

УПРАВЛЕНИЕ И ПОЛИТИКА

GOVERNANCE
AND
POLITICS



Том 1
№ 2
2022

Журнал

«УПРАВЛЕНИЕ И ПОЛИТИКА»

Governance and Politics»

Цель рецензируемого научного журнала «Governance and Politics» – публикация результатов исследований в области политической науки. Журнал сфокусирован на политической теории, проблемах и трансформации политических институтов и процессов, вопросах политической идеологии и государственного управления. G&P публикует рукописи высокого качества и новизны, охватывающие фундаментальные теоретические и эмпирические исследования в указанных предметных областях.

Журнал издается на русском и английском языках, преследуя цель интеграции международного академического политологического сообщества и развития научного диалога. Авторы из всех стран мира приглашаются к опубликованию в журнале результатов своих исследований. G&P охватывает широкую географию авторов и рецензентов, а также членов редколлегии.

Области исследований

- политическая философия / политическая теория
- история политической науки
- методология политической науки
- политические институты
- политические процессы и тенденции
- политическая культура и идеология
- политические конфликты
- государственное управление и государственная политика

Основатель и издатель

МГИМО МИД России
www.mgimo.ru

Язык

английский / русский

Редакция

119454, Россия, Москва, пр. Вернадского 76
Факультет управления и политики
gp@inno.mgimo.ru

Официальный сайт журнала

<https://www.gp-mgimo.ru>

Редакционная коллегия

Председатель редакционной коллегии

Анатолий Васильевич Торкунов,
профессор, академик РАН, ректор МГИМО МИД России, Россия

Главный редактор

Генри Тигранович Сардарян,
декан Факультета управления и политики МГИМО МИД России, Россия

Татьяна Александровна Алексеева,
профессор, заведующая кафедрой политической теории МГИМО МИД России, Россия

Оксана Викторовна Гаман-Голутвина,
профессор, член-корреспондент РАН, заведующая кафедрой сравнительной политологии
МГИМО МИД России; президент Российской ассоциации политических наук, Россия

Александр Жебит,
доцент, Федеральный университет Рио-де-Жанейро, Бразилия

Сергей Георгиевич Камолов,
профессор, заведующий кафедрой государственного управления МГИМО МИД России, Россия

Марина Михайловна Лебедева,
профессор, заведующая кафедрой мировых политических процессов МГИМО МИД России, Россия

Рафаэле Маркетти,
профессор, проректор по интернационализации Свободного международного университета
социальных наук «Гвидо Карли», Италия

Юрай Немец,
профессор, Масариков университет, Чехия

Сергей Васильевич Рязанцев,
профессор, член-корреспондент РАН, директор Института демографических исследований
филиала Федерального научно-исследовательского социологического центра РАН, Россия

Леонид Владимирович Сморгун,
профессор, заведующий кафедрой политического управления Санкт-Петербургского
государственного университета, Россия

Арчана Упадауй,
профессор Школы международных исследований Университета Джавахарлала Неру, Индия

Августин Квази Фосу,
профессор, Университет Ганы, Гана; Университет Йоханнесбурга, Университет Претории,
Южно-Африканская Республика; научный сотрудник, Оксфордский университет, Великобритания

Андрей Юрьевич Шотов,
профессор, декан Факультета политологии Московского государственного университета
им. М.В. Ломоносова, Россия

Редакция

Научный редактор **Оксана Геннадьевна Харитонова,** МГИМО МИД России, Россия

Выпускающий редактор **Денис Андреевич Кузнецов,** МГИМО МИД России, Россия

Ответственный секретарь **Юлиана Ников,** МГИМО МИД России, Россия

Редакторы **Саймон Паттерсон,** Новая Зеландия

Ольга Павловна Дмитриева, Россия

Верстка **Дмитрий Евгеньевич Волков,** МГИМО МИД России, Россия

Управление и политика

Governance and Politics

Aim and Scope

The aim of the Journal is to publish the results of research in the field of political science. The journal is focused on political theory, problems and transformation of political institutions and processes, political ideology as well as public administration. G&P publishes manuscripts of high quality and novelty covering fundamental theoretical and empirical findings in these subject areas. The journal is published in Russian and English, insofar as it considers integration of international academic political science community as its strategic purpose; it encourages international academic dialogue among political scientists. Authors from all over the world are invited to publish in the Journal the results of their research. G&P embraces a wide geography of authors and reviewers as well as the members of the Editorial Board.

Fields of Research

- political philosophy / political theory
- history of political science
- political science methodology
- political institutions
- political processes and trends
- political culture and ideologies
- political conflicts
- public administration and public policy

Founder and Publisher

MGIMO University
www.mgimo.ru

Language

English / Russian

Editorial Office

76, av. Vernadsky, Moscow, Russia, 119454
School of Governance and Politics

Official Website

<https://www.gp-mgimo.ru>

Editorial Board

Head of the Editorial Board

Anatoly Torkunov,

Professor, Full Member of Russian Academy of Sciences, Rector of MGIMO University, Russia

Editor-in-Chief

Henry Sardaryan,

Dean of School of Governance and Politics, MGIMO University, Russia

Tatiana Alekseeva,

Professor, Head of Department of Political Theory, MGIMO University, Russia

Augustin Kwasi Fosu,

Professor, University of Ghana, Ghana; University of Johannesburg, University of Pretoria, the Republic of South Africa; Research Associate, University of Oxford, the United Kingdom

Oxana Gaman-Golutvina,

Professor, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of Department of Comparatives Politics, MGIMO University; President of Russian Political Science Association, Russia

Sergey Kamolov,

Professor, Head of Department of Public Governance, MGIMO University, Russia

Marina Lebedeva,

Professor, Head of Department of World Politics, MGIMO University, Russia

Raffaele Marchetti,

Professor, Deputy Rector for Internationalization, Free International University of Social Studies Guido Carli, Italy

Juraj Nemec,

Professor, Masaryk University, the Czech Republic

Sergey Ryazantsev,

Professor, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director, Institute for Demographic Research of Branch of the Federal Center of Theoretical and Applied Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia

Leonid Smorgunov,

Professor, Head of Department of Political Governance, Saint Petersburg State University, Russia

Andrey Shutov,

Professor, Dean of Faculty of Political Science, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia

Archana Upadhyay,

Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India

Alexander Zhebit,

Associate Professor, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Editorial Staff

Scientific Editor **Oxana Kharitonova**, Associate Professor, MGIMO University, Russia

Publishing Editor **Denis Kuznetsov**, Associate Professor, MGIMO University, Russia

Executive Secretary **Yuliana Nikov**, MGIMO University, Russia

Editors **Simon Patterson**, New Zealand

Olga Dmitrieva, Russia

Layout **Dmitry Volkov**, Russia, MGIMO University, Russia

Содержание / Contents

ГЛОБАЛЬНЫЙ КОНТЕКСТ / GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES

Transforming Institutions and Governance to Build forward Better towards 2030	7
<i>Louis Meuleman, Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi</i>	

ИДЕИ И ДИСКУРС / CURRENT DEBATES

Political Manipulation via Crisis Ideologization	30
<i>Elena V. Pilgun</i>	

СТРАНОВОЙ ФОКУС / COUNTRY IN FOCUS

Wolf Warrior Diplomacy – Foreign Policy for Internal Use in China	44
<i>Natalia V. Selezneva</i>	
Development of China's Demographic Policies	59
<i>Shide Feng</i>	
Migration in the Republic of Moldova: Trends, Determinants, and State Policy Effects	82
<i>Svetlana Rusu, Ion Partachi, Elena Rusu</i>	

Информация для авторов / Brief Author's Guide	102
---	-----

Transforming Institutions and Governance to Build forward Better towards 2030

LOUIS MEULEMAN¹

Public Governance Institute (Belgium), University of Massachusetts Boston (the United States of America), Wageningen University (Netherlands)

GERALDINE FRASER-MOLEKETI²

Nelson Mandela University (the Republic of South Africa)

Abstract

The article is intended to stimulate the discussions on sustainable development and separate Sustainable Development Goals. It was initially prepared for the 21st session of the UN Committee of Experts on Public Administration “Transforming institutions and governance to build forward better towards 2030”. The article covers the progress, lessons learned and challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impacts on the implementation of Goals 4, 5, 14 and 15 and on leaving no one behind, as well as reflections on the challenges of state-building. The authors suggest that building strong and effective public institutions is crucial for achieving the Goals and building forward better after the pandemic. This should be accompanied by investments in the public sector workforce to align competences and values with the challenges ahead. Supporting developing countries in making their public institutions, societal and physical infrastructure and economies more resilient and agile not only against COVID-19 but against all potential future shocks is crucial and in the interest of all nations. Global cooperation and solidarity are therefore critical, and all countries should work together to address the virus and ensure equitable vaccine distribution while also ensuring that no one – and no country – is left behind.

Key words

sustainable development, Sustainable Development Goals, COVID-19, state-building, public institutions, public sector

¹ **Dr. Louis Meuleman** – PhD, Visiting Professor, Public Governance Institute, Belgium; Senior Fellow, University of Massachusetts Boston, the United States of America; Research Associate, Wageningen University, Netherlands.
E-mail: louis.meuleman@kuleuven.be

² **Dr. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi** – PhD, Chancellor, Nelson Mandela University, Gqeberha, the Republic of South Africa.
E-mail: info@mandela.ac.za

The article is based on the report “Transforming institutions and governance to build forward better towards 2030”, prepared by the authors in the framework of the 21st session of the Committee of Experts on Public Administration at the UN Economic and Social Council in January 2022.

For citation

Meuleman Louis, Fraser-Moleketi Geraldine (2022). Transforming Institutions and Governance to Build forward Better towards 2030. *Управление и политика*, 1(2), Р. 7–29.

As the world's population has tripled over the past 70 years, major challenges have remained, such as diseases, hunger, inequalities, biodiversity loss and climate change. The still ongoing pandemic has caused millions of lives to be lost, taken an unprecedented human and economic toll and resulted in recovery efforts that have often been uneven, inequitable and insufficiently geared towards achieving sustainable development. The pandemic is threatening decades of developmental progress, hampering the urgent transition to greener, more inclusive economies and delaying or preventing progress on the Sustainable Development Goals.

The pandemic further underscores the critical importance of public administration as a bastion of democracy and people-centered values, a field that promotes action and that can support sustainable recovery from the pandemic and achievement of the Goals. As society builds back better, or builds forward better, there is a need to rediscover public administration as a science and a system of values priming the general interest and service of the people.

An essential role of public governance and governing is establishing the rules of the game for the functioning of society and the economy through legislation, regulation and the distribution of valuable resources and dispensations so that adequate services are provided on the basis of the needs of people and target groups and so that governments and organizations are held accountable.

The coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has underscored the crucial role of public institutions in providing essential public services to those who need them the most. Institutional weaknesses that existed before the pandemic have become more prevalent and prominent during the crisis, with women and vulnerable groups all too often left behind. Capable, adept and agile institutions are required that embrace and utilize whole-of-government and whole-of-society approaches, involving all levels of government and all relevant stakeholders, while acting in a coherent and cohesive fashion. Strategic alliances and collaborative efforts that involve all parts of society, including young people, and foster inclusion and participation are key.

The importance of strong institutions – in particular those that foster greater inclusion, good governance, trust in the public sector and social cohesion – for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its Sustainable Development Goals is clear, given that governance issues remain at the forefront five years after its adoption.³ As countries consider policy approaches, put in place institutional arrangements, develop tools and allocate resources, taking into account the needs of the majority of people will be paramount, rather than only focusing on the needs and issues of a small but powerful elite layer of society. Marginalization, discrimination, inequalities and exclusion of population groups remain critical risks in systems of government.

Public administration comprises effective public services, social protection, inclusion and equal opportunities for all. The pandemic has confirmed that many years of focusing on efficiency rather than on effectiveness have eroded the capacity of public administration in many countries to deliver the services that are needed. In the context of crisis response policy, effective public services also serve as building blocks for social cohesion and trust, which are so critically important for a more effective pandemic management response.

Countries must take all of these aspects into consideration as they respond to and recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and tackle the implementation of the Goals without being selective.

Governance and public administration perspectives on the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals

Building strong institutions to ensure quality education. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the world was not on track to meet reading and mathematics targets, and school attendance and completion remained insufficient in many parts of the world. Access to education in some regions has been hampered by high levels of poverty, armed conflict and, in some instances, extremism, gender inequality and other challenges, which have resulted in an increase

³ World Public Sector Report 2021. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations publication, 2021. URL: <https://www.un.org/en/desa/world-public-sector-report> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

in the number of children out of school. Achieving Goal 4 will depend on strong institutions fostering high-quality education, which specifically entails appropriate skills development, gender parity and the provision of suitable school infrastructure, equipment, educational materials and resources, scholarships and teachers.

While overall progress in education before the COVID -19 pandemic was already too slow to achieve Goal 4 by 2030, progress has been made in achieving universal primary education in some regions. In sub-Saharan Africa, for example, school enrolment increased, from 52 per cent in 1990 to 78 per cent in 2012 (Mogoatlhe, 2020). However, the region has the highest number of out-of-school children compared with any other region in the world.

The COVID-19 pandemic was a stress test for higher education systems globally and a major challenge to fair access to education for all, especially in developing countries, owing to the digital divide. It has put the resilience of education systems to the test, forcing many countries to switch to distance learning. However, distance learning has not been possible in all countries owing to a lack of digital connectivity, unequal access to e-learning platforms and limited use or unavailability of digital devices in low-income households. As a result, the crisis has proven to be a major driver of increasing education inequality, which represents a major setback and a key risk of widening the education gap.

The COVID-19 pandemic forced schools and universities to rethink their ideas on providing access to all students and ensuring that no one is left behind. Universities in Africa responded to the global challenge through the provision of COVID-19 testing facilities and care centers and the local production of personal protective equipment and ventilation solutions.

The collaborative efforts of higher education institutions across the continent that partnered with local telecommunications companies to aid in the shift to online learning has also been acknowledged. In addition, partnerships were fostered to draw assistance from civil society, businesses and communities.

In Latin America, only 25 per cent of poor households are connected to the Internet and have a mobile device, and 44 per cent of schools are not connected. A total of 32 million children from 5 to 12 years of age (or 46 per cent) cannot switch to e-learning. Some countries, such as Bolivia, have had to suspend schooling because of the impossibility of maintaining it online.

One of the indicators for quality education is tertiary education enrolment. Data on tertiary enrolment by gender in sub-Saharan Africa indicate that female enrolment was consistently slightly lower than male enrolment from 2016 to 2020. A comparison between tertiary enrolment in sub-Saharan Africa and other regions of the world shows that both male and female enrolment are much lower in sub-Saharan Africa.

Great advances have been made in the provision of education in South Africa, including through legislation on free-of-charge primary schooling for the poorest 40 per cent of the population.⁴ Notwithstanding these efforts to reduce inequalities in the education sector, the quality of education still varies widely, and the school system is considered to effectively consist of two differently functioning subsystems, reflecting the historical divide in schooling between white children and children of colour (Fleisch, 2008).

The education system in Zimbabwe has continued to be among the best in Africa despite a protracted economic crisis with wide-reaching impacts. Upon its independence in 1980, the country introduced free compulsory primary and secondary education. However, State funding for schools is now inadequate, and the economic situation during the past decade has hampered the ability of some Zimbabweans to send their children to school. Low teacher morale owing to low salaries poses another serious challenge to the education system.⁵

In Kenya, the Government introduced a policy of free primary education, which led to a significant increase in pupil enrolment across the country in 2003. In 2018, the World Bank ranked Kenya as the top African country for education outcomes.⁶ In 2007, the Government announced Kenya Vision 2030 with the goal of globally competitive high-quality education for sustainable development by 2030. To improve the quality of education in Kenya, the global initiative entitled “Child-Friendly Schools” was implemented in the country.⁷ Notwithstand-

⁴ Educational access in South Africa. Consortium for Research on Educational Access, Transitions and Equity. Country Policy Brief. March 2008. URL: http://www.create-rpc.org/pdf_documents/South_Africa_Country_Research_Summary.pdf (accessed: 15.07.2022)

⁵ See at UNDP. URL: <https://www.zw.undp.org/content/zimbabwe/en/home/post-2015/mdgoverview/overview/mdg2.html> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

⁶ Pattillo K. How Kenya Became the Strongest Education System in Africa: 10 Little-known Moments That Shaped History – from Kikuyu Boycotts to Alliance, the Airlifts, Mau and M-Pesa, EdWell, 6 August 2020.

⁷ Child-Friendly Schools Manual. United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). New York, 2009. URL: <https://www.unicef.org/documents/child-friendly-schools-manual> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

ing these efforts, overall learning conditions and outcomes for children remain unsatisfactory in Kenya.⁸

In Asia, child-friendly schools have been implemented in several countries, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

The education system in Singapore is considered the best in the world, according to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Sri Lanka has the highest reported youth literacy rate in South Asia, at 98.7 per cent. The policy of its government is to provide free education from the primary stage to the first-degree level of university education. Fundamental challenges include a lack of access to high-quality education, trained teachers and government funding for education.

In Bangladesh, all citizens must undertake 10 years of compulsory education. Primary and secondary education is financed by the State and free of charge in public schools. The country has achieved near-universal net primary enrolment, with approximately 98 per cent of children of primary school age enrolled in school. However, the quality of education in Bangladesh remains low. Major barriers to gaining access to education continue to exist for marginalized and excluded children, who are the most vulnerable to low learning outcomes and high dropout rates at both the primary and secondary levels.

Since 2007, India has made significant progress in education, with the overall enrolment rate for primary school-going children at over 95 per cent. However, surveys have highlighted that access to schooling has not translated into quality of learning. India is also among the countries with the world's longest pandemic-induced school closures, some at over 600 days, with significant consequences for education and learning. In addition, a large part of India does not have access to online education. In a recent survey of over 1,400 underprivileged homes, students in only 8 per cent of rural households and 24 per cent of urban households had such access. The challenge will be to bridge these pandemic-induced gaps and to strengthen the school system to address long-term challenges. This means reorienting the metrics of performance away from

⁸ Monitoring children's competencies in East Africa. Australian Council for Educational Research Centre for Global Education Monitoring, Uwezo: Assessment Series No. 7, November 2014.

school inputs to outcomes and a greater degree of decentralization in school management so that teachers and school leaders are empowered to better align school functioning with school needs.

Building strong institutions to achieve gender equality. Gender inequalities, violence and discrimination against women continue to be major challenges, and climate change and natural disasters continue to have a disproportionate effect on women and children, as do conflict, migration and wars.

Conflict often exacerbates gender inequality and violence against women. Poverty is also a risk factor associated with gender-based violence that often intersects with and reinforces gender inequality. Various microfinance and other economic empowerment approaches have been implemented to try to address this intersection. The most frequently reported form of violence related directly to the COVID-19 pandemic is rapidly increasing sexual and gender-based violence, often perpetrated during the lockdown.

Efforts to fulfil Goal 5 – achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls – through gender mainstreaming are yielding fewer results than expected. A major cause is weak institutions across countries with reduced capabilities with which to implement such mainstreaming.

Gender mainstreaming is, among others, reflected in the labor force participation rate of men and women, which shows significant disparities worldwide, indicating institutional shortfalls in such mainstreaming.⁹ Labor force participation rates for women between 2015 and 2021 are consistently below those of their male counterparts, notwithstanding policies to address gender inequality across the globe.

While Africa performs well overall on gender equality at work, with a higher-than-average labor force participation rate than that of the rest of the world, most African women work in the informal sector and have not been able to break into higher-paid, quality jobs and leading positions (The Power of Parity, 2019). Although Africa has made remarkable progress regarding women's participation in policymaking, the continent still needs to attain the 50 per cent gender parity target set in the Goals (Morsy 2019).

⁹ International Labor Organization Estimates, 2020.

South Africa has the highest gender parity score, 0.76 (The Power of Parity, 2019). The Constitution enshrines the right to equality, equal protection and the benefit of the law, as well as to non-discrimination. The country's National Development Plan 2030, adopted in 2012, identifies women as the most affected by inequality, poverty and unemployment. In 2014, a new Department for Women was established to promote gender equality through oversight, advocacy, monitoring and evaluation.¹⁰

Although Botswana continues to make efforts towards gender equality, there are challenges that limit progress, such as cultural practices that perpetuate gender-based violence, inadequate representation of women in decision-making, poverty in women-headed households and laws that favor males over females (e.g. inheritance laws). In 2012, women in decision-making positions accounted for 20.6 per cent at the local governance level and 30.6 per cent within the four political parties.¹¹

In Zimbabwe, although more women are in the labor market and public office than before, large inequalities still exist in some regions, with women systematically being denied the same work/labor rights as men. Unpaid care and domestic work, carried out mostly by women, and discrimination against women in public office remain huge barriers. Women earn 77 cents for every dollar that men receive for the same work. In 2018, only 24 per cent of national parliamentarians were women.¹²

In Kenya, the new Constitution of 2010 provided that no more than two thirds of the seats in the National Assembly should be held by persons of the same gender. In 2020, women captured 21.8 per cent – a marked improvement compared with the percentage for the previous parliament, but less than the expected one-third representation.¹³

¹⁰ Gender Equality and Women Empowerment (n.d.). United Nations Development Program (UNDP) South Africa. URL: https://www.za.undp.org/content/south_africa/en/home/operations/projects/womens_empowerment/gender-equality-and-women-empowerment--.html (accessed: 15.07.2022)

¹¹ Mainstreaming Gender in Policies in Botswana (n.d.). UNDP Botswana. URL: https://www.bw.undp.org/content/botswana/en/home/operations/projects/democratic_governance/mainstreaming-gender-in-policies-in-botswana.html (accessed: 15.07.2022)

¹² Sustainable Development that Leaves no One behind (n.d.). UNDP Zimbabwe. URL: <https://www.zw.undp.org/content/zimbabwe/en/home/sustainable-development.html> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

¹³ Proportion of Seats Held by Women in the National Parliament of Kenya from 2000 to 2020. Statista database. URL: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/1248316/proportion-of-seats-held-by-women-in-kenya-national-parliament> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

In Latin America, not all women have benefited from advances in gender equality. In a World Bank study, it was found that, in 2010, women's wages equaled 71 per cent of those of men. Women of African and indigenous descent continue to be at a disadvantage.

In Brazil, the gap between men and women in labor force participation has changed little over the past decade, and women continue to be employed in areas with lower growth and lower wages and continue to have limited representation in politics.¹⁴

The gender inequality index reflects gender-based inequalities in three dimensions – reproductive health, empowerment and economic activity. In 2019, Mexico had a gender inequality index value of 0.322, ranking it 71 out of 162 countries.¹⁵ In all, 48.4 per cent of parliamentary seats were held by women. The participation of women in the labor market was at 44.2 per cent compared with 78.5 per cent for men.

In Morocco, in 2020, 90.5 per cent of girls between 15 and 17 years of age in urban areas and 39.2 per cent of girls in that age group in rural areas were enrolled in school, compared with 56.3 per cent and 6.1 per cent, respectively, in 2000. Women in decision-making and leadership positions in the Parliament, the government and local governance represent more than 30 per cent.

Assessment of the situation regarding the principle of leaving no one behind against the background of the COVID-19 pandemic and for implementation of the 2030 Agenda

Leaving no one behind. The COVID-19 pandemic has markedly slowed progress towards attaining the Goals which are aimed at creating a better and more sustainable future for all by 2030. In order for the world to recover and build back better from the COVID-19 pandemic, no one (and no country) should be left behind in global efforts. Urgent action needs to be taken to prevent existing disparities from widening further, including between wealthy countries that

¹⁴ What Does It Mean to Be a Woman in Brazil? The Answer Will Surprise You. World Bank, 8 March 2017.

¹⁵ The Next Frontier: Human Development and the Anthropocene. Briefing Note for Countries on the *Human Development Report 2020*: Mexico, 2020.

have widespread access to vaccines, diagnostics and therapeutics and poorer countries that are still struggling to vaccinate front-line health-care workers.

Under the heading of inclusiveness, leaving no one, and no country, behind and non-discrimination are key principles of effective governance, as formulated by the Committee and endorsed by the Economic and Social Council in 2018. In some countries, such as South Africa, the ambition to leave no one behind has a legal basis.

To build back better from COVID-19, it is important that countries build strong institutions capable of delivering the Goals, for example by ensuring policies that foster a more equal distribution of incomes and access to government services, promoting the public health sector and gender equality and enabling high-quality education. The COVID-19 pandemic has, for example, led to spiking unemployment rates with disproportionate impacts on low-income families, resulting in a call for adaptive social safety nets. It has shown the value of building universal social protection systems for all members of society.

The pandemic has also encouraged some governments to establish innovative governance mechanisms, including COVID-19 policy trackers. The tracker used by Egypt is a dashboard that contains the country's response and recovery efforts. The pandemic has, however, also revealed an imbalance in how nations can respond and cooperate to mitigate its threat, with those who were already more vulnerable also the most prone to be left behind. Huge disparities have been observed in the ability of countries to implement the right policy packages to mitigate the impact of the pandemic on society and protect workers, including by reducing skill mismatches, encouraging job creation and enabling unemployed workers to find new employment more quickly. This calls for a renewed focus on people and their well-being and capabilities through regional and international cooperation.¹⁶

The emergence of new variants (Delta and Omicron) in both developed and developing countries, and related travel restrictions or bans, has caused further disruptions to economic activity, with financial stocks and labor markets

¹⁶ Combating COVID-19 and ensuring no one is left behind. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, 12 July 2021. URL: <https://www.unescap.org/op-ed/combating-covid-19-and-ensuring-no-one-left-behind> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

reacting, making it even more difficult to build back from the pandemic. The pandemic is reshaping labor markets, and economies are adapting to whatever the new normal turns out to be.

Developing countries have been particularly affected, especially if travel bans or restrictions had been put in place by developed countries, a practice sometimes seen as selective or biased against developing countries.

While travel restrictions can be a good means to slow the spread of new variants of the virus, they should not be selective or go beyond health parameters to include economic and political dimensions. To be eliminated, the virus must be eliminated worldwide. In short, control of the spread of the virus (and its new variants), and more effective pandemic management across economically integrated jurisdictions, can be considered a global public good whose production is determined by the weakest link, given that even well-performing countries will be affected by the insufficient progress of countries that are left behind.

Facing the COVID-19 pandemic requires an unprecedented degree of cooperation and collaboration between governments and citizens and across all facets of government and society to implement spatial distancing and other policy measures.¹⁷ The need for a coordinated response and solutions to problems should be seen beyond individual contexts. There is a need to refocus interventions from a global development standpoint, where the boundaries between developed and developing countries are increasingly blurred (Horner, 2019). Therefore, non-silo thinking in terms of response and recovery strategies is vital to counteracting this crisis.

The pandemic, and the subsequent resurgence of variants in both developed and developing countries, accompanied by inequality in gaining access to vaccines, points to the fact that there is a need for better governance in managing the virus and in the provision and distribution of vaccines. In Africa, low and insufficient levels of vaccination prevail owing to a lack of access to vaccines, among other factors. In April 2021, less than 2 per cent of the population of Africa had been vaccinated. By contrast, over 40 per cent of the population of the United States of America and over 20 per cent of the population of Europe

¹⁷ Governance and institutions COVID -19 response resources (n.d.). World Bank.

had received at least one dose of the vaccine. This discrepancy reinforces the need for countries to increase their collaboration, working together to build back better from the pandemic while advancing the full implementation of the 2030 Agenda. Equal access to vaccines provides an example of an ideal world strategy for maximizing collaborative efforts to uphold the promise of leaving no one behind.

The COVID-19 crisis has accelerated the digital transformation of governments, which has proven critical to the continued provision of essential services and access to them. It has also increased the risk of a widening digital divide between and within countries, as well as the related risks of the digital exclusion of vulnerable groups. The application of the principle of leaving no one behind in the digital age means ensuring that the digital transition is inclusive, fair and just. Trust in government in the digital age involves digital transformation processes that are people-centered and representative of the realities of societies, especially in developing countries, as well as addressing some of the most pressing challenges for government institutions, in particular corruption. This will also require embedding digital rights relating to the responsible and ethical use of disruptive technologies to improve people's lives.

More investment in health care, education and other basic public services is needed. In the wake of rising inequality and mounting public debt, countries will have to find innovative approaches to obtain enough resources. Against this backdrop, it is important to strike the right balance between ensuring the safety of public health and maintaining and sustaining economic activity.

Reflections on state-building. Goal 16 is aimed at promoting peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, providing access to justice for all and building effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. This aspiration must be supported by building sustainable States. State-building is an extremely difficult and long process, an even greater challenge in times of huge demands on governmental services, such as during a pandemic and/or a natural disaster. Not all States are the same or look the same. One of the key factors in possible success, which is not without complexity, is to consider national political will and structures, cultures and traditions, such as collective decision-making with the participation of community and religious leaders.

Public administration and the governance of public institutions are more complex and problematic in conflict-affected countries, given that most of them have weak governance systems, poor-quality or partial institutions and contested sovereignty or violent conflict, as well as mistrust in governments that too often fail to deliver good-quality services, in particular those relating to education and health, which are among the most crucial public services for any population.

Public administration and government have shown that they are critical in managing conflict and violence, including during the COVID -19 pandemic. However, some governments are taking advantage of the pandemic to create increasingly repressive security institutions that put populations, especially marginalized groups, at risk of violence.

The following elements seem generally important to helping to construct strong States: developing an overall consistent strategy and aims that do not change over time; correctly estimating the amount of time that it takes to construct institutions; avoiding the prioritization of short-term programs that involve significant spending, which can increase corruption and reduce effectiveness; creating incentives to tackle corruption; building sustainable institutions; maintaining policies and practices; understanding the local political terrain; and ensuring peace and security.

An important lesson learned is that the bulk of resources spent should be on development activities and not on weaponry, engaging in conflicts or the military. In order for institutions to function properly, they require fundamental changes to society at large, which need to be introduced by clearly defining access to State power and authority, as well as the distribution of resources. The State should be sustainable and not too dependent on other States, which requires robust succession planning and the appointment of qualified leaders. The development of a sustainable tax base is also crucial to maintain State institutions. It is important that international financial support be reliable over a longer time period, given that sudden disruptions in aid and financial transfers can have catastrophic consequences for a country's economy.

Lastly, the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated government digitalization, which will continue to progress and influence State-building in the future.

Recommendations on building strong institutions to build back better from COVID-19

Ensuring that no one is left behind. As noted, facing the COVID-19 pandemic requires cooperation between governments and citizens across all facets of society on a global scale, including with regard to building strong health institutions. When countries are left behind, there are weak links in the chain to fight COVID-19. Countries need to work together to eliminate the pandemic and build back better, ensuring that no one is left behind. Policies for fighting COVID-19 should not be discriminatory or unfair, but rather should ensure regional and global cooperation and solidarity and should promote the equitable distribution of vaccines. There is an urgent need to address the huge disparities in the ability of countries to fight the pandemic and roll out vaccines. This can also help to ease the shocks caused in the stock, financial and labor markets.

Building strong institutions to ensure quality education. It is important that countries build strong institutions capable of delivering high - quality education. This can be achieved through the effective management of learning institutions, leadership and accountability, as well as through management systems capable of focusing on and controlling learning outcomes. Other measures include involving communities in the management of learning institutions, strengthening relationships with and support among all stakeholders and setting up structures that allow institutions to provide opportunities to engage with and empower students and their parents. The State should ensure a predictable and adequate budget allocation for these institutions. Promoting the use of technological equipment, such as tablets and interactive whiteboards, for better student-teacher interaction and improving the conditions for and empowering teachers, as well as developing their skills, are paramount. Furthermore, programs that reduce the cost of schooling or provide incentives for attendance can be utilized. The child-friendly school model should be adopted more widely.

Education is central to climate change mitigation and adaptation and the sustainable use of natural resources. The reduction of waste and pollution, the recycling of materials and the use of environmentally benign products and services need to be accelerated by enhancing related education at all levels and in

areas ranging from environmental science to civic action while tailoring them to the needs of girls and women in developing countries in particular, who have a primary role in gathering natural resources, including water, firewood and small-scale agriculture, for household consumption and use.

Building strong institutions to achieve gender equality. Gender mainstreaming needs to be further promoted, which involves the integration of a gender perspective into the preparation, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies, regulatory measures and spending programs with a view to promoting equality between women and men and combating discrimination.¹⁸ This can lead to increased well-being and the creation of a more socially just and sustainable society. Key elements to consider are adequate preparation, sufficient resources, stakeholder involvement, knowledge generation and gender expertise.

National policy and legislation that are translated at the institutional and corporate levels are required for stronger accountability on gender issues. There should be political commitment and a legal framework for better, higher-quality policymaking, better-functioning institutions and more effective processes so that policies respond more effectively to the needs of citizens of all genders.¹⁹ Institutions need to make efforts to broaden the equitable participation of citizens of all genders at all levels of decision-making, which should ensure equal opportunities, recognition and status, as well as the equal sharing of the outcomes of development. Gender training needs to be continuous, up-to-date and more tailored to operational activities.

The skills, attitudes and behaviors of service providers should reflect a responsiveness to the needs and rights of women. Institutions need to make use of data disaggregated by sex in decision-making to gain a more informed understanding of an issue or a situation and to allow gender differences and inequalities to be identified and addressed.

Building strong institutions to protect ecosystems and support climate action. Strong institutions will need to be built to conserve ecosystems and natural re-

¹⁸ What Is Gender Mainstreaming? European Institute for Gender Equality. URL: <https://eige.europa.eu/gender-mainstreaming/what-is-gender-mainstreaming> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

¹⁹ Ibid.

sources and to support climate action. New metrics and measures that monitor the extent of natural capital are needed for assessing trends and critical locations for targeted interventions.

The education and empowerment of local communities, in particular of women, will be important, including for monitoring and data collection, as will efforts towards the restoration and improvement of environmental conditions. Local context-related components should be included in education curricula at all levels to raise awareness of challenges, such as climate change and biodiversity loss, as well as to elaborate measures that can increase conservation, sustainable use and resilience, including by empowering communities to adapt and innovate for their well-being.

Multi-stakeholder partnerships involving all relevant stakeholders will be critical for protecting and restoring marine and terrestrial ecosystems, addressing pollution and regulating resource use. Sustained partnerships should be stimulated, which may employ new financing models, new ecosystem valuation approaches (to raise financing partly from the private sector) and new solutions, such as the use of natural infrastructure for removing pollution, restoring environmental conditions and protecting against natural hazards. New natural capital valuation approaches can provide a basis for financing and building partnerships to implement sustainable solutions.

The unprecedented momentum towards climate action, supported by a number of country and private-sector pledges, should be used to foster collective agreements that attract more participants to the cause and to heighten the efforts of the global community to provide climate finance and technology transfers to developing countries in order to help them to enhance their efforts.

Promoting the better use of digital technology to support implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals under review. Digital transformation is embedded in and negotiated within broader political, societal and economic processes.²⁰ Business models based on data extraction, concentrations of power and the viral spread of misinformation and disinformation represent defining features of the current phase of digital transformation. For both private actors

²⁰ Ilona Kickbusch et al. The Lancet and Financial Times Commission on Governing Health Futures 2030: Growing up in a Digital World. 24 October 2021. URL: <https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34706260/> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

and governments, digital tools also allow unprecedented reach into people's everyday lives, including with regard to their health and education, were well as other areas. Digital transformation has the potential to bring both enormous long-term benefits and substantial disruption to many different areas. One such example is the rapid adoption of digital tools in the global educational sector since the outbreak of COVID-19. Improved institutional design can help to promote better use of digital technology in support of the implementation of the Goals under review.

**Policy recommendations, commitments and cooperation measures
for promoting a sustainable, resilient and inclusive recovery from
the pandemic while advancing full implementation of the 2030 Agenda**

The slogan “building back better” should also be interpreted as “building forward better”, which can be accomplished by making public institutions resilient enough to deal better with future societal disruptions. This implies applying foresight methods, such as scenario planning, horizon scanning and visioning.

The European Union promotes resilience and strategic foresight through, for example, regulatory impact assessments and by offering loans and grants of more than €700 billion to its 27 member States to invest in green and digital transitions, with the agreed targets of 37 per cent for climate and 20 per cent for digitalization projects. The European Union has also dedicated funding to ensuring a just transition.

Digital infrastructure and tools have been shown to be extremely important in tackling the pandemic and will continue to be needed, including to support implementation of the Goals by 2030. Digitalization can make governments much more effective and enables the more rapid provision of government services and more inclusive communication with citizens. Social media platforms have become the main source of news and information for not only young people but most people. They are huge accelerators for the distribution of essential information, but at the same time they can provide platforms for fake news and theories that are aimed at undermining trust in and the stability of democratic institutions. Thus, they have the potential to support institutions and governance in attaining the 2030 Agenda, but also to undermine them, while their own

accountability is limited or absent (Eisenstat, 2021; Schirch, 2021). In the trade-off between ensuring freedom of communication and restricting the spread of damaging information, it may be time to strengthen global cooperation against abuse of social media.

Central to the global debate on the future of government in the digital era are the broader ethical challenges of new technologies and their responsible use in, for and by the public sector. Reinforcing trust in the digital era has many dimensions, including trust in the capacity of governments to deliver services that are cost-effective; trust in the capacity of institutions to ensure that these services are delivered in an inclusive and fair manner, especially to those who need them the most; and trust in democracy to mitigate the risks of disinformation and polarization. In this regard, the United Nations is a critical platform for resolving central issues, including by fostering the human-centered development of artificial intelligence, respecting human rights and ensuring that no one is left out of the digital transition. The adoption of the first global Recommendation on the Ethics of Artificial Intelligence is an important step towards regulation in the digital era.²¹

“Building forward better and stronger” is also a good slogan for those parts of social and economic life that have not been fundamentally changed as a result of the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing climate change crisis. However, the tasks, means, working methods and workforce of the public sector have fundamentally changed, with some changes appearing to be more substantial in certain countries than in others. The prominent features of the new normal include the new strengths mentioned in the paragraphs below, as well as associated weaknesses, which should be addressed.

First, there is a new recognition of the crucial role of public institutions in creating values, putting service back into public service for sustainable development and ensuring transparent and effective regulatory authorities for functioning markets and the rule of law. However, this needs to be accompanied by partnerships with civil society, business operators, the private sector, academia and science.

²¹ Adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO in November 2021.

Second, practical experience and learning from past errors regarding crisis management are assets of effective public administration. Crises are not permanent, and crisis management should have its limits. Governments should not hesitate to scale down from crisis governance mode to normal governance mode as soon as possible while maintaining additional new capacity to switch quickly to crisis governance mode when a new crisis emerges.

This is a test case for responsible political leadership because crisis management comes with special powers, which should not be extended beyond reasonable limits or abused.

Third, the crisis has forced many public servants to work from home, and they may be working in hybrid circumstances going forward. This has given them greater flexibility and saved them commuting time. However, a new balance must be found between working from home and working in person in government offices to serve all people with integrity and transparency and under independent oversight. This reality must include public servants in the health and education sectors who, in a changing labor market and work environment, interact directly with citizens.

Fourth, civil servants are facing new challenges related to crisis management, Goal implementation and the implementation of climate change policies. New mindsets and behaviors in public institutions need to be promoted to better prepare for related complexity and uncertainties.²² Both competences and values must be aligned with current and future requirements at all levels of governance.

It is necessary to address the long-term underlying causes of conflict and exclusion, including State legitimacy, the misuse of power, inequality and poverty. Governments and multilateral institutions are capable of the long-term policy changes required in development approaches to facilitate inclusion.

The COVID-19 pandemic is not just a health, humanitarian and socio-economic crisis; it is a governance crisis testing the resilience of governance systems and institutions. A lack of sufficient accountability and oversight mechanisms in crisis response and recovery significantly increases the risk of corruption. It

²² Recommended practices can be found in United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Changing Mindsets to Realize the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: How to Promote New Mindsets and Behaviors in Public Institutions to Implement the Sustainable Development Goals*. United Nations publication, 2021. URL: <https://unpan.un.org/sites/unpan.un.org/files/Changing%20mindsets%20report%20-%20201%20October.pdf> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

is important to integrate transparency, accountability and anti-corruption into both response and recovery priorities. The aim should be to strengthen governance arrangements, promote social accountability and the role of civil society, and harness the benefits of technology and innovation in enhancing transparency and openness. In addition, it is necessary to increase the capacities of centers of government with regard to strategic planning and co-ordination to manage government operations.

Competent public administration, governance and institutions are necessary for the coordination of sustainable policies. With weak public institutions or structures, the public sector remains vulnerable to external pressures, including corruption and repressive behavior by regimes that seek to enhance their own power, undermining effective and inclusive governance.

Effectively addressing the Goals under review at the national and subnational levels requires high-quality and contextualized public institutions and governance with mechanisms to monitor progress, including by using meaningful indicators. The current set of official Goal indicators could be improved. Given that only a short time remains until 2030, potentially leaving insufficient time to develop new official indicators, countries could use auxiliary indicators to complement the set of globally agreed Goal indicators. Although they sometimes lack statistical data or rely on qualitative assessments, some national statistical offices think that using them results in more balanced monitoring and could also help to accelerate the maturation of official Goal indicators.

Problems of mistrust and issues may surround the legitimacy of some governments. The technical ability of public officials is a necessary but insufficient condition for building trust. Trust is also built through the provision of clear and verified information, among other actions, such as the communication of evidence about vaccinations to the population.

The development of local governance networks and community partnerships can help to build trust and enable governments and communities to build forward from COVID-19 together. Since the beginning of the pandemic, the organization United Cities and Local Governments has organized several activities with various stakeholders to raise awareness of and highlight best practices, including in Africa, where local and regional governments are on the frontline to deal and cope with the pandemic.

The pandemic and other recent crises have made it clear that different levels of government cannot provide the necessary services and protection to citizens if they work in silos. In countries including India, for example, strong subnational governance, in particular at the local level, played an important role in ensuring that COVID-19 health-related responses reached patients. States with strong local governments, such as Kerala, were far better at responding to COVID -19 than states where local governments lacked fiscal and administrative powers. Beyond COVID-19, many of the critical challenges confronting the globe will require the strong participation of local governments, which need better intergovernmental coordination and cooperation. This requires building new federal institutions that enable institutionalized spaces for coordination and cooperation across levels of governments. As part of their crisis management, many countries have created ad hoc multilevel committees or other forms of collaboration between the national Government and the tiers of the subnational government. In regions where supranational rules or agreements apply, the regional level is part of the multilevel governance architecture. These new institutional mechanisms for quick and effective collaboration should not be abolished completely after a crisis, but should at least remain in a kind of standby mode, ready to be used again when necessary, which would enhance the institutional resilience of governments and societies as a whole.

International cooperation amplifies the efforts of individual countries in the fight against and recovery from the COVID -19 pandemic and is not only useful but indispensable. It is essential to confront this shared threat, as well as to support and facilitate inclusive and sustainable recovery. The pandemic revealed the need for inclusive multilateralism – cooperation, collective action and common principles – while respecting people's differences as much as their common values. The pandemic also exposed new vulnerabilities in multilateral governance and the need to balance national interest, global needs and challenges within countries related to subnational coordination and federal negotiation. In 2020, countries were quick to close their borders, perhaps for the first time in contemporary history. New challenges for global and multilateral institutions have now emerged, visible most starkly in the challenge of vaccine equity, which seems to be the only route to fighting COVID-19 and which has been highlighted by the emergence of the Omicron variant.

Получено в редакции: 12 февраля 2022 г.

Принято к публикации: 1 мая 2022 г.

УДК: 369.032

Задачи трансформации институтов и государственного управления в целях гармонизации развития к 2030 году

Луис Мелеман, доктор философии, приглашенный профессор
Института государственного управления, Бельгия;
старший научный сотрудник Массачусетского университета в Бостоне,
Соединенные Штаты Америки;
Научный сотрудник, Вагенингенский университет, Нидерланды
E-mail: louis.meuleman@kuleuven.be

Джеральдин Фрейзер-Молекети, доктор философии, ректор,
Университет Нельсона Манделы, Южно-Африканская Республика
E-mail: info@mandela.ac.za

Аннотация: Статья продолжает научную дискуссию по проблемам устойчивого развития. В статье описываются достигнутые успехи, извлеченные уроки, вызванные пандемией COVID-19 проблемы и ее влияние на достижение Целей устойчивого развития 4, 5, 14 и 15, а также на реализацию подхода «никого не обойти вниманием» применительно к государственному регулированию и управлению, а также содержатся размышления о проблемах государственного строительства. Авторы полагают, что создание сильных и эффективных государственных учреждений имеет решающее значение для достижения целей в области устойчивого развития и построения будущего на более совершенной основе после пандемии. Этот процесс должен подкрепляться инвестированием средств в развитие кадровых ресурсов государственного сектора, с тем, чтобы привить им компетенции и ценности, соответствующие масштабу предстоящих задач. Оказание развивающимся странам поддержки в повышении устойчивости и гибкости их государственных учреждений, социальной и физической инфраструктуры и экономики не только в условиях COVID-19, но и в случае любых возможных потрясений в будущем имеет решающее значение и отвечает интересам всех стран. Все страны должны работать сообща, чтобы побороть пандемию и обеспечить справедливое распределение вакцин, а также гарантировать при этом, что никто – и ни одна из стран – не будет обойден вниманием.

Ключевые слова: устойчивое развитие, Цели устойчивого развития, COVID-19, государственное строительство, общественные институты, государственный сектор

Статья основана на материалах доклада «Преобразование учреждений и государственного управления для создания более благоприятных условий на пути к 2030 году», подготовленного авторами в рамках 21-й сессии Комитета экспертов по государственному управлению при Экономическом и Социальном Совете ООН в январе 2022 г.

References

Eisenstat, Y. (2021). How to Hold Social Media Accountable for Undermining Democracy. *Harvard Business Review*, 11 January.

Fleisch, B. (2008). *Primary Education in Crisis: Why South African Schoolchildren Underachieve in Reading and Mathematics*. Cape Town, Juta & Company.

Horner, R. (2019) Towards a New Paradigm of Global Development? Beyond the Limits of International Development. *Progress in Human Geography*, 44(3). DOI: 10.1177/0309132519836158

Mogoatlhe, L. (2020). What Does Universal Quality Education Really Mean for Sub-Saharan Africa? *Global Citizen*, 4 March. URL: <https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/universal-quality-education-in-africa/>

Morsy, H. (2019). Mainstreaming Gender in African Policymaking: Ensuring no Voice is Unheard. African Development Bank Group, 24 November.

Schirch, Lisa (ed.) (2021). *Social Media Impacts on Conflict and Democracy: The Tectonic Shift*. London, Routledge.

The Power of Parity: Advancing Women's Equality in Africa. (2019). McKinsey Global Institute. McKinsey & Company, November 24, 2019. URL: <https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/gender-equality/the-power-of-parity-advancing-womens-equality-in-africa>

Political Manipulation via Crisis Ideologization

ELENA V. PILGUN¹

Minsk State Linguistic University (Belarus)

Abstract

Crisis ideologization as one of the tools to carry out political manipulations plays a leading role in the construction of reality, has the powerful potential for influencing the mass consciousness. It makes the manipulation of the public opinion possible, impacts the behaviour and political decisions of the recipient to get rid of political dividends in favour of the actor. The actors exercise control over the value balance in the society both within their own country and abroad using a set of tactics – special tools, which allow influencing political decision-making and public opinion to ideologize mass consciousness. The mechanism of ideologizing a crisis is wide-spread in modern international relations. The author offers a typology of manipulative tools relying on the study of crisis situations by the method of critical discourse analysis, and singles out the tactics of legitimization of the political actors' actions, censure and condemnation, coercion and punishment, accusations, threats of war, misinformation, seduction, insults, and distraction. The aim of the article is to describe the mechanisms of political manipulations by means of crisis ideologization. The study is based on mass media publications representing various crises emerged in the post-Soviet space since 2020.

Key words

crisis, ideologization of crises, political manipulations, political technology, international relations

For citation

Pilgun Elena V. (2022). Political Manipulation via Crisis Ideologization. *Управление и политика*, 1(2), P. 30–43.

¹ **Elena V. Pilgun** – PhD., Vice-Rector for Academic Affairs and Internationalization of Education, Minsk State Linguistic University, Belarus.

E-mail: elenpilgun@gmail.com

The author declares the absence of conflict of interests

Relations between countries, emerging crises, dramatic changes in the foreign policies of states and sometimes complete uncertainty in the international domain invariably attract attention not only of international expert community, but also of ordinary people from around the world. The former makes attempts to study historical experience and predict possible development scenarios, while the latter assess events within their competence. However, both those and others become the objects of political manipulations. Political manipulation, according to V.G. Domanov, is a system of methods of psychological influence on the masses, used by political actors for the purpose of political deception, introducing illusory ideas about political life into the minds of people (Доманов, 2010).

Political manipulation is always about information impact, which is possible since political information is generally closed to direct access by experts and the public. The purpose of this type of manipulation is to obtain, retain and exercise power. On the one hand, the mechanisms of political manipulation can induce the object to certain actions in the interests of the subject of political manipulation, correct or radically change (including full neutralization) the ideological attitudes of recipients. On the other hand, political manipulation can be employed to ensure political stability in states and integration associations. Manipulation can be carried out directly by political actors via statements, speeches, etc. Other channels for that are the media and social networks. Political manipulation is actively manifested in crisis situations since the solution of acute crisis issues affects the well-being and development of all spheres of life in a particular country and requires an immediate response from the authorities. Crises are caused by social, political, economic, man-made or environmental reasons, they arise within or between countries fostered by external forces (Пильгун, 2020, p. 13). Crises give rise to geopolitical transformations, redistribution of resources and territories, changing methods, approaches, ways of interaction between states, international organizations, etc. Tackling crises, politicians and parties experience rises and falls of their ratings. Crises cannot be overcome without efforts of the official authorities; at the same time, the actions of the state are carried out in conditions of intense international competition, and therefore crises become a pretext for manipulation to achieve national interests.

It should be noted that manipulations in international relations are carried out through mechanisms of pressure on decision-making and influence on public opinion. These mechanisms work simultaneously and are used to influence recipients both in their own country and abroad. To do this, a crisis is ideologized with the help of manipulative tactics that allow implementing goals and exercising control over the value balance of society.

A set of tactics to put pressure directly on the authorities or those who make political decisions in the society is expressed in the activity of the actor. The basis for such an impact is inflation, unemployment, taxation and other problems of the economy, public security, foreign and domestic policy, international relations, healthcare, ecology, scientific and technological development, etc. Tactics are inextricably linked with communication since they allow public opinion to present the crisis in the light, favourable to the actor. Thus, the process of crisis ideologization to carry out political manipulations becomes a rather convenient strategy for international interaction. The ideologization of a crisis makes it possible to put the recipient in a dependent position and manipulate behaviour, political decisions, public opinion in society, etc.

The purpose of the article is to analyse the mechanisms of influence used by actors to satisfy their own interests in international interaction. The study is based on general scientific and special methods including critical discourse analysis. Crisis events and processes in the post-Soviet space for the period from 2020 to the present are used as illustrative material. The cases were selected by the method of continuous sampling in news reports. During 2020, 95 socio-political crises (armed conflicts) were identified in the world, most of them concentrated in Africa – 38 cases, followed by Asia – 25, the Middle East – 12, Europe and Latin America – 10 cases each.²

Mechanisms of influence in international relations

In today's world, crises have become a pretext and an instrument of pressure on political decision-making, have a direct impact on people's emotions,

² Alert 2021! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding. Report (2021, August 08). Reliefweb. URL: <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/alert-2021-report-conflicts-human-rights-and-peacebuilding> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

and consequently on public opinion. On the one hand, crises open new areas of social reality since they always stimulate new impetus for development; on the other hand, they act as a pretext for the ideologization of mass consciousness. According to E.L. Dotsenko, the result of the manipulator's activity largely depends on the "environment" of his statements (Доценко, 1997, p. 141). Moreover, given the need to structure and control social relations in crisis situations, the concept of ideology comes here to the fore.

Ideology is considered as a system of views that allows a person and society to navigate in the space and time around them (Боратуров, Косолапов, Хрусталеv, 2002, p. 234-236). At the end of the 20th – beginning of the 21st century, there was a shift in the interpretation of the very concept of ideology [Маслова, 2011, p. 315], which began to be seen as a set of ideas that have a systemic form (Войтоловский, 2010, p. 15). The inculcation of certain views and the ideologization of the mass consciousness, both domestically and in the recipient country, have become a tool for influencing international relations. The ideologization of public consciousness begins usually with the substitution of facts, putting events in a favourable light, demonstrating the negative sides of positive processes, and so on.

The ideologization of mass consciousness amid crisis involves the use of social, cultural, and linguistic factors that regulate the behaviour of the audience, and might be perceived as manipulative technologies. Ideologization is aimed at structuring social relations, offering ready-made models of human behaviour: to protect from the bad, to preserve the good, to achieve the best, adjust the value orientations, etc.

The ideologization of crisis occurs by means of manipulative tactics. Manipulation can affect the emotional and mental state of the target and change the situation as a whole (Noggle, 2021). The use of manipulative tactics leads to irrational behaviour of the authorities: under these conditions, countries miss profitable opportunities, suspend cooperation and neglect national interests. P. Ordeshook (Ordeshook, 1986), G. Allison (Allison, 1971), M. Halperin (Halperin, 1974; Halperin, 1972) were engaged in the study of such behavioural tactics in the framework of the theory of public administration. The practices of political manipulation in the context of collective bargaining in international organizations and in the UN General Assembly were analyzed by

W. Riker, S.G. Kara-Murza, M.A. Odintsova (Riker, 1986; Кара-Мурза, 2005; Одинцова, 2010).

Amid crises, manipulation tactics used for political purposes (political manipulation) differ from persuasion and other influence tactics. Manipulation is aimed at structuring decision-making in crisis situations: the chances of making the “right” decision increase (International Practices, 2011). Persuasion, on the other hand, is a direct attempt to influence (pressure) the decision-maker to change his preferences (Maoz, 1990, p. 77). Political manipulation in some cases can lead to necessary steps and decisions, even in case at first glance such decisions do not seem rational and logical.

Situational and structural conditions of the crisis contribute or limit the success of manipulative tactics. Therefore, correct tactics might harness any crisis for own's purposes to ideologize the mass consciousness. The ideologization of crisis situations makes it possible to obtain profound political effects.

Tactics of political manipulation in crisis situations

Manipulative tactics are employed to achieve the actor's goals in the context of a certain crisis promoting the country's image, obtaining economic and political preferences, etc. The impact might be both positive and negative. Manipulation in most cases involves obtaining political effects rather with negative consequences for the recipient. Events that have a negative context at a particular moment of time can also lead to positive consequences in the future. In this case, it is worth talking about the processes of ideologization, so the development of a situation can be anticipated by the actor in accordance with his global intentions to strengthen the area of influence or even to establish a new world order.

To ideologize a crisis, the actors of world politics use the following tactics:

The tactic of legalizing the actions of political actors. Those in power are always monopolists, possessing full information about current affairs, acting as a guarantor of peace, security, well-being and justice, exercising control and managing social processes. While tackling a crisis, authorities, on the one hand, play a dominant role, and, on the other hand, risk their powers depending on the success of overcoming a crisis. In its turn, a crisis allows authorities to legitimize

their actions. A striking example here is a situation in Kazakhstan occurred in early 2022. Twofold increase in gas prices became a reason for mass protests and resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency in the country. The demands of the protesters quickly turned into to be political. The government successfully overcame the crisis, cementing an image of a stable state as well as the authority of the incumbent president legitimizing his actions both for international partners and for the population of the country. Thanks to timely and competent information policy, the Western countries were assured that the crisis was caused by terrorist networks and their attempt to seize power, even though no terrorist organization claimed responsibility for what happened. Satisfying the requests of the protesters, the dissolution of the Parliament and other political actions accompanied by stable communication with the population allowed President Tokaev to enjoy the support of the Kazakh people and get other advantages emerging as a strong leader, reducing the influence of previous President and Chairman of the Security Council Nazarbayev, and confirming his legitimacy and readiness to solve the crisis.

The resolution of the crisis in Kazakhstan with the involvement of the CSTO forces caused a backlash in the United States. Secretary of state Blinken argued that Kazakhstan was forced to seek the assistance of an organization dominated by Russia.³ In this situation, the US used the *tactics of condemnation and censure* with the intention to demonstrate its influence and patronage in Central Asia.

The tactics of coercion and punishment are used widely mainly by global actors of international relations. For instance, they include the policy of sanctions which are used mostly by the developed states as a “punishment” for “wrong” actions or decisions to force the authorities to take “better” steps. For example, the reason for the introduction of the 5th package of sanctions against Belarus was the situation with migrants on the Belarusian-Polish border. The crisis arose because the EU unilaterally terminated the readmission agreement as a punitive measure following the results of the 2020 presidential election campaign. The situation was used to introduce unilateral restrictive measures by individual

³ США потребовали у Казахстана объяснений по обращению за помощью к ОДКБ. РИА-Новости, 30.05.2022. [The United States demanded an explanation from Kazakhstan on seeking help from the CSTO. RIA News] URL: <https://ria.ru/20220109/odkb-1767063961.html> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

neighbouring states, such as Lithuania, in relation to oil products coming from the territory of the Union State.

The tools of manipulation can be not only political in nature, but also environmental, i.e. related to the UN Agenda 2030. Thus, Sweden is one of the leaders in the world in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): in the international SDG index published in 2020, Sweden was ranked 1^s.⁴ At the same time the implementation of Agenda 2030 is designed to strengthen the image of Sweden abroad. Under the pretext of implementing the 2030 Agenda, Sweden is trying to extend its influence on other countries. In that sense a key instrument of influence is financing and assistance to developing states. Sweden is currently one of the key aid donors in the world. In 2020, the amount of official development assistance provided by Sweden to foreign countries comprised to 4.3 billion dollars. The main recipients are the poorest countries of Africa and Asia (Afghanistan, Somalia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, etc.), several technical assistance projects are also being implemented in Eastern Europe and Latin America. The main Swedish partner of Belarus in bilateral technical cooperation is the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Interaction with Belarus is carried out by SIDA since the regional strategy was adopted by the Government of Sweden for Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans and Turkey for 2014-2020, and was extended to 2021. On August 18, 2020, the Swedish media published a message that Sweden decided to suspend several technical assistance projects with Belarus due to events related to the presidential election campaign. On September 10, 2020, SIDA announced the suspension of the third project of assistance to Belarus due to the actions of the state after the elections. The Swedish side has frozen financing in the amount of 7 million SEK (about 0.8 million dollars) for the project to promote human rights in Belarusian universities.⁵ Commenting on this decision, the Minister for International Development Cooperation P. Eriksson (2019-2021) noted that “more support will be provided to civil society, and the part that was allocated

⁴ The Sustainable Development Goals and Covid-19. Sustainable Development Report 2020. URL: <https://sdgindex.org/reports/sustainable-development-report-2020/> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

⁵ Sida fryser ytterligare stöd till Belarus. Sida, 2022, February 10. URL: <https://www.sida.se/Svenska/aktuellt-och-press/nyheter/2020/september-2020/sida-fryser-ytterligare-stod-till-belarus/> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

to projects with the participation of state structures has been frozen.”⁶ Thus, Sweden continues to implement initiatives in Belarus to support the opposition, trying to put pressure on the authorities.

Another manipulative tactic in international relations is the *tactic of projecting accusations*. The Russian Federation nowadays is subject to accusations of aggression. Almost any crisis can serve as an example here, especially those that occur on the territory of foreign states: the Skripal case, the election of D. Trump, the crisis on the Belarusian-Polish border, the increase in prices for Russian gas, etc.

Official Minsk also faces unfounded accusations from Western countries. So, in the summer of 2021, the United States accused Minsk of “obstructing American programs in the field of international development.”⁷ Similar programs were realized in Belarus for more than a year and were aimed at strengthening American values, as well as at destabilizing the situation in the country. In this regard, Public Relations Department of the US Embassy, and the office of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), including the American Centre in Minsk, were closed. However, their closure did not stop the activities of the organizations now conducted via Internet platforms, one of which is a Facebook group promoting educational initiatives “Education opportunities for Belarusians.”

In modern crisis discourse, the usage of the *“threat of war” tactic* is increasingly popular. This tactic is expressed in the statements about the deployment of armed forces, acquisition of weapons, redeployment of nuclear weapons, crossing of state borders by drones, etc. The tactic works in two directions: it is used by political actors to influence the mass consciousness on the territory of their own country to ensure national security and protect borders and the population from external influence, or to achieve certain goals in the international arena to intimidate an opponent and ideologize public opinion outside their own countries.

⁶ Peter Eriksson: Rätt Fortsätta Samarbete med Kommuner i Belarus. GlobalBar Magazine. David Issacson, 20.06.2022. URL: <https://globalbar.se/2020/08/peter-eriksson-ratt-fortsatta-samarbete-med-kommuner-i-belarus/> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

⁷ U.S. Embassy Minsk Statement. URL: usembassy.gov (accessed: 15.07.2022)

There are cases of employing the *tactic of disinformation* in its various manifestations, which implies hiding information, lie, distortion and suppression of facts. Disinformation involves the collection of supporting evidence, images and decontextualization of information (Krafft, Donovan, 2020, p. 194). In the “post-truth” era disinformation brings serious consequences for public and political discourse, political processes, and governance (Landon-Murray, Mujkic, Nussbaum, 2019, p. 512).

The *tactic of “seduction”* is designed to earn the trust and loyalty of the patron. One can provide a case of Lithuania, which in 2022 refused to transport Belarusian potassium by rail, since the potash fertilizer manufacturer Belaruskali does not meet the interests of Lithuania’s national security.⁸ The United States imposed sanctions on this enterprise. Violating contractual obligations regarding the Belarusian company, the Lithuanian government went to undermine its own economy to obtain preferences and loyalty from official Washington.

The *tactic of insult* is expressed verbally or by means of actions. US Secretary of State Blinken, following the results of the CSTO operation in Kazakhstan, said: “Once Russians are in your house, it is sometimes very difficult to get them to leave.”⁹ The Russian side commented that the Secretary of State “joked in his usual boorish manner,” and retorted: “When Americans are in your house, it can be difficult to stay alive, not to be robbed or raped.”¹⁰ Such an exchange of “courtesies” exemplifies the Russophobia and hostility on the part of the American side. In turn, the Russian side applies the principle of “mirror measures” in international relations and gives a diplomatic response, alluding to the events caused by the American policy in the Middle East. The use of insult tactics is also manifested in the upside down placement of the flag of another state or replacing it with an alternative unofficial one. Similar cases were observed in the Latvia, Germany and Ukraine with the official flag of the Republic of Belarus.

⁸ Литва решила расторгнуть контракт на ж/д перевозку белорусского калия. Интерфакс, 12.01.2022. [Lithuania decided to terminate the contract for railway transportation of Belarusian potassium. Interfax, 01/12/2022] URL: <https://www.interfax.ru/world/815045> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

⁹ В МИД назвали заявление Блинкена о роли России в Казахстане детским лепетом. РИА-новости, 09.01.2022. [The Foreign Ministry called Blinken's statement about Russia's role in Kazakhstan child's play. RIA-news, 01/09/2022] URL: <https://ria.ru/20220108/kazakhstan-1767001160.html> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

¹⁰ Ibid.

A *distraction tactic* is the escalation of a certain event in neighbouring countries to divert public attention from problems within one's own state. Often such tactics are used in the Baltic countries. For example, Lithuania's statements about its intention to build a wall on the Belarusian-Lithuanian border in connection with the influx of refugees on the border with Poland.¹¹ Lithuania accounted for a relatively small number of refugees using the country's territory for transit to Germany, but the situation was used by the Lithuanian authorities to divert the attention of Lithuanian society from internal problems. The crisis made it possible to postpone the process of amending the Lithuanian Constitution. The introduction of a state of emergency and demonstration of force made it possible for the incumbent government to increase the social loyalty.

The usage of manipulative tactics to ideologize a certain crisis allows actors to exert specific political effects. Two such effects should be singled out, one of which is aimed at rallying of society, peoples, countries in the face of a crisis – in other words, consolidation. For example, the tactics of the Russian and Belarus authorities aimed at the legitimization of the political actions through the adoption of 28 programs of the Union in combination with the tactics of “threat of war” amid a growing threat to Russia and Belarus from the collective West, will strengthen the joint political course, the integration potential of the two countries, closer interaction and pool the efforts for their sustainable development. The second effect – fragmentation – is aimed at dividing society, peoples and states. The “threat of war” tactics used by the authorities of Western countries against the Union State, combined with the tactics of “condemnation and censure”, “coercion and punishment”, affects mass consciousness of the Union State and is designed to undermine its ideology from the inside, discrediting the authorities and bringing division lines in their population. The use of crises for the purpose of fragmentation might lead to territorial disputes, xenophobic manifestations, aggression and discrimination, and so on.

¹¹ Литва решила построить стену на границе с Белоруссией из-за мигрантов. RBC, 07.07.2021. [Lithuania decided to build a wall on the border with Belarus because of migrants. RBC, 07.07.2021] URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/07/07/2021/60e58dc19a7947854fd1fc9a> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

Conclusion

Thus, the ideologization of any crisis by means of political manipulation plays a crucial role in constructing reality. Manipulations are fulfilled through the actions of political actors and through the communicative and information support of these actions creating a kind of a crisis discourse. Crises have the strongest potential to influence mass consciousness. On the one hand, they have an impact on the emotional state of the society, actualizing the need for protection, on the other hand, they test the strength of state, prompting the society to preserve the existing order or change it.

Political manipulation in the international arena through the ideologization of a crisis and/or control of mass consciousness involves the use of manipulative tactics, under the influence of which the recipient makes political decisions which are beneficial to the subject of influence. The recipient falls into a dependent position both on the will of the subject and on his own actions. With the help of such mechanisms of influence, the subjects of international relations (authority, opposition, state, transnational corporation, NGOs and others) satisfy their own geopolitical ambitions, create or improve the image in the political sphere, disseminate and replicate patterns of political behaviour in the international arena, control, prevent and neutralize the emergence of negative or positive manifestations in society, etc.

In turn, the pragmatic dimension of the crisis discourse determines the choice of representation methods, meanings and shades in accordance with the necessary context, determines the use of the very manipulative tactics. Depending on the goals, actors through mass media ideologize or counter-ideologize the mass consciousness. Examples of such communicative tactics are legitimization of the political actors' actions, censure and condemnation, coercion and punishment, accusations, threats of war, misinformation, seduction, insults, and distraction.

Manipulative tactics amid a crisis have an emotional and mental effect on the recipient, evoke emotions and/or prompt reflection, which allows the recipient to interpret what he heard or saw. In a crisis situation, they affect each recipient individually and the mass consciousness as a whole. This mechanism allows

the actor to exert influence to spread the given value and behavioural attitudes, control and retain power. The study of such mechanisms and principles of their work will help to identify the facts of manipulation and organize counteraction to the impact on target groups, protect the information sovereignty of states.

Получено в редакции: 26 июля 2022 г.
Принято к публикации: 23 августа 2022 г.

УДК: 32.019.51, 323, 327

Политическое манипулирование через идеологизацию кризиса

Елена Витальевна Пильгун, к.фил.н., проректор по учебной работе
и интернационализации образования Минского государственного
лингвистического университета, Минск, Республика Беларусь
E-mail: elenpilgun@gmail.com

Аннотация: Идеологизация кризиса в качестве одного из инструментов осуществления политических манипуляций играет ведущую роль в конструировании реальности и обладает мощным потенциалом воздействия на массовое сознание. Благодаря идеологизации происходит манипулирование общественным мнением, осуществляется воздействие на политическое поведение и политические решения. Акторы осуществляют контроль над ценностным балансом в обществе как внутри своей страны, так и за рубежом, используя набор тактик – специальных инструментов, позволяющих влиять на принятие политических решений и общественное мнение с целью идеологизации массового сознания. Механизм идеологизации кризиса широко распространен в современных международных отношениях. Автор предлагает типологию манипулятивных средств, опираясь на изучение кризисных ситуаций методом критического дискурсивного анализа, и выделяет тактики легитимации действий политических акторов, порицания и осуждения, принуждения и наказания, обвинения, угроз войны, дезинформации, оскорбления и отвлечения внимания. Цель статьи – описать механизмы политических манипуляций посредством идеологизации кризиса. Исследование основано на публикациях в СМИ, освещающих различные кризисы, возникшие на постсоветском пространстве с 2020 года.

Ключевые слова: кризис, идеологизация кризиса, политические манипуляции, полит-технологии, международные отношения

References

- Allison, G. T. (1971). *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little Brown. 277 p.
- Halperin, M. A., (1972). Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications. *Theory and Policy in International Relations*. Tanter, Raymond and Ullman, Richard, eds. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 40–79.

Halperin, M. A., (1974). *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 415 p.

International Practices (2011). Cambridge University Press, pp. 255–279. DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511862373.015

Krafft, P. M. & Donovan, J. (2020). Disinformation by Design: The Use of Evidence Collages and Platform Filtering in a Media Manipulation Campaign. *Political Communication*, 37(2), 194–214. DOI: 10.1080/10584609.2019.1686094

Landon-Murray, M., Mujkic, E. & Nussbaum, B. (2019). Disinformation in Contemporary U.S. Foreign Policy: Impacts and Ethics in an Era of Fake News, Social Media, and Artificial Intelligence. *Public Integrity*, 21(5), 512–522. DOI: 10.1080/10999922.2019.1613832

Maoz, Z. (1990). Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of Foreign Policy Decisions in Group Settings. *World Politics*, 43(1), 77–110. DOI: 10.2307/2010552

Noggle, R. (2021). Manipulation in Politics. *Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of Politics*. 29. Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.2012

Ordeshook, P.C. (1986). *Game Theory and Political Theory*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 500 p.

Riker, W.H. (1986). *The Art of Political Manipulation*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 153 p.

Bogaturov A.D., Kosolapov N.A., Khrustalev M.A. 2002. Oчерки теории i politicheskogo analiza mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy [Essays on the Theory and Political Analysis of International Relations]. Moscow. 380 p. (In Russian)

Domanov V.G. (2010). Politicheskaya manipulyatsiya Politologiya. Slovar' [Political Manipulation Political Science. Dictionary]. Ed. by V.N. Konovalov. Moscow: RGU. (In Russian)

Dotsenko E.L. (1997). Psikhologiya manipulyatsii: fenomeny, mekhanizmy i zashchita [Psychology of Manipulation: Phenomena, Mechanisms and Protection]. Moscow: CheRo – MGU Publishing House. 344 p. (In Russian)

Kara-Murza, S.G. (2005). Manipulyatsiya soznaniyem [Mind Manipulation]. Moscow: Eksmo. 832 p. (In Russian)

Maslova E.A. (2011). Evolyutsiya predstavleniy ob ideologii politicheskoy teorii [The Evolution of Ideas about the Ideology of Political Theory]. Bulletin of the Nizhny Novgorod University. Series: International relations. Political science. Regional studies. No. 6, pp. 315–319. (In Russian)

Odintsova M.A. (2010). Mnogolikost' «zhertvy» ili nemnogo o Velikoy manipulyatsii (Sistema raboty, diagnostika, treningi) [The Many Faces of the "Victim" or a Little about the Great Manipulation (System of Work, Diagnostics, Trainings)]. Moscow: Flinta. 256 p. (In Russian)

Pilgun E.V. (2020). Semantika i pragmatika krizisnogo diskursa [Semantics and Pragmatics of Crisis Discourse]. Minsk: Information Center of the Ministry of Finance. 203 p. (In Russian)

Voitolovsky, F.G. (2010). Ideologicheskiye sostavlyayushchiye global'nykh transformatsiy. Sovremennyye global'nyye problemy [Ideological Components of Global Transformations. Modern Global Problems] / Ed. by V.G. Baranovsky, A.D. Bogaturov. Moscow: Aspect-Press. Pp. 307–322. (In Russian)

Литература на русском языке (Literature in Russian):

Богатуров А.Д., Косолапов Н.А., Хрусталеv М.А. 2002. Очерки теории и политического анализа международных отношений. М. 380 с.

Войтоловский, Ф.Г. (2010). Идеологические составляющие глобальных трансформаций. *Современные глобальные проблемы* / Отв. ред. Барановский В.Г., Богатуров А.Д. М.: «Аспект-Пресс». С. 307–322.

Доманов В.Г. (2010). Политическая манипуляция *Политология. Словарь. Под ред. В.Н. Коновалова*. М: РГУ.

Доценко Е.Л. (1997). *Психология манипуляции: феномены, механизмы и защита*. М.: ЧеРо – Издательство МГУ. 344 с.

Кара-Мурза, С.Г. (2005). *Манипуляция сознанием*. М.: Эксмо. 832 с.

Маслова Е.А. (2011). Эволюция представлений об идеологии политической теории. *Вестник Нижегородского университета. Серия: Международные отношения. Политология. Регионоведение*. № 6. С. 315–319.

Одинцова М.А. (2010). *Многоликость «жертвы» или немного о Великой манипуляции (Система работы, диагностика, тренинги)*. М.: Флинта. 256 с.

Пильгун Е.В. (2020). *Семантика и прагматика кризисного дискурса*. Минск: ИВЦ Минфина. 203 с.

Wolf Warrior Diplomacy – Foreign Policy for Internal Use in China

NATALIA V. SELEZNEVA¹

Novosibirsk State Technical University (Russia)

Abstract

The article reveals the content of the new concept of “wolf warrior diplomacy” that first appeared in 2019. “Wolf warrior diplomacy” is a metaphorical phrase denoting a new demeanor of Chinese diplomats, characterized by particular assertiveness and aggressiveness. The author examines the emergence of the concept and its popularization in Chinese media discourse, and comes to the conclusion that this behavior of Chinese diplomats was not only condemned by the Chinese leadership and Chinese society, but, on the contrary, was supported and publicly approved. This is consistent with the new conceptual foreign and domestic political ideas of China – the strengthening of the “discursive power” in the international arena and the strengthening of the “four certainties” within the country. Wolf warrior diplomacy is intended to demonstrate China’s ability to turn in its favor even ideas, concepts and formulations that were originally anti-Chinese in nature and were developed by Western countries to discredit China and undermine its international image.

Key words

Wolf warrior diplomacy, China, diplomacy, foreign policy, discursive power

For citation

Selezneva Natalia V. (2022). Wolf Warrior Diplomacy – Foreign Policy for Internal Use in China. *Управление и политика*, 1(2), P. 44–58.

¹ **Natalia V. Selezneva** – PhD (Philology), Department of International Relations and Regional Studies, Novosibirsk State Technical University, Russia.

E-mail: xie-ling@yandex.ru

The author declares the absence of conflict of interests

In recent years, China's foreign policy has been characterized by a departure from the diplomatic principles formulated by Deng Xiaoping, which were expressed in the formula *"observe cold-bloodedly, stand firmly on your feet, be unflappable, hide your capabilities and bide your time, never take the lead, take the opportunity and do what you are capable of"*. With Xi Jinping's accession to power, Chinese diplomacy has taken on new features – not only new concepts that shape the diplomatic narrative, but also new forms of diplomatic response and the language of diplomacy itself are changing.

Domestic experts have already noted that Chinese diplomacy has changed since the election of Xi Jinping. They claim that: "after 2012, the search for a new model of China's relations with the outside world intensified, moving discussions on the need for a new proactive diplomacy into the practical sphere" (Денисов, 2017, p. 86); "Despite the fact that the 'fifth generation of China's leaders' retains the traditional policy of 'not joining', 'keeping a low profile', 'showing restraint and modesty', the very quality of China's foreign policy is changing" (Козыкина, Муратшина, 2017, p. 54). The transformation of China's foreign policy allowed V. Kashin and A. Pyatachkova to talk about a "new style" of Chinese diplomacy during the pandemic (КАШИН, ПЯТАЧКОВА, 2020).

Practice has shown that the new Chinese diplomacy gives priority not to soft power, but to strengthening its "discursive power" internationally (Denisov, 2020), with rather severe and aggressive statements used for its reinforcement. This behavior of Chinese diplomats is called *Zhan lang waijiao* (战狼外交) – translated into English as "wolf policy"², "battle wolf diplomacy"³, "wolf diplomacy"⁴, "wolf warrior diplomacy."⁵ Without going into details of translation, we will simply note that the latest formulation proposed by I.E. Denisov and I.Yu. Zuenko, seems to us to be the most accurate and will be used in this article.

² Габуев А., Умаров Т. Политика волков и масок: как Китай защищает свою репутацию в кризис. РБК, 30.04.2020 [Gabuev A., Umarov T. The Policy of Wolves and Masks: How China Protects Its Reputation in a Crisis. RBK, 04/30/2020]. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/opinions/politics/30/04/2020/5ea9d6519a794770045da33f> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

³ Скосырев В. Агрессивный тон Китайского МИДа задают молодые «волки-воины». Независимая газета, 20.05.2020 [Skosyrev V. The Aggressive Tone of the Chinese Foreign Ministry Is Set by Young "Wolf Warriors". Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 05/20/2020]. URL: https://www.ng.ru/world/2020-05-20/6_7865_china.html (accessed: 15.07.2022)

⁴ Как работает «дипломатия волков»? Информационно-аналитический портал «Империя», 01.04.2021. [How Does Wolf Diplomacy Work? Information and Analytical Portal "Empire", 04/01/2021.] URL: <https://www.imperiyanews.ru/details/1e4d6e2b-1193-eb11-8122-020c5d00406e> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

⁵ Денисов И., Зуенко И. Почему новый язык китайской дипломатии звучит так грубо. Профиль, 26.05.2020. [Denisov I., Zuenko I. Why the New Language of Chinese Diplomacy Sounds so Rude. Profile, 05/26/2020] URL: <https://profile.ru/abroad/pochemu-novyy-yazyk-kitajskoj-diplomatii-zvuchit-tak-grubo-320380/> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

“Wolf warrior diplomacy” has come to be referred to as the severe, tough, aggressive (often insulting) reaction of Chinese diplomats to statements by foreign colleagues, officials, journalists, etc. that touch issues that are sensitive to China.

If we look for parallels to such behavior in Chinese culture, Jeanne M. Smith, PhD in Law and Senior Fellow in the Strategic Technology Program at the U.S. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), writes that the origins of “wolf warrior diplomacy” should be sought in the *Dào Dé Jīng*, a study of which is extremely useful for understanding the behavior of China and Chinese diplomats.⁶

It seems that the correlation with Chinese stratagems can be of great importance for understanding the nature of “wolf warrior diplomacy”. V.S. Miasnikov writes: “Everything that is required to win a political struggle needed a strategy... Strategy in diplomacy drew its means not from its principles, norms and customs of international law, but from the theory of military art, which has a total nature and claims that the end justifies the means... A strategy is the ability to calculate moves in political game, and sometimes not only to calculate them, but also to program them based on the specifics of situation and qualities of the opponent” (Мясников, 2004, p. 8-10).

The transformation of Chinese diplomacy from the “silence of the lambs” to “wolf warrior diplomacy” can be characterized by the transition from the strategy “Hide a dagger behind a smile” (seek the trust of your rival and inspire calm; only then carry out your own hidden agendas; prepare appropriately, attack without hesitation and do not let the enemy recover) – to the strategy “The cicada sheds its skin” (always keep an air of confidence, not allowing flaws in your viewpoint). This way one can prevent an ally from giving way to fear, and not give an enemy the chance to launch an attack. As noted by I.N. Panarin, these strategies are among the most frequently used in modern diplomacy (Панарин, 2015, pp. 211-212). In addition, the use of “wolf warrior diplomacy” can also be seen as a way of emotionally goading an opponent in the hope that he will say or do something that can then be actively used against him. As the treatise by Sun

⁶ Smith Zhanna M. New Tail for China’s ‘Wolf Warrior’ Diplomats. CSIS, 13.10.2021. URL: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-tail-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomats> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

Tzu says: “Having aroused anger in him, put him into a state of disorder” (Сунь-цзы, 2002, pp. 68-69), and the incisive comments of Chinese diplomats, which caused an unusually violent reaction in the West, characterize this postulate in the best way possible.

For a deeper understanding of “wolf warrior diplomacy”, we should go back to the origins and look at how and when this phenomenon took shape. The Chinese equivalent of Wikipedia claims that the phrase “wolf warrior diplomacy” first appeared in December 2020, linking it to a speech by the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Hua Jianmin and the reaction to the use of this wording in the German newspaper “Der Tagesspiegel.”⁷ However, according to the Chