by the definition of the traditional Russian values, put forward by the 2015 NSS, with the priority of the spiritual over the material at the top and followed by the protection of human life, rights and freedoms, family, creative labor, service to the motherland, the norms of morality, humanism, charity, fairness, mutual assistance, collectivism, unity of Russia's nations and the continuity of the Russian history. This conservative discourse is complemented by a strict refusal of external interference undermining cultural sovereignty. The Russian state stipulates the right to protect citizens against external expansion in terms of ideology and values, as well as to control the information sphere.²⁸ The 2021 Strategy rearranges the enumeration of the Russian values only minimally.²⁹

The establishment and reinforcement of sovereignty in different spheres of the life of the state and society brings multiple risks, especially in terms of

²⁶ Strategiiia natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Kremlin (National Security Strategy 2021). 2021, July 02. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/QZw6hSk5z9gWq0plD1ZzmR5cER0g5tZC.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

²⁷ U.S. – Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability. Kremlin 2021, June 16. URL: <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5658> (accessed 20.02.2022)

²⁸ Strategiiia natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii (National Security Strategy). Kremlin. 2015, December 31. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201512310038.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

²⁹ Strategiiia natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Kremlin (National Security Strategy 2021). 2021, July 02. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/QZw6hSk5z9gWq0plD1ZzmR5cER0g5tZC.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

individual rights and freedoms. The dominant conservative paradigm under Vladimir Putin is nevertheless moderate. Potential radicalization is dependent mainly on the objective external pressure and subjective sense of danger. This combination is risky if taking the Russian tradition of patrimonialism, strong state, and collectivism into consideration. It could result in a substantial closure of the country, the building of a fortress and isolationism. In that case, Russia might become a real international threat – which is not absolutely at this moment. On the contrary, it is the anti-Russian narrative together with actual political steps aimed against Russia which forces the country to the adoption of defensive, partially hostile stance.

Comprehensive sovereignty: an external perspective

Russia's concept of sovereignty includes the principles of autonomy and independence, strategic stability and partnership. Whereas the autonomy and independence reflect predominantly the internal dimension, the stability and partnership concern the external one – the external relations as well as a vision of and practical steps towards reform of the global system in line with the general normative outlook on how the system should be designated and structured in the 21st century. In this chapter, we will turn to the external dimension, going through the strategic framework defined by the *National Security Strategies* and subsequently focusing on the relations with the US and China.

It is worth noticing that both the 2015 and 2021 NSS do not position the relations with the West (the US and Europe) on the top of priorities. It has a symbolic significance connected with the deep disillusionment with the Western policies in the last decades, turn to the East and renunciation of Westernization. It shows that the West is not in the spotlight anymore, thus underlining the objective reality of multipolarization and the rise of the East. Taking this development into account, the secondary position of the US and Europe within the NSS exceeds the genuinely symbolic meaning and expresses the rational and pragmatic choice made in response to the transformation of the global order, economy and politics. Not surprisingly, therefore, the 2015 NSS emphasized the multilateral cooperation within BRICS, SCO, APEC and G20, highlighting the relationship with China and India. Besides, stress was laid on the near neigh-

borhood, the CIS and integration processes in Eurasia, first and foremost, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). As far as Europe is concerned, the NSS mentioned the support for win-win cooperation with the European states and the EU, harmonization of integration processes in Europe and on the post-Soviet territory (EAEU) as well as the establishment of joint collective security architecture in the Euro-Atlantic region.³⁰ These were long-term goals pursued by the Russian establishment. Their inclusion in the 2015 NSS can be perceived as proof of continuity and transparency of Russia's foreign policy if we become aware of the context of the sharp deterioration in the relations with the West. Irrespective of obvious Washington's involvement in the coup d'état in Ukraine, Moscow reaffirmed its readiness to develop the bilateral partnership. Moreover, it admitted the development of relations with NATO on the condition that the latter respects international law and Russia's interests.³¹

The wording of the 2021 NSS is different. It contains the keystones of the long-term Russian strategy such as maintenance of the central coordination role of the UN and the UN Security Council, deepening cooperation within CIS, CSTO, SCO, BRICS, EAEU or ASEAN. However, no explicit mentions of Europe, the US and NATO are made. It is especially the part dedicated to external affairs which distinguishes the present strategy from the former. And it is sharper in criticism. The world is characterized as a place where contradictions and conflicts have been intensifying and where the declining powers of the West assault on others, violate principles and norms of the international law as well as international treaties, breach sovereignty, undermine trust among individual actors and stability of the system, impose sanctions and attempt to revise the existing rules. Obviously, Russia endeavors to present itself as a crucial stabilizing element and protector of the *status quo*. In this regard, the NSS addresses the need for reinforcement of coherence and resilience of the international system and its legal base, strengthening of international peace and collective security, prevention of military conflicts and, last but not least, – strategic stability.³²

³⁰ Strategiiia natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii (National Security Strategy). Kremlin. 2015, December 31. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201512310038.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

³¹ Ibid.

³² Strategiiia natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Kremlin (National Security Strategy 2021). 2021, July 02. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/QZw6hSk5z9gWq0plD1ZzmR5cER0g5tZC.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

Russia's self-perception as a protector of the *status quo* and concurrent accusation against the declining Western actors of revisionism is not new, since it has appeared in recent articles published by the highest representatives, especially Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov. In the article *The World at a Crossroads and a System of International Relations for the Future* from 2019, Lavrov subjected the West and its liberal democratic ideology to criticism. Lambasting the West for endeavors to usurp the fruits of globalization to the detriment of the "rest", he describes the Western countries as hypocrites, for the narrative based on freedom, democracy and human rights entails inequality, injustice, selfishness and exceptionalism (Lavrov, 2019, p. 10). More or less explicitly, Minister follows the concepts of multiple modernities, multipolarity and multilateralism which fit the reality of the transforming global order. From the Russian perspective, the West invented the concept of a *rules-based order* which is revisionist in its essence. Lavrov characterizes it as a calculated, selective combination of rules, unilaterally employed with the aim to circumvent multilateral, collective decision-making and international legal instruments and processes based on the UN Charter as a core of the post-war order.³³

The rules-based order introduces a division between liberal democracies and "authoritarian powers", "autocracies", between allies and systemic rivals, friends and enemies. Inevitably, it leads to confrontation, conflicts and instability of the international system. The Western concept is opposite to pragmatism, openness and pluralism, being another sequel of Western universalism. Moreover, it is utterly moralistic, introducing the ethical categories of good and evil into international politics, making it very ideologized. The US President is trying to establish an "alliance of democracies" to confront "autocracies". At his first news conference after the election, Biden spoke about a "battle" between these two artificially invented camps.³⁴ Later on, the US highest representative announced the plan to organize a summit of the "democratic states" to counter global authoritarianism.³⁵ The Biden administration develops continuously the

³³ Ibid, p. 11.

³⁴ Sanger, D. E. Biden Defines His Underlying Challenge with China: 'Prove Democracy Works'. New York Times. 2021, March 26. URL: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/26/us/politics/biden-china-democracy.html> (accessed 20.02.2022)

³⁵ President Biden to Convene Leaders' Summit for Democracy. The White House. 2021, August 11. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/08/11/president-biden-to-convene-leaders-summit-for-democracy/> (accessed 20.02.2022)

confrontational narrative created during Donald Trump's presidency, albeit in a more sophisticated, ostensibly more diplomatic and moderate way. Biden's "alliance of democracies" is a reformulation of Trump's and Pompeo's antinomy between the "free world" and "new tyranny", i.e. China and its kind.³⁶ Continuity in external policy between these two seemingly contradictory Presidents is indisputable, even though Biden pursues a more multilateral, more collective, more inclusive attitude. This attitude is, nevertheless, conditioned by adherence to the "democratic" camp, to the universalist and hegemonic Western paradigm. The others are excluded. That is why the UN-based order ceases being convenient for the West since the objective power decline results in an inability to control the system. And that is why the Western actors are seeking to replace the *UN-based* order with the *rules-based* one.

The West's attempts to marginalize the UN and weaken collective decision-making irrespective of socioeconomic, political, ideological or cultural differences are obvious, so the Russian accusations of revisionism are justifiable. On the other hand, however, the post-1991 world was dominated by the West with the US on the top, being greatly unipolar, and these dominating actors – be they states, transnational corporations or other non-state subjects – are interested in the preservation of the model and their hegemony. The reality is therefore more complex and the role of the West is ambiguous, being typical of contradictory tendencies towards the maintenance of the status quo and revisionism.³⁷

The revisionist tendencies can be seen in the US withdrawal from the *Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty* (ABM Treaty) in 2002, *Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action* (JCPOA), the UN Human Rights Council and UNESCO in 2018, *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty* (INF Treaty) in 2019, *Paris Agreement and Treaty on Open Skies* in 2020. The US position towards the *Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty* (CTBT) is also questionable as Washington is reluctant to ratify it. Similarly, the destiny of the *Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms* (New START) was extremely uncertain for a long period. Many of these steps disrupted the foundations

³⁶ Pompeo, M. R. Communist China and the Free World's Future. U.S. Department of State 2020, July 23. URL: <https://2017-2021.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future-2/index.html> (accessed 20.02.2022)

³⁷ In this article, I put aside the difference between reformism and revisionism as it is not substantial for the reasoning (compare with: Sergunin, 2016, p. 25, 27, 32-35). Revisionism is simply meant as the effort to change the *status quo*.

of the system, gradually forming after World War II amidst the systemic confrontation between and coexistence of the two camps. The US withdrawals thus undermined relative stability and transparency brought about by the bilateral agreements between the US and the USSR. The Russian Federation assumed obligations and inherited armaments from the Soviet period and as such, it continues to be one of the pillars of international security architecture with the UN Security Council as its core. In this regard, it is Washington that has attempted to reverse the long-term *status quo*. The US have ignored the UN Security Council resolutions (for instance regarding the settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), launched unilateral military operations without authorization by this UN body and carried out multiple measures aimed against other countries – extra-territorial use of the US legislation, spying on their closest allies, abuse of the status of the USD as the main means of payment, introduction of protectionist barriers and, last but not least, imposition of sanctions. These practices have become an integral part of the US-led rules-based order.

The imposition of sanctions is an increasingly frequent practice used by liberal democracies against others. Given the intensifying frictions and transformation of the global order, continuation and deepening of this tendency are to be expected in the following period. It is worth noting that in spite of the strong pressure, the impacts on the Russian economy have been relatively low compared to other external factors such as the drop in oil prices, global pandemic and related economic slump. The data published by the International Monetary Fund follows that the role of sanctions accounted only for -0.2% in terms of GDP growth. At the same time, low macroeconomic influence is accompanied by high risks for individual businesses and projects (Timofeev, 2021, p. 4). In his report *Sanctions Against Russia: A Look into 2021*, Ivan Timofeev, therefore, comes to the conclusion that the best long-term answer for Russia is to lower dependency on the Western structures through concurrent development of the national payment system and a single payment system within the EAEU and the SCO, de-dollarization of the Russian economy as well as the development of international/regional mechanisms of counter-sanctions (Timofeev, 2021, p. 19). The significance of the latter is highlighted by the fact that it is China and Russia together with Iran that is the most frequent targets. Adaptation on the Western restrictive regimes thus could be made more effective through

the SCO, especially after the Islamic Republic becomes a full member of the organization.³⁸

Not only sanctions show that the discourse dividing countries into “democracies” and “autocracies” is dangerous. Instead, the division into those who advocate unipolarity or multipolarity is relevant. We can hardly avoid delimitation, as the world is full of antagonism, contradictions, divergent interests and conflicts. As long the sphere of the political exists, dividing lines are inevitable. The difference between friends and foes, allies and challengers remains. As Carl Schmitt (2015) put it, the political world is pluriverse in its essence, since the existence of genuine universality requires complete depoliticization, hence the elimination of the state as a social institution. At this stage of development, the elimination of the state or *withering away of the state* – if we use the Marxist term coined by Friedrich Engels in his *Anti-Dühring* – is not only unfeasible but also undesirable. The opponents of Western hegemonism and unipolarity need to have a strong state to break those structures that hamper the development towards a more democratic, fairer, more equal, more inclusive model. Naturally, it raises resistance from the declining powers which have resorted to the narrative of democracies versus autocracies, rules-based order versus a “law-of-the-jungle-based” order. Such a picture is false, serving merely the particular interests of the weakening hegemons.

Joe Biden gave up the isolationist America First imperative, replacing it with “Democracies First”. Of course, the US only has liberal democracies in mind. The internationalist agenda, however, remains particularist, albeit presented as universalist and objectively valid. The US President has revived ties with the allies, making some initial concessions (Nord Stream 2), but continues establishing a “global democratic phalanx”, as an American scholar called one of the pillars of the Biden doctrine (Brands, 2021). Biden makes use of the existing, frequently overwhelming structures like Group of Seven, the Quad (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), the Indo-Pacific Strategy (“*A free and open Indo-Pacific*”), América Crece, T-12 (League of Digital Democracies), D-10 (Democracies 10) and the *Clean Network*, or is developing new ones such as B3W initiative

³⁸ SCO Opposes External Meddling, Builds Shield against Outside Forces. Global Times. 2021, September 17. URL: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202109/1234595.shtml> (accessed 20.02.2022)

(*Build Back Better World*), the Summit for Democracy, AUKUS or Trade and Technology Council (TTC) to advance hegemonic interests and contain “autocracies”. The first leader-level summit of the Quad was held in March 2021.³⁹ The Biden administration tries to give a new impetus to this grouping with the aim to incorporate it into the “global phalanx” and employ it against China. The G7 summit in Carbis Bay in June 2021 presented the B3W initiative to provide an alternative to the *Belt and Road Initiative* (BRI) in relation to the “strategic competition” with Beijing. The ambitious infrastructure project is focused on low- and middle-income countries from the Americas to Africa, Indo-Pacific and beyond. Representatives of the largest liberal democracies agreed on an investment worth at least 40 trillion USD. Both the ideologic background and financial sources come predominantly from the US. The idea can be interpreted as an expanded and updated version of the New Silk Road Initiative announced by the Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in 2011. It also builds on the *Blue Dot Network* (BDN) launched in 2019. Washington as a leading force of the B3W plans to engage the Development Finance Corporation, the Agency for International Development (USAID), the Export-Import Bank (EXIM), the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the US Trade and Development Agency or the Transaction Advisory Fund.⁴⁰ Generally, the US-led global initiative is in line with the *Strategic Competition Act of 2021*, one of the priorities of which is to counter the “malign influence of the Communist Party of China” worldwide, thus following the anti-Chinese discourse and policies of Trump’s era with its zero-sum-game logic. What, then, is Russia’s position amid the “strategic competition” between Washington and Beijing declared by the US political class?

Russia-US-China triangle. The first summit of Biden and Putin in Geneva, following the public accusations made by the US President⁴¹, could be interpreted as a step towards stabilization of the volatile and deteriorating relations. The

³⁹ Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement: “The Spirit of the Quad”. The White House. 2021, March 12. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/03/12/quad-leaders-joint-statement-the-spirit-of-the-quad/> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁴⁰ President Biden and G7 Leaders Launch Build Back Better World (B3W) Partnership. The White House. 2021c, June 12. URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/12/fact-sheet-president-biden-and-g7-leaders-launch-build-back-better-world-b3w-partnership/> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁴¹ The Czech Republic expressed an interest in the mediation of the meeting in Prague, but the plan was thwarted as a result of an unprecedented anti-Russian campaign in the country based on the allegation of Russia’s “terrorist act” on Czech territory in 2014. For greater detail see Zemánek (2021a; 2021b).

goal was not a reset of the relationship, and created a more realistic context. As Dmitry Suslov (2021) aptly expressed it, the realistic aim was to lay foundations for a “managed confrontation”. Moscow welcomed this initiative irrespective of the recent US actions perceived as hostile – sanctions, the expulsion of diplomats, hesitation in prolongation of the New START, forming a front against “autocracies”, engagement in Belarus, military provocations, labeling Russia’s President as a “killer”, accusations of attacks against other countries (the Czech Republic in 2014 in particular) and so on and so forth. The reasons behind Biden’s efforts are likely to be connected with China, as the latter has become the cardinal rival for Washington, replacing Russia.⁴² Therefore, Biden is motivated to seek sustainability in their relations with Moscow, notwithstanding deeply divergent interests and values. It seems to be a sequel to Trump’s vision to revive cooperation with Russia against China which failed primarily due to historical experience, and the mental and ideological inertia of the US establishment.

In both cases, nevertheless, it is still the same zero-sum-game perspective, calculated cooperation with one country against another. Whereas Washington took side with China several times in the last century, such a symbiosis never existed with Russia – with the exception of hints in the 1990s. The US supported Japan financially against Russia in the Russo-Japanese War at the beginning of the 20th century. They refused to recognize the USSR until 1933 as the last of the major powers, even though the rule of the Soviet regime had been a *fait accompli* long before this. The first bilateral agreement was concluded no earlier than 1964. In spite of the balance of power based on nuclear deterrence, both hegemons waged a wide array of proxy wars against each other. The US also imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union, for example in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The unique possibility to incorporate the new Russia into the Euro-Atlantic community after 1991 miscarried predominantly due to the West’s arrogant belief of superiority and hegemonism (NATO expansion eastwards, support for separatism in Russia, disrespect for Russia’s specific conditions, interests and needs). Given these experiences, it is hard to expect that any kind of “Russiamerica” (akin to “Chinamerica”) will emerge in the future

⁴² Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. 2021, April 09. URL: <https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

and oppose anyone, unless other emerging non-Western actors adopt a radical anti-Russian attitude. The Biden-Putin summit was merely aimed to find an elementary level of understanding and communication which had been lost because of the extreme politicization of the Russian question in the US under Donald Trump. Russia became one of the main factors in the domestic political struggle. It made a constructive policy towards Moscow impossible. Unlike the preceding President, Joe Biden is not accused of having ties with the Kremlin in the public discourse, which paradoxically may facilitate mutual interactions (Kortunov, 2021, p. 7-10).

Regardless of discrepancies, the Geneva summit can be interpreted in terms of starting talks about “strategic stability”.⁴³ The US side has made a constructive step when agreeing with the extension of the New START which remains in force until 2026. Both major powers could also find a way of cooperation in the field of cybersecurity, especially cybercrime, and at least define rules of cyberwarfare. Another area of possible cooperation concerns the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, as well as climate change and green transition (Suslov, 2021). The latter became easier after the US rejoined the *Paris Agreement*. The war on terrorism was an exception where Russia and the US managed to intensify cooperation during Trump’s presidency (Shakirov, 2020, p. 8). This tendency could continue under Biden. Similarly, both powers will be confronted with a move towards militarization and exploitation of outer space and new regions such as the Arctic, which will require the establishment of rules and a legal framework (Shakirov, 2020, p. 10). The dynamic development, disruptions and innovations in many fields (cyberspace, the Arctic, outer space) will push both Moscow and Washington into interacting and seeking pragmatic solutions. However, the confrontation will be a harsh reality. Russia belongs to the “autocratic camp” and the unprecedented level of cooperation and understanding between Moscow and Beijing is already raising concerns among the liberal democracies. Some experts, therefore, warn about the West’s possible attempts to undermine the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, taking the side of either the Russians or the Chinese (Kortunov, 2021, p. 27). Others even call upon the Western political

⁴³ U.S. – Russia Presidential Joint Statement on Strategic Stability. Kremlin 2021, June 16. URL: <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5658> (accessed 20.02.2022)

elites to rupture the “axis of the autocratic powers” (Kendall-Taylor & Shullman, 2021). Still, such a scenario is merely wishful thinking.

Although the 2021 NSS is very concise as far as the relationship with China is concerned⁴⁴, the real state of affairs is much more vivid. Possibly, the laconism of the NSS is intended to weaken the assertions, according to which the Sino-Russian “axis” is a *de facto* alliance, and to emphasize Russia’s multi-vector external orientation, excluding superiority of partnership with one country. Whatever the reasons, the fact is that Sino-Russian relations have reached the highest level in history. The legal framework of the bilateral interactions is defined by the *Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation* concluded in 2001. On the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the signing of this fundamental document, both sides issued a *Joint Statement*⁴⁵ that reflects the unprecedented development of the comprehensive partnership, demonstrating its specific, innovative nature, being an example of a new type of interstate relations in our era.

The document characterizes bilateral ties as a “comprehensive partnership”, “strategic interaction”, “international relations of a new type” and a “model of harmonious coexistence” based on the “comprehensive consideration of the partner’s interests and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs”. Refusing the concept of a military or political alliance of the past, both actors stress that the partnership is not directed against third sides.⁴⁶ Undoubtedly, we are witnesses of a peculiar phenomenon that can anticipate new forms of interactions in the reformed, polycentric, regions-based order. After all, China is a pioneer of such a shift, if we take into consideration the nature and specific forms of the Belt and Road Initiative, 16+1 (Central and Eastern Europe + China) and other analogic formats in different regions. Unlike these, the Sino-Russian relationship is bilateral and its crucial significance is connected with objective factors, as well as the fact that both major powers are the engines of the Eurasian integration and pillars of the emerging new order.

⁴⁴ Strategiiia natsional’noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Kremlin (National Security Strategy 2021). 2021, July 02. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/QZw6hSk5z9gWq0pID1ZzmR5cER0g5tZC.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁴⁵ Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. Kremlin. 2021, June 28. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/en/Bo3RF3JzGDvMAPjHBQAUsemVPWTEvb3c.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁴⁶ Ibid.

The June *Joint Statement*⁴⁷ defines the overall direction and priorities of the Sino-Russian partnership for the ongoing period. (1) The major emphasis is put on Putin-Xi diplomacy as the cornerstone and guarantee of successful development. Mutual meetings at leaders' level are very frequent and regular. The same applies to the lower levels (PMs, ministers or state agencies). (2) Military and military technology cooperation are in second place. It regards not only joint exercises, military exchanges or purchases of armaments but also the reduction of armed forces in the border areas. Both China and Russia have expanded the military cooperation and potential through multilateral platforms, particularly the SCO. (3) The economic and trade ties are seen as a substantial element of the social development and improvement of the people's living standards. The goals are set as follows: (i) to increase the volume of bilateral trade; (ii) to strengthen energy cooperation; (iii) to deepen financial interaction, support the expansion of mutual payments in national currencies in trade; (iv) to strengthen cooperation in the field of industry, information and communication technologies, space and aviation; (v) to enhance cooperation in the scientific and technological innovations; (vi) to ensure protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights; (vii) to increase cooperation in agro-industry; (viii) to deepen interactions in the field of transport; (ix) to strengthen cooperation within the Northern Sea Route (or the so-called Polar Silk Road), promoting sustainable development of the Arctic; (x) to enhance interregional ties. (4) The expansion of interregional ties is of the utmost importance given the obvious tendency towards regionalization as an accompanying phenomenon of globalization at the current stage of development that is typical of the ambivalent logic of integration and autonomization, openness and introversion. The Eurasian macro-region is the most dynamic space in this regard as it includes several grand integration processes, starting with the *Belt and Road Initiative*, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Eurasian Economic Union subsumed into the overarching vision of the *Greater Eurasian Partnership* (GEP), and ending with the European Union in the Western part of Eurasia.

The abovementioned projects (with the exception of the EU) are crucial to redefining the international order, embodying the new paradigm as a perspec-

⁴⁷ Ibid.

tive of the emancipating and rising non-Western world, seeking full-fledged recognition, equity and participation (Zemánek, 2020, p. 200). Not by coincidence, the GEP is mentioned in the recent Russian NSS for the first time ever.⁴⁸ Agreement on the basic values and principles of the international order between Russia and China is crucial as it multiplies the relevance, attraction and influence of the new paradigm. The *Joint Statement* replicates the wording of the Russian strategic documents. The mutual understanding can be demonstrated in Russia's explicit recognition of the China-proposed concept of building a community of shared future for humanity and China's concurrent recognition of the concept of multipolar global order pursued by Russia for a long period.⁴⁹ Both major powers have the identical perception of the main risks in terms of the international stability and security – unilateralism and undermining of the UN-based legal framework (the withdrawal from several arms control agreements made by the US), development of the US missile defense system, building high-precision non-nuclear weapons, militarization and the arms race in outer space, or the so-called *Three Evils* of terrorism, separatism and extremism. Moscow and Beijing make a commitment to pursue multilateralism and keep global stability through developing regional partnerships and integration as a step towards the community with a shared future for mankind, protecting security through the establishment of a global information security system (China's *Global Initiative on Data Security* as an alternative to the US-led *Clean Network*) with the sovereign states' right to regulate the national segment of the Internet, as well as promoting a multilateral and open trading system with the WTO as its core.⁵⁰

Despite being labelled “autocratic”, both Russia and China adhere to democracy and human rights. The cause of controversies between these countries and the West rests in the simple fact that Russia and China admit the existence of multiple democracies and conceptions of human rights.⁵¹ They are more open,

⁴⁸ Strategiiia natsional'noi bezopasnosti Rossiiskoi Federatsii. Kremlin (National Security Strategy 2021). 2021, July 02. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/QZw6hSk5z9gWq0pID1ZzmR5cER0g5tZC.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁴⁹ Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the Twentieth Anniversary of the Treaty of Good Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China. Kremlin. 2021, June 28. URL: <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/en/Bo3RF3JzGDvMAPjHBQAUsemVPWTEvb3c.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of China and Russia on Certain Aspects of Global Governance in Modern Conditions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2021, March 23. URL: https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4647776 (accessed 20.02.2022)

plural and tolerant than the West with its monism and moralism, hampering pragmatic cooperation to the benefit of all members of the global community. The gradual building of the Greater Eurasian Partnership comprising manifold integration processes, development patterns as well as political models, and based on both common interests and shared principles, creates a new normative framework, significantly influenced by Russian perspective as enshrined in the basic national strategic documents. The rising Eurasian community poses a great challenge to the European Union that has been caught in a trap of Euro-Atlanticism. It inevitably complicates relations with Russia and China.

The EU and Russia: seeking a new modus vivendi. The EU elites decided to follow the path of *strategic autonomy*. While commenced in the field of the defense industry, the concept has gradually spread to other fields including economy, technology, politics, research and development or education. The concept became a part of the *Common Security and Defense Policy* (CSDP) in 2013, before the split with Moscow and in the times of the record mutual trade exchange and deepening relations (Shkolyar, 2021). After the crisis around Ukraine erupted, the strategic autonomy expanded into the external policies, being present in the 2016 *EU Global Strategy*. It is a similar process compared to that in Russia where the concept of sovereignty started to be employed in different fields including economy, power industry, information or culture, thus not limiting itself to the foreign policy or military. Securitization of the individual fields is accompanied by the introduction of the concept of sovereignty into new contexts. The same applies to strategic autonomy in the EU. Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, published an article *Why European Strategic Autonomy Matters* in which he explains the reasons for this strategy. Borrell explicitly admits that strategic autonomy is a “process of political survival” given the objective tendency of decline in the European significance and influence in the world.⁵² It is therefore connected with the protection of the “European way of life” (irrespective of the controversial and obscure nature of this term), development of the independent position and

⁵² Borrell, J. B. *Why European Strategic Autonomy Matters*. European External Action Service. 2020, December 03. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/89865/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en (accessed 20.02.2022)

distinctive “mission” within the global community and, last but not least, with the economic base.

Face to face with Trump’s protectionism, unilateralism, growing international instability and rivalry, as well as the coronavirus pandemic, the EU elites noticed the Union’s vulnerability and weak points of interdependence. From this perspective, strategic autonomy can be interpreted as a positive effort to make the EU one of the poles in the multipolar world, globalized and regionalized at the same time. Donald Trump’s America First policy, China’s dual circulation and Russia’s comprehensive sovereignty are of a similar nature even though the individual characteristics vary. Within the EU’s strategic autonomy, Brussels endeavors to boost the international role of the euro, regulate and control foreign investment (through screening mechanisms) or critical infrastructure (including 5G, energy sector or health service) as well as increase the military capabilities. It has launched the European Development Fund (EDF), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), European Battery Alliance (EBA), European Raw Material Alliance (ERMA), Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and many other projects in different fields. The EU aspires to deepen self-sufficiency in some regards, particularly those having strategic significance, to increase domestic production and decrease the role of import where the latter collides with the Union’s interests. In response to the results of the G7 summit in Carbis Bay and following the European Commission’s Asian strategy called *Connecting Europe and Asia – Building Blocks for an EU Strategy* announced in 2018, the Council of the EU approved the basic framework for the initiative *A Globally Connected Europe*, a rival project of the BRI.⁵³ It subsequently materialized in the project of the *Global Gateway* that explicitly declares the goal to expand the “EU’s democratic values”.⁵⁴ The new global infrastructure plan is, however, prepared in close cooperation with Washington, as German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas avowed, and builds on partnerships with India and Japan.⁵⁵ It will

⁵³ A Globally Connected Europe: Council Approves Conclusions. European Council. 2021, July 12. URL: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/12/a-globally-connected-europe-council-approves-conclusions/> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁵⁴ Global Gateway: up to €300 billion for the European Union’s strategy to boost sustainable links around the world. European Commission. 2021, December 01. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_6433 (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁵⁵ Emmott, R., & Siebold, S. After G7 Pledge, EU Seeks to Rival China’s ‘Belt and Road’ with Own Infrastructure Plan. Reuters, 2021, July 12. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/china/after-g7-pledge-eu-seeks-rival-chinas-belt-road-with-own-infrastructure-plan-2021-07-12/> (accessed 20.02.2022)

therefore be predisposed to become misused for the US-led confrontation with “autocracies”.

The gradual integration of national military capability and formation of the EU army can also be subsumed into the strategic autonomy. Integration in this field poses serious risks in terms of the individual member states, at the same time, however, it can result in emancipation from Washington and NATO or a substantial transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance. Obviously, Borrell understands the importance of the strategic autonomy and its potential, nevertheless, being still unable to overcome the Euro-Atlantic paradigm as demonstrated by the following words: “[N]o one disputes the vital character of the transatlantic relationship and no one advocates the development of a fully autonomous European force outside NATO, which remains the only viable framework to ensure the territorial defense of Europe”.⁵⁶ In fact, the opposite is true. If the EU wants to position itself as an independent center of power, if it aspires to a sovereign policy, if the highest representatives are serious about the need for the EU to assume responsibility for itself, the Euro-Atlantic concept must be abandoned. The EU will not play an independent role in the world if remains subordinated to the US. Until the Union does not emancipate from Washington, integration of the Eurasian macro-region, a common space from Lisbon to Vladivostok and Jakarta free of confrontation and dividing lines will be a mere vision.

Notwithstanding Russia’s pivot to the East, Moscow still reiterates its readiness to deepen cooperation with the EU. Formal ties began in 1997 when the *Partnership and Cooperation Agreement* (PCA) was concluded, establishing a general framework of the EU-Russian political and economic relations. In 2003, both sides agreed on four “common spaces”, strengthening the strategic partnership. It included the creation of common economic space, cooperation in the field of both internal and external security and justice, research, education and culture. In 2010, Moscow and Brussels launched a new *Partnership for Modernization* on the 25th EU-Russian summit in Rostov-on-Don, addressing common

⁵⁶ Borrell, J. B. Why European Strategic Autonomy Matters. European External Action Service. 2020, December 03. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/89865/why-european-strategic-autonomy-matters_en (accessed 20.02.2022)

challenges and problems, for instance, those emerging from the global economic crisis.⁵⁷ Recently, Foreign Minister Lavrov reminded the progress made by both actors prior to 2014 as well as Russia's proactiveness, when putting forward the *European Security Treaty* to establish a common security area, the idea of a common energy complex, the joint committee on foreign policy and security, cooperation in crisis management or visa-free regime, the latter being a step from realization. Mutual interaction was increasingly intensive at different levels, including the political one. Permanent Partnership Council as the main working body of the EU-Russia cooperation was active, joint summits were held every six months, the Russian Government and the European Commission held a joint session once a year.⁵⁸ The gradual building of Greater Europe was a reality. However, this auspicious development failed in 2014. The EU suspended mutual initiatives, imposed sanctions and joined the US confrontational policy. Since 2016, the EU's approach to Russia is guided by five principles: (1) full implementation of the Minsk agreements; (2) strengthening the Eastern Partnership, involving other countries from the region; (3) building Union's resilience in the field of energy security, hybrid threats or strategic communication; (4) selective engagement with Moscow in chosen areas; (5) promoting people-to-people contacts and supporting Russian "civil society".⁵⁹ The official discourse vis-à-vis Russia remains hostile. The European Council arranged the first strategic debate on Russia in May 2021. The result was not a plan how to improve the relationship but a simple condemnation of the "illegal, provocative and disruptive Russian activities against the EU, its Member States and beyond".⁶⁰

The political confrontation does not correspond with other ways of interaction whatsoever. Irrespective of the restrictive measures, Russia is the EU's fifth-largest trade partner while the EU remains Russia's biggest trade partner. The EU also accounts for up to 75% of all foreign direct investment in the coun-

⁵⁷ EU and Russia Launch New Partnership for Modernization. European Commission. 2010, June 01. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_10_649 (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁵⁸ Lavrov, S. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Remarks at a Conference on Relations between Russia and the European Union. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2021a, May 31. URL: https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/ckNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4759042 (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁵⁹ EU-Russia Relations: Commission and High Representative Propose the Way forward. European Commission. 2021, June 16. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3010 (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁶⁰ Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on EU-Russia relations – Push Back, Constrain and Engage. European Commission. 2021, June 16. URL: <https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/joint-communication-eu-russia-relations.pdf> (accessed 20.02.2022)

try. Similar is the situation in the energy sector. Almost two thirds of Russia's oil exports, two thirds of the gas exports and approximately half of its coal exports go to the EU. At the same time, up to 26% of EU oil imports and 40% of gas imports come from Russia.⁶¹ The economic interdependence has thus remained deep. The mutual interactions and exchange would even intensify in case of political normalization. The Russian side has also repeatedly raised the question of linking the EAEU with the EU, but Brussels conditions the debate by normalization.⁶²

The European (and Western) vector is absent in the 2021 NSS, but the Russian leadership have sent messages that Moscow is interested in stable ties and revival of the strategic partnership. Vladimir Putin published an article in the German newspaper *Die Zeit* in June 2021. The Russian President speaks out in favor of “constructive interdependence”, “comprehensive partnership”, “common space of equal cooperation, security and prosperity from the Atlantic to the Pacific”, thus reaffirming the continuity of the basic principles and goals of Russia's European policy regardless of the shift after 2014. Putin emphasizes Russia's cultural and historical affinity with Europe, expressing his long-term belief that the partnership is to be grounded in the close relationship between Moscow and Berlin.⁶³ Sergei Lavrov presented a somewhat more skeptical attitude in December 2020, asserting that even though the EU could play a role of an independent pole in the multipolar global system, it has allegedly given up this ambition as shown by German and French recent policies following the concept of “rules-based multilateralism”.⁶⁴ Multilateralism as such is positive (as opposed to Trump's unilateralism) but the Western notion of it is exclusive and permeated with pseudo-universalism, moralism and superiority. In a sense, it is an expanded unilateralism as it does not accept “the others” on equal terms. The EU's multilateralism is conditioned with adherence to the currently proclaimed

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Lavrov, S. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Remarks at a Conference on Relations between Russia and the European Union. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2021a, May 31. URL: https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4759042 (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁶³ Putin, V. Stat'ia Vladimira Putina «Byt' otkrytymi, nesmotria na proshloe» (Putin: Be Open, Regardless of the Past). Kremlin. 2021, June 22. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/65899> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁶⁴ Lavrov, S. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's Remarks at a Conference on Relations between Russia and the European Union. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2021a, May 31. URL: https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4759042 (accessed 20.02.2022)

European (Western) values and rules, to liberal democracy.⁶⁵ The development of the rules-based order (RBO) can undermine the UN-based international system that is multilateral and inclusive. The RBO is liberal in its essence and denies the equal existence of different patterns and models, whether they are political, economic or cultural. These reasons lie behind Lavrov's critical remarks. In another article, the Foreign Minister relates the EU's reinterpretation of multilateralism to the need for an ideological justification in maintaining the West's declining power in the transforming world order.⁶⁶

Russia wants the EU to be a pole in a multipolar system. Not a few political actors in Europe are interested in equal and win-win cooperation with its biggest neighbor, but the decision-making processes continue to be dominated by adherents of Euro-Atlanticism who obstruct normalization and a restart of mutual relations. Signs of a more constructive, rational and pragmatic policy can, nevertheless, be observed throughout the continent. French President Emmanuel Macron stated in May 2021 that anti-Russian sanctions were not working, calling upon the European Commission to rethink its confrontational position.⁶⁷ Shortly after, Macron and Chancellor Angela Merkel declared that maintaining dialogue with Russia was crucial in terms of security and stability.⁶⁸ Both leaders subsequently put forward the idea to convene the EU-Russia summit. However, the initiative was foiled by the Baltic states and Poland.⁶⁹ Hungary, Greece, Italy and Portugal belong to countries that are in favor of normalization, or that are even developing relations with Moscow. Amidst tensions at the beginning of February 2022, Viktor Orbán made an official visit to Russia, showing an example of a constructive, win-win relationship despite Hungary's membership in NATO and the EU.⁷⁰ Viktor Orbán's "illiberal democracy" with multi-vector

⁶⁵ Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the European Council and the Council on Strengthening the EU's Contribution to Rules-Based Multilateralism. European Commission. (2021, February 17). URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/en_strategy_on_strengthening_the_eus_contribution_to_rules-based_multilateralism.pdf (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁶⁶ Lavrov, S. (2021). O prave, pravakh i pravilakh (On Law, Rights and Rules). *Global Affairs*, June 28. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/o-prave-pravah-i-pravilah/> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁶⁷ Rettman, A. Macron: EU Sanctions on Russia Do not Work. *EU Observer*. 2021, May 26. URL: <https://euobserver.com/world/151946> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁶⁸ Merkel, Macron: 'Russia Is a Big Challenge for Us'. *Deutsche Welle*. 2021, June 18. URL: <https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-macron-russia-is-a-big-challenge-for-us/a-57960118> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁶⁹ Siebold, S., & Emmott, R. France and Germany Drop Russia Summit Plan after EU's East Objects. *Reuters*. 2021, June 25. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/france-germany-drop-plans-russia-summit-after-eu-outcry-2021-06-25/> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁷⁰ News Conference Following Russian-Hungarian Talks. *Kremlin*. 2022, February 01. URL: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67690> (accessed 20.02.2022)

external orientation and concurrent affiliation to Western structures is an inspiring model. Furthermore, the prospective successful fulfilment of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline would be a symbol of win-win bilateral cooperation with Russia despite US sanctions. It seems that – under the current circumstances – bilateral interactions represent a more viable path compared to the EU-Russia level, which is extremely politicized. Increasing bilateral relations could subsequently affect the collective decisions and actions.

Neither the EU nor Russia will be able to overcome the essential discrepancies in the years to come. The relationship will likely become a “cold partnership” (Fischer & Timofeev, 2020). It corresponds with the EU’s selective engagement policy presented by the Joint Communication on the EU’s relations with Russia in June 2021 in accordance with the five principles guiding the Union’s Russian strategy. Josep Borrell summarized it as follows: “Our ambition should be to explore paths that could help change the current dynamics gradually into a more predictable and stable relationship. The EU will simultaneously push back, constrain and engage with Russia, based on a strong common understanding of Russia’s aims and an approach of principled pragmatism”.⁷¹ The dialectics of confrontation, containment, deterrence, sanctioning on one hand and moderate selective cooperation on the other seem to be the reality of the EU-Russia interactions of the coming years, whether this is called a “cold partnership” or “managed confrontation”.

Conclusion

Interactions between Russia and “the rest” can be characterized in terms of binary alternation of *openness* (and endeavor to follow and adopt external developmental patterns: political, economic, social or cultural) and *introversion*. Prior to 2014, Russia succeeded in integrating into the international structures in many respects but rather as an independent center with its own interests, goals and pretenses, not as a minor, marginal partner of the dominating Western powers. It gradually sobered up from the initial enthusiasm for the West

⁷¹ EU-Russia Relations: Commission and High Representative Propose the Way forward. European Commission. 2021, June 16. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3010 (accessed 20.02.2022)

and the temptation of liberal democracy. Face to face with the NATO expansion eastwards, Western support for Chechen Islamists, separatist forces within Russia, anti-Russian forces in the post-Soviet countries, experiences with wars in Afghanistan, Iraq and Yugoslavia, the role of the Western countries in the color revolutions, weakening of the central role of the United Nations, stagnation of the West after the 2008 economic crisis and – last but not least – cultural wars and progressivist tendencies in the West, Russia revised its conceptual framework, put an end to Westernization, turned to the East and rejected the Western developmental pattern as an example to follow (Bratersky, 2014, p. 54-55, 60-61). The final reversal happened in 2014 in connection with the crisis in Ukraine. The vision of Russia's integration in Euro-Atlantic security systems including NATO did not take place either. If Yeltsin, Putin or Medvedev (and Gorbachev before them) hoped for the West to recognize Russia as an equal, full-fledged, important and sovereign member of a single Western community, they must have been deeply disappointed (Kotkin, 2001). Russia opened unprecedentedly to the West but the latter remained closed.

What is Russia like today, then? The new, still emergent, post-Soviet Russia is lacking a comprehensive ideology. It avoids extremes, rethinking its position and role in the international order. It rejected the radical openness of the 1990s, refusing to be an isolated fortress. It can rather be characterized as finding a middle path. The absence of a strong, high-profiled ideology need not be a shortcoming for the time being. On the contrary, pragmatism enables flexibility and synthesis of heterogeneous elements. The new Russia has brought an end to dogmatism, messianism and seeking utopia, be it religious (Holy Rus', the Third Rome) or quasi-religious (Communism) (Lukin, 2018a, p. 150). The recent state is close to the Chinese principle of seeking truth from facts. The new Russia wants to revive or safeguard positive traditions and social patterns while adopting external elements where useful or necessary. The ruling elites have realized that building a strong state is an objective need and a rational choice for their country. Historical experiences teach them that Russia cannot get along without this social institute, as otherwise the society falls into chaos, as happened in the *smutnoe vremia* (Time of Troubles) of the early 17th century, after the fall of the monarchy in 1917 or in the 1990s. Andrei Tsygankov (2014, p. viii-ix) observes that a strong state has been advocated by socialists, liberals, conservatives as

well as Eurasianists, and so the question is not whether a strong state will be established in Russia or not – the only question is what the Russian strong state will be like. While combining traditional etatism or patrimonialism, social-liberal economic policies with conservatism in terms of values, Russia develops a “managed” or “illiberal” democracy internally. From the external point of view, Russia cultivates pragmatic relations with different countries, regions and organizations, putting an emphasis on the principles of peaceful coexistence. It wants to be engaged in global processes and institutions, pursuing integration but at the same time insists on independence, autonomy, non-interference. Learning lessons from both the past experiences and the present objective developmental tendencies, the Russian leadership has arrived at *comprehensive sovereignty* and *stability* which is the leading principle of official policies in post-2014 Russia.

In search of a new model of the global order, maintaining some fundamentals of the present one, particularly the central role of the UN, while rejecting others with the unipolar US-based hegemonism at the top, Russia collides and clashes with revisionist attempts of the Western actors who oppose the idea of global polycentric architecture, being imbued with cold-war mentality, confrontational notion of a permanent struggle against “autocrats of the world”, and superiority of liberal democratic model as well as Western values. These characteristics are embodied in the concept of the “rules-based international order” that substitutes the international law and principles emerging from the UN for particularist moral categories and haphazardly introduced rules. Such pressure inevitably provokes resistance among the “rest”. The concurrent containment of Russia and China has also resulted in an unprecedented level of mutual understanding and cooperation between the Eurasian major powers. Both countries’ ambassadors in Washington called for a “harmonious coexistence between countries with different social systems, ideologies, histories, cultures, and development levels” as a basis of what China calls the “community with a shared future for mankind”⁷² in November 2021. Against the Western hegemonism, these Eurasian major powers uphold the legitimacy of pluriversum and diversity, in-

⁷² Antonov, A., & Qin, G. Russian and Chinese Ambassadors: Respecting People’s Democratic Rights. National Interest. 2021, November 26. URL: <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/russian-and-chinese-ambassadors-respecting-people-s-democratic-rights-197165> (accessed 20.02.2022)

cluding multiple modernities or democracies. This lower-level declaration was reaffirmed by the joint statement of President Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin “on international relations entering a new era and global sustainable development”, made on the occasion of the 24th Olympic Winter Games in Beijing in February 2022. The document can be perceived as a manifesto against hegemonism and militarism as seen in the ongoing NATO expansion or the establishment of AUKUS, thus promoting cooperation and solidarity instead of confrontation and divisions.⁷³

Euro-Atlanticism will be a source of frictions and one of the major obstacles to a peaceful move forward, global restructuring, and the establishment of a common security area including both Europe and Russia. Unless Washington gives up its claims to control the European subcontinent, a sustainable solution of conflicts between Russia and Europe will not be reached. And genuine negotiations about Moscow’s security concerns and national interests are also unlikely to be held, as was shown by the intensified interactions and crisis bargaining in the first weeks of 2022, in which the US and Joe Biden’s himself played an inauspicious role.⁷⁴ Russia’s security requirements aimed at a multilateral, comprehensive security settlement in Europe were denied.⁷⁵

A new impetus to Euro-Atlanticism was given by Biden’s electoral victory. The US President managed to revive the mutual partnership and Western multilateralism based on liberal principles and embodied by the rules-based order. Washington made necessary concessions to overcome the mistrust that emerged under Donald Trump and amid scandals concerning US spying on their European allies.⁷⁶ The EU elites, however, cannot forget the experience with Biden’s predecessor who exposed the allies to serious uncertainty. Trump’s unilateralism and “America First” policy contributed to the development and legitimacy of the strategic autonomy in the EU. Paradoxically, Trumpism played

⁷³ Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development. Kremlin. 2022, February 04. URL: <http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770>

⁷⁴ Tsygankov, A. P. Liberal Messianism and the Ukraine Crisis Have Turned Joe Biden into a Russia Hawk. Canadian Dimension. 2022, February 17. <https://canadiandimension.com/articles/view/liberal-messianism-and-the-ukraine-crisis-have-turned-joe-biden-into-a-russia-hawk> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁷⁵ Obrashchenie Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Presidential Address). Kremlin. 2022, February 21. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67828> (accessed 20.02.2022)

⁷⁶ Henley, J. Denmark Helped US Spy on Angela Merkel and European Allies – Report. The Guardian, 2021, May 31. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/may/31/denmark-helped-us-spy-on-angela-merkel-and-european-allies-report> (accessed 20.02.2022)

a progressive role, and made the “autonomization” of individual countries or regions (the US, the EU, China, Russia) inevitable. All these actors have set out a path of development for mobilizing and focusing on domestic sources and potential, and deepening integration with their close partners, thus reaffirming the tendency towards regionalization within globalization. The EU’s strategic autonomy, Russia’s comprehensive concept of sovereignty and China’s dual circulation can be interpreted as a manifestation of the transformation of the global order towards polycentrism. As such, it may avert a slide into a new, China-US bipolarity, even though bipolarity coincides with the West’s predisposition to a dualist or Manichaeian way of thinking (Zhao & Kortunov, 2020). This shift entails the risk of deglobalization, particularism and conflicts, but I expect that given the existing long-term tendencies and trajectories the scenario of *glocalization* and *pragmatic polycentrism* will prevail eventually.

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BRICS in Global Governance: A Gradual but Steady Expansion

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Abstract

BRICS is the most prominent organisation to have emerged in the non-Western sphere in the post-Cold War period. It has crystallised into a formal institution and has begun to play a crucial role in global governance. It has become a visible entity that is increasingly making a mark in global investments, sustainable development, trade negotiations, climate change talks and deliberations on terrorism. The paper focusses on one generic question and three specific questions: First, what purpose does BRICS serve in global governance? Second, has the New Development Bank emerged as a credible source of financing for developing economies? Third, what role has BRICS played in climate change negotiations? And finally, what steps does BRICS take to counter the menace of global terrorism?

Key words

BRICS, global governance, developing economies, NDB, CRA, governance, climate change, terrorism

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BRICS is the most prominent organisation to have emerged in the non-Western sphere in the post-Cold War period. It began as a discussion forum to explore the possibility of co-operation and address a pronounced anomaly in

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global governance: the dominating presence of the West in key institutions of governance. Emerging states were catching up fast with developed economies, but their economic influence was not translated into a proportional influence in global governance. These states were particularly concerned about financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Trading Organization (WTO). They found these institutions to be unduly biased towards the prerequisites of Western states. The rules of financial assistance, investment and trade were tied to the restructuring of liberal economic and concomitant political ideologies. Emerging states had been demanding the reform of key institutions since the 1990s, but this reached a crescendo after the 2008 financial crisis. This crisis demolished several myths associated with American capitalism. Unlike previous crises, it had its origin in the US, its ripple effects were felt primarily in the West, and countries like China and India remained largely unharmed. The G7 lost its prestige because its capacity to enforce laws diminished drastically. Financial governance became a real challenge because the success of western policies now depended largely upon the active co-operation of BRICS states. A phase of tussle, co-option and parallel institutionalisation began during this period. Two important developments occurred during this period: the G7 shifted gear to the G20, and emerging countries formalised their association to constitute BRIC in 2009.

The term BRICs owes its genesis to Jim O'Neill, but the aspiration for a collective grouping dates back to the late 1990s. Yevgeny Primakov, the Prime Minister of Russia, floated the idea of a "strategic triangle" in the form of RIC, i.e., Russia, India and China, during his New Delhi visit in 1998 (Kumar, 2017). Moscow expected a sympathetic audience as New Delhi and Beijing also held grudges against the US hegemonic order. RIC held its first meeting in 2001, when the foreign affairs ministers of Russia, China and India met in New York. Its economic expansion and global presence led RIC to incorporate new members and become BRIC in Yekaterinburg in 2009. BRICS has crystallised into a formal institution and has begun to play a crucial role in global governance. It has become a visible entity that is increasingly making a mark in global investments, infrastructure development, aid, sustainable development, trade negotiations, climate change talks and deliberations on terrorism. It is an organisation in its infancy, and much of its analysis is speculative and based on future projections.

The article does not cover every aspect of BRICS. It is confined to one generic question and three specific questions: First, what purpose does BRICS serve in global governance? Second, has the New Development Bank (NDB) emerged as a credible source of financing for developing economies? Third, what role has BRICS played in climate change negotiations? And finally, what steps does BRICS take to counter the menace of global terrorism?

Expansive Economic Outreach of BRICS

How credible is the argument that BRICS has expanded its global footprint? A long-term overview of growth in BRICS countries offers an accurate perspective on where they are headed in the next two decades. China and India were leading economies from the 17th to the early 19th century. However, their combined share in global income later began to decline; it dropped from 49 per cent in 1820 to 9 per cent in 1950 (Nayyar, 2016, p. 578). BRICS economies, except Russia, remained peripheral in the next three decades from 1950 to 1980. A remarkable turnaround took place in the period from 1980 to 2010 (Nayyar, 2016). The share of Brazil, India, China and South Africa in global GDP, calculated in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), was 12.2 per cent in 1980; it shot up to 15 per cent in 1990, 20.1 per cent in 2000, and 27.1 per cent in 2008. At the time of its inception in 2010, the combined nominal market GDP of BRICS was \$12 trillion. It was almost three times less than the GDP of the G7, which stood at \$33 trillion. But in PPP terms, it was estimated at \$26 trillion, compared to \$30.9 trillion of the G7³.

Despite the financial crisis and recession, the aggregate economies of BRICS continued to register upward growth. The nominal GDP of BRICS rose to \$21 trillion in 2019, compared to \$39 trillion of the G7 (Mahbubani, 2021). BRICS GDP increased by 1.8 times compared to 1.2 times for the G7. The share of BRICS in global GDP was only 8 per cent in 2000 in nominal terms. It climbed to 24 per cent in 2019 (Mahbubani, 2021). Contrast that with the decline in the GDP of the G7 from 64 per cent to 44 per cent in the same period (2000-2019).

³ The World Bank (2012). World Bank Open Data. URL: <https://data.worldbank.org/> (accessed: 15.02.2022)

In terms of PPP, BRICS stood at \$41 trillion compared to the G7's \$43 trillion (Mahbubani, 2021). In 2010, the cumulative trade of BRICS was \$4.7 trillion. This shot up to \$6.8 trillion in 2018, constituting 17 per cent of total global trade. Intra-BRICS trade also expanded from \$459 billion in 2010 to \$684 billion in 2017⁴. China's trade with India, Russia and Brazil exceeded \$125 billion by 2021. India's trade with China was \$3 billion in 2000, and exceeded \$125 billion in 2021. China's trade with Russia was \$147 billion, and \$102.5 billion with Brazil in 2021. China is the biggest exporter with a share of about 50 per cent. Intra-BRICS investment was \$119.5 billion in more than 1000 projects (Bangari, 2021). India was the leading destination for intra-BRICS investment (35 per cent), followed by Russia (28 per cent) and Brazil (16 per cent).

All economic forecasts indicate that these economies are likely to surpass the G7 by 2032. India is expected to grow at an annual average rate of 7.9 per cent and China 6.0 at per cent during the 2022-25 period (IMF estimates in 2021). The economic expansion of BRICS can also be gauged from FDI patterns. BRICS received nearly 20 per cent of total global FDI in 2018 (Hiratuka, 2019). This was a jump of 14 per cent from the figure of 6 per cent in 2000. Interestingly, a huge chunk of the FDI went to the Western economies. BRICS has become the biggest investor in Africa, and its share was roughly 25 per cent in 2010⁵. BRICS is home to 142 of the top Fortune 500 companies (Kishora, 2021, p. 84). It is likely to contribute 50 per cent of the global GDP in PPP terms by 2050. BRICS accounted for 40 per cent of global infrastructure investment in 2019 (Kishora, 2021). The economic expansion of these states is steady despite cyclical crises and several endemic woes related to human development indices.

Their economic growth transformed them into confident and assertive negotiators. They withstood pressure in international negotiations on trade, services, investment and climate change. The WTO became the first clear forum for their hard-nosed negotiations. It must be remembered that they did not necessarily work as a bloc in trade negotiations, but they did collaborate when their interests converged. For instance, the BRICS countries worked together

⁴ Exim Bank of India. (2021). *Enhancing BRICS Cooperation: Way Forward*. URL: https://www.eximbankindia.in/Assets/pdf/research-on-states/EXIM_Bank_Enhancing_BRICS_Cooperation_Way_Forward_08092021.pdf (accessed: 15.02.2022)

⁵ UNCTAD. (2013). The Rise of BRICS FDI and Africa, *Global Investment Trends Monitor*, (12). URL: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/webdiaeia2013d6_en.pdf (accessed: 15.02.2022)

in negotiations with the WTO. Hopewell (Hopewell, 2017, p. 1378) contends that emerging countries, especially Brazil, India and China, challenged “the traditional structure of power within the World Trade Organization (WTO) and transformed the Doha Round of trade negotiations into a battle drawn along North-South lines”. Despite their diverse interests and objectives, they co-ordinated their negotiation strategy to advance their interests. They worked informally to counterbalance the West led by the US. To be specific, Brazil and India created G20-T, which raised the issue of subsidies given by the US and EU to their farmers (Hopewell, 2017, p. 1383). India also led the G33, which sought to protect the agricultural market of developing countries. Additionally, India, Brazil and South Africa provided leadership in securing exemptions on WTO intellectual property guidelines on health and medicinal products (Hopewell, 2017: 1384). As part of its strategy, China allowed Brazil and India to “do the fighting” while providing “support from behind” (Hopewell, 2017, p. 1385).

BRICS has become a potent force in global trading. The member states share common concerns on issues of agricultural and industrial subsidies provided by Western states. They oppose Western attempts to remove a country from the list of “developing status”, criticise the trade protectionism of developed countries, and favour data digitization and e-commerce (Arapova and Lissovolik, 2021). The 2021 BRICS statement declared that reformed multilateralism was not an “abstract idea” but an “essential tool for ensuring successful governance” (Roche, 2021). It further stated that the WTO members should “avoid unilateral and protectionist measures that run counter to the spirit and rules of the WTO” (Roche, 2021). It demanded the restoration of the two-stage WTO Dispute Settlement system, and appointment of all Appellate Body members.

Apart from its role in the WTO, BRICS members are united in their demands to reform the IMF and the World Bank. In virtually every declaration, BRICS expressed displeasure at the slow reform of the IMF and the World Bank (BRICS Declaration 2014, BRICS Statement, 2021). The World Bank and the IMF continue to remain under the control of the G7. The cumulative voting rights of BRICS are less than 15 per cent in both the IMF and the World Bank (Bangari, 2021: 135). Constant pressure for reform has led to some incremental reforms of the IMF. For instance, India’s voting rights went up from 2.3 to 2.6 per cent, and China’s from 3.8 to 6 per cent in 2016. India’s share of quota

increased from 2.44 to 2.7 per cent, China's from 4 to 6.39 per cent and Russia's from 2.5 to 2.71 per cent. It was also agreed that the executive director would be elected, and not selected. The latest BRICS Summit in New Delhi in 2021 reiterated its demand for quota review under the 15th General Review of Quota. It demanded a 16th review by 2023.

Role of the New Development Bank

BRICS launched the New Development Bank (NDB) in 2014. It was conceived as a bank for financing physical infrastructure and social development in emerging countries. The impression prevailed that the World Bank (WB) was not adequately funding infrastructure in developing countries. It focused more on poverty relief and "good governance". Furthermore, its assistance was subject to certain financial and political conditions. The West used development financing to bring policy change in the borrowing countries (Wang, 2019). BRICS pushed for reforms of the WB and the IMF, but it was constrained by the structure and rules of these institutions. Since the outcome of a game depends on the strength of players and the general rules of the game, BRICS wanted to change the rules (Xiujun, 2020). Thus, the NDB was conceived as a parallel institution that would collaborate with and compete against existing institutions.

It is believed that some economists such as Joseph Stiglitz, Nicholas Stern and Amar Bhattacharya proposed to the then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh the idea of creating a multilateral development bank (Batista, 2021). The Indian government pursued this idea with other members, which accepted it, although Russia was initially hesitant. The 2012 BRICS summit in New Delhi discussed the proposal further. The idea behind the creation of this Bank was not to subvert the WB or the IMF but to acquire a supportive role with focus on developing countries.

The NDB was to serve all the developing economies and not BRICS exclusively. For this purpose, a working group co-chaired by India and South Africa was created. India, China, and South Africa wanted to locate the headquarters of the bank in their territory. When negotiators favoured Shanghai as the location, India was dissatisfied (Batista, 2021). A compromise was found, whereby the headquarters of the bank would be in Shanghai and its first president would

be appointed by India. Thereafter, the following rotation system would be followed for the presidency: Brazil, Russia, South Africa, and lastly, China (Batista, 2021). South Africa managed to get the first regional office of NDB. Subsequently, regional offices were opened in Brazil and Russia. Work to start a regional office in India is currently in progress.

To meet funding requirements, the BRICS countries committed a capital of \$100 billion for the NDB (Xiujun, 2020). The NDB has funded several infrastructure and sustainable development projects. In 2015, BRICS initiated the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) for financial stability during the emergency balance of payment crisis. It has a reserve of \$100 billion to which China committed \$41 billion, South Africa \$5 billion and other members \$18 billion each. Some consider the CRA as a competitor of the IMF. But the CRA is linked to the IMF. For instance, if a country needs to borrow more than 30 per cent of its borrowing quota, it must first seek structural adjustment loans from the IMF before it can receive funds from the CRA⁶. The BRICS Economic Bulletin (2021) holds that “The BRICS CRA has achieved a new milestone in 2021 by conducting the IMF linked test run and initiating collaboration with the IMF”. It has become a pillar of the Global Financial Safety Net. The emergency reserve arrangement is for meeting short-term payment imbalances. It can help member countries in a potential liquidity crisis.

The NDB is unique in that it is based on the principle of equality. It has an equal-weight system. This principle is unparalleled in the history of global financial institutions. In contrast to the IMF and the World Bank, each member has equal capital share, and it is headed by a member state on a rotational basis. All members have equal rights in the NDB. Even though the nominal GDP of China is more than that of all other BRICS countries taken together, all the countries have equal voting shares (Lessambo, 2021). During negotiations, China did try to have the lion’s share of capital as well as votes, but other countries objected to this move (Batista, 2021). In the NDB, no decision requires consensus, as unanimity would amount to veto power (Batista, 2021). Decisions can be made with a simple majority or a qualified majority/special majority. However,

⁶ Juutinen, M. (2017, September 25). *The BRICS dilemma*. URL: <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/brics-dilemma/> (accessed: 15.02.2022)

in actual practice, the first president always favoured consensus. Therefore, no country has a dominant position. In fact, some argue that China created the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016 partly because it was dissatisfied with the NDB. It wanted a separate financial institution where it could play a dominant role.

The NDB started functioning successfully in 2015. All members deposited the required paid-in capital of the new bank on time. It was a demonstration of their commitment to the NDB. The first batch of projects, mostly renewable energy green projects, were cleared at the Ufa summit in July 2015. The bank issued the first bond in July 2016, a 5-year “green bond” denominated in renminbi (Yuan) for 3 billion (equivalent to about US\$ 450 million) (Batista, 2021). It was oversubscribed, and the coupon rate was only 3.07 per cent, which is slightly above the interest rate paid by China Development Bank.

The NDB also developed a strategy for 2017-2021. The general understanding is that two-thirds of the funds are to be used for creating sustainable infrastructure and the remaining one-third for environmental and biodiversity projects. It has cut down bureaucracy and set up a timeline for projects to speed up implementation. Therefore, identification and support of projects have to be completed in six months. It will also provide loans in local currencies to avoid external risks (Batista, 2021).

The political conflict between India and China affected the growth of the NDB. China's One Belt One Road (OBOR), or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), became a concern for India. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Indian territory. India did not join this flagship connectivity project of China. Thus, when China wanted the NDB to sign a memorandum of understanding to support the OBOR, India opposed it. Furthermore, the conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine has also affected the expansion plans of the bank, as nearly 40 countries have imposed sanctions on Russia. The West vetoes WB loans to Russia. India was in favour of expansion of the NDB initially, but it feared the inclusion of Pakistan with China's support.

During 2017 to 2021, discussions were held to expand BRICS. But nothing of the sort happened in the initial five years, and the NDB remained a hub of BRICS member states. This was mainly due to the reasons mentioned above, and because the first president of the bank was not very keen on expansion. How-

ever, new countries became members of the NDB later. Bangladesh, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Uruguay had become members by December 2021. As per Article 8 of the agreement of the NDB, the shares that new members must initially subscribe to are decided by the Board of Governors⁷. A special majority means affirmation by four of the founding members and two-thirds of the voting power of members. Even if new members are added, the founding members retain a 55% voting share as per the agreement on NDB. Currently, the NDB provides financial assistance of up to USD10 billion to member countries for crisis-related emergencies, including economic recovery in a fast-track process⁸. The NDB provided necessary loans to member countries to recover from the crisis caused by the COVID pandemic (Chellaney, 2021). In April 2020, the Bank issued a Coronavirus Combating Bond for approximately USD 700 million.

All member countries received COVID loans during the pandemic period. In 2020, China received a COVID 19 emergency response loan of RMB 7 billion. India, South Africa and Brazil received a loan of USD 1 billion to support healthcare facilities and other projects⁹. India and Brazil received another loan of USD 1 billion as an Emergency Assistance Programme for Economic Recovery in December 2020. The NDB doubled its loans and advances in 2021. NDB's total advances had amounted to USD 6.61 billion by the end of 2020. They reached USD 11.97 billion in the first nine months of 2021. The NDB had approved nearly 51 projects by 2021. 28 per cent of its total disbursement went to China, 27 per cent to India, 18 per cent to Russia, 16 per cent to South Africa and 10 per cent to Brazil (Mahbubani, 2021). Most of the loans were for transport, renewable energy, water and urban development projects. NDB's operations have been the largest in India (Kishora, 2021, p. 98). It had approved a total loan of \$7 billion to India by 2019, which accounted for 28 per cent of NDB's total approvals.

7 *Agreement on the New Development Bank – Fortaleza, July 15*. (2015, July 15). NDB. URL: <https://www.ndb.int/wp-content/themes/ndb/pdf/Agreement-on-the-New-Development-Bank.pdf> (accessed: 15.02.2022)

8 *NDB Annual Report*. (2020). NDB | New Development Bank. URL: <https://www.ndb.int/annual-report-2020/download.html> (accessed: 15.02.2022)

9 *Ibid*.

The NDB has emerged as an important institution for finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects and has lent immense credibility to the BRICS as an organisation. The NDB is a step towards formal institutionalisation and long-term collaboration. Its real impact will be visible in a few years.

Climate Change

Climate change has become an ominous threat. Already, the world has warmed up by 1.1 degree Celsius. Global efforts to reduce carbon emissions have picked up in a bid to keep global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. All five BRICS countries face serious climate issues. For Russia, the permafrost in the Arctic is melting on an unprecedented scale, and if the current trend continues, all of the Arctic ice will melt in a few decades. Forest fires have also become frequent. China is facing extreme weather conditions. In India, there have been flash floods and droughts in several regions and changes in weather patterns are evident. There have been unprecedented forest fires in Brazil and droughts in South Africa.

BRICS countries account for 42 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions (Kirton, 2020). China is responsible for 28 per cent of global emissions, and the US comes second with 15 per cent of emissions. India ranks third with 7 per cent of emissions, and Russia ranks fourth with 5 per cent of global emissions. South Africa and Brazil rank 13th and 14th with 1 per cent of emissions each (Kirton, 2020). Since the BRICS countries constitute the largest land area and population, they are central to all climate negotiations.

The environment ministers of BRICS meet regularly. Their 7th meeting was held in August 2021 in New Delhi. The member states have reiterated the need to “honour the commitments made by developed countries in the pre-2020 period, including the yearly \$100 billion goal for climate finance”¹⁰. BRICS is also concerned with proposals of unilateral carbon border adjustment, which may create trade barriers. The New Delhi Statement on Environment (2021) reaf-

¹⁰ Express News Service. (2021, August 28). BRICS countries pledge to work together to tackle climate change. *Indian Express*. URL: <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/brics-countries-pledge-to-work-together-to-tackle-climate-change-7474619/> (accessed: 15.02.2022)

firmed commitment to the Principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, including Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities (CBDR-RC).

Indian Prime Minister Modi pledged net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2070 at the COP26 summit held in Glasgow in November 2021. This is 10 years later than China. The BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) grouping praised developing countries for their climate commitments, although they do not bear the historical responsibility for causing climate change¹¹. At this meeting, India announced that it would generate 50 per cent of total electric power from renewable energy by 2030. It is expected to reduce emission of carbon by 1 billion tonnes between now and 2030¹².

Even though President Putin was absent, he sent a large delegation to the COP26 summit. Since Russia's leading trading partners, the EU and China, have made carbon neutrality pledges, Russia will be obliged to follow the guidelines. The EU plans to impose a carbon tax on goods imported from 2023 onwards. There is a possibility that demand for Russian oil, gas and coal may drop by 2030. Russia also set 2060 as the deadline for carbon neutrality. China aims to peak carbon dioxide emissions before 2030 and to achieve the target of carbon neutrality before 2060¹³. By 2030, China intends to reduce its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by over 65 per cent from the 2005 level. Brazil also announced its climate goals during the meeting. It would reduce emissions by 50 per cent by 2030 and achieve zero illegal deforestation by 2028. South Africa set a target of 17 per cent reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by 2025 and a 32 per cent reduction by 2030¹⁴.

All the BRICS states have engaged actively in climate change negotiations. They are not the main culprits of climate change, but they are willing to bear the cost of transition from fossil to non-fossil fuels. They insist on financial and

¹¹ BASIC Ministerial Joint Statement. (2021, November 10). *BASIC Ministerial Joint Statement at UNFCCC's Glasgow Climate Change Conference (COP 26/CMP 16/CMA3)*. URL: https://www.dffe.gov.za/basic_ministerial_joint_statement_unfccc%E2%80%99s_glasgow_climate_change_conference_cop26cmp16cma3 (accessed: 15.02.2022)

¹² TV BRICS. (2021, November 11). *Brazil, South Africa, India, China meet at COP26 in Glasgow | TV BRICS, 11.11.21*. URL: <https://tvbrics.com/en/news/ministers-of-brazil-south-africa-india-china-representing-basic-group-meet-at-cop26-in-glasgow/> (accessed: 15.02.2022)

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

technological assistance from developed states to undertake this transition. The declarations and statements of BRICS demonstrate its resolution to take larger global responsibilities in areas of non-traditional security.

Terrorism

Terrorism is another area where BRICS members have pledged co-operation. BRICS declarations clearly mention the Islamic State, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Haqqani network, Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement, and Hizb-ut-Tahrir as terrorist organisations (Kumar, 2017). Now that the Haqqani network is part of the government in Afghanistan, BRICS may gradually evolve a flexible strategy towards this organisation. On the issue of terrorism, there is a major disagreement between India and China on terrorist organisations operating from Pakistan. For instance, China objected to the Indian effort to designate Masood Azhar, the chief of Jaish-e-Mohammed, as a “global terrorist”. It discouraged India from raising the issue at the 2016 Goa Summit. China is unwilling to subscribe to the Indian narrative on terrorism. In a significant turnaround, however, New Delhi persuaded Beijing to name Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed as terrorist organisations at the 2017 BRICS summit in Xiamen.

India and Russia are two prime victims of radical ideology and terrorism. From their perspective, BRICS must evolve a strategy to deal with the menace of terrorism. The Moscow Virtual Summit of 2020 decided to call a convention on terrorism within the UN framework (BRICS Summit Moscow Declaration, 2020). New Delhi and Moscow are working closely on terrorism and other issues related to cyber security, terror financing and drug trafficking. BRICS formed the Counter Terrorism Working Group which met virtually in July 2021. It pledged to take specific steps to “implement the BRICS Counter Terrorism Strategy adopted by BRICS Leaders in 2020”¹⁵. The Action Plan will take measures to prevent and combat terrorism, check radicalisation, and stop financing of terrorism and misuse of cyberspace by terrorists.

¹⁵ Ministry of External Affairs, India (21 July, 2021), 6th Meeting of the BRICS Counter Terrorism Working Group. URL: https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/34089/6th_Meeting_of_the_BRICS_Counter_Terrorism_Working_Group (accessed: 15.02.2022)

Conclusion

In a short span of time, BRICS has emerged as a formidable organisation. It has belied its sceptics, who dismissed it as an “acronym without substance” or “too diverse to play a substantive role” in global governance. The evolution of BRICS as an organisation has been gradual and steady. It is an organisation in its infancy and has several contradictions, yet it has managed to achieve a remarkable level of institutionalisation and regularity. It did not cancel its summit even when two of its members, India and China, were embroiled in border standoffs.

The growth of BRICS economies is not uniform, but if we take a long-term perspective, it has risen significantly in the last few decades. China’s and India’s steady growth are bound to have epochal changes in global governance. The full impact of such a transition will be visible in the next two decades. Brazil, Russia and South Africa are undisputed leaders in their respective regions. Russia may have a weak economy, but its role in global security and regional stability cannot be overestimated. In other words, BRICS countries have become central to global governance. They have made their presence felt in global governance through their own forums or as members of other multilateral institutions such as the UN, the World Bank and the IMF.

This paper confined itself to four specific areas of global governance, but the de facto role of BRICS is far wider and extensive. It ranges from disaster management to education and scientific co-operation, migration, cultural co-operation and international security. BRICS members have become the core of WTO negotiations, climate talks, G20 deliberations, the UN Security Council and other financial institutions. They are gradually filling the vacuum created by the precipitous decline of the G7.

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Abstracts in Russian

Данные о статьях на русском языке

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

An Assessment of Neoliberal Coups: the 1973 Chilean Military Coup and the 1980 Turkish Military Coup

Nilay Ökten, Meral Balci

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Эффекты неолиберальных переворотов: чилийский военный переворот 1973 г. и турецкий военный переворот 1980 г.

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Аннотация: Авторы изучают экономические и политические эффекты неолиберального курса, реализуемого в результате военных переворотов. Влияние армии на экономическую политику и политическую историю рассматривается на примерах режимов, установленных после военных переворотов в Чили в 1973 г. и в Турции в 1980 г. В данном контексте анализируется фактор гегемона в лице США, которые в годы холодной войны и в целом в последней четверти XX века использовали местные вооруженные силы для экспорта неолиберализма. Подчеркивается, что стратегия непрямого вмешательства является менее затратной и более «легитимной» для государства-гегемона, имеющего достаточные экономические, военные и политические ресурсы для вооруженного вмешательства. На примере военных переворотов в Турции и Чили авторы фиксируют не прямое внешнее вмешательство через инструментализацию армии и приходят к выводу, что опосредованный экспорт неолиберализма являются продуктом гегемонии США.

Ключевые слова: неолиберализм, гегемония, США, Чили, Турция, военные перевороты

CURRENT DEBATES

Governance, Politics, and Economic Development: Some African Perspectives

Augustin Kwasi Fosu

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Управление, политика и экономическое развитие: африканский фокус

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Аннотация: В статье анализируется эволюция государственного управления в Африке после обретения государствами континента независимости сквозь призму концепций экономической свободы, электоральной конкуренции, политических прав и гражданских свобод, а также в контексте polity2. Автор рассматривает последствия реализации управленческой политики, основанной на данных принципах, для экономического развития Африки. Политическая дестабилизация, которая ведет к государственным переворотам и гражданским войнам, рассматривается как результат неэффективного государственного управления. Автор анализирует связь между основными показателями качества управления – Мировыми показателями управления Всемирного банка (WGI) – и фактическими результатами экономического развития африканских стран. В статье особое внимание уделено потенциальным инструментам управления, которые могут способствовать росту его эффективности, а также выявляются скрытые риски, с которыми сталкиваются африканские страны в своих усилиях по сохранению экономических достижений на континенте.

Ключевые слова: государственное управление, Африка, экономическое развитие, экономическая свобода, электоральная конкуренция, политические права, polity2

COUNTRY IN FOCUS

The COVID-19 Pandemic and Slovakia: Why Do Results for the First and Later Phases Differ so Much?

Juraj Nemec

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COVID-19 и Словакия: факторы эффективности государственной политики на нескольких волнах пандемии

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Аннотация: Словакия, небольшая страна в Центральной Европе, стала одной из самых успешных стран в борьбе с COVID-19 на первом этапе пандемии весной 2020 г. Вместе с тем, в следующие волны пандемии политика в сфере здравоохранения оказалась не столь эффективной. Цель настоящей статьи – проанализировать кейс словацкого кейса борьбы с COVID-19. Почему Словакия эффективно справилась со вспышкой COVID-19 на начальном этапе, а затем потерпела неудачу? Положительные результаты противоэпидемической политики на первом этапе были обусловлены эффективной государственной политикой (реализованной при смене правительств), усиленной высоким уровнем общественного сознания граждан. Неудачи, с которыми Словакия столкнулась позже, связаны с ограниченными долгосрочными политико-административными возможностями государства, политизацией пандемии и, как следствие, сниженной общественной лояльностью. Краткосрочный успех стал возможным благодаря мобилизации всех ресурсов, ставшей возможным в определенный период, в связи с чем долгосрочный успех в стране представляется «невыполнимой миссией».

Ключевые слова: управление, COVID-19, пандемия, Словакия, государственная политика, социальная политика, сектор здравоохранения

Russia's Sovereignty and Emergence of Pragmatic Polycentrism

Ladislav Zemanek

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Суверенитет России и становление прагматического полицентризма

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Аннотация: В статье анализируется российская концепция всеобъемлющего суверенитета, являющаяся краеугольным камнем официальной государственной парадигмы. Суверенитет анализируется как во внутреннем, так и во внешнем, как в синхроническом, так и в диахроническом измерении. Концепция увязана с национальной безопасностью, распространяющейся на различные сферы. Тенденции секьюритизации на основе суверенитета исследуются с помощью методов дискурсивного анализа, базирующихся на конструктивистских предположениях. Автор делает акцент на формировании концептуальных структур и дискурсивных практиках, существенно влияющих на индивидуальное восприятие, интерпретацию и мировоззрение политического лидерства в целом, тем самым формируя поведение, стратегии и политику отдельных акторов. Анализ позволяет выявить сравнительное родство между концептами и дискурсивными практиками субъектов исследования – России, США, Китая и Европейского союза. Принятые ими стратегии исследуются в связи с трансформацией мирового порядка от гегемонизма во главе с США к полицентризму. Автор обращает внимание на взаимодействие внутри «четырёхугольника» России, Китая, ЕС и США, чтобы продемонстрировать возникновение и динамику автономизации или регионализации, которые следует рассматривать в диалектике процессов глобализации, глокализации, а также становления прагматического полицентризма.

Ключевые слова: Россия, США, Китай, Евросоюз, суверенитет, национальная безопасность, полицентризм, евроатлантизм, стратегическая автономия, гегемонизм

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

BRICS in Global Governance: A Gradual but Steady Expansion

Rajan Kumar, Biju Thomas

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БРИКС в глобальном управлении: постепенное и неуклонное расширение участия

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Аннотация: БРИКС является наиболее известным международным форумом, состоящим из представителей незападного мира и возникшим после окончания холодной войны. Формат БРИКС превратился в полноценного международного актора, играя ощутимую роль в глобальном управлении, за счет растущего влияния в сфере глобальных инвестиций, устойчивого развития, торговли, борьбы с изменением климата и с терроризмом. В статье предпринята попытка ответить на несколько вопросов: какой цели служит БРИКС в глобальном управлении? Стал ли Новый банк развития надежным источником финансирования для развивающихся стран? Какую роль БРИКС сыграл в переговорах по изменению климата? И, наконец, какие шаги предпринимает БРИКС для противодействия угрозе глобального терроризма?

Ключевые слова: БРИКС, глобальное управление, развивающиеся экономики, НБР, государственное управление, изменение климата, терроризм

Brief Author's Guide

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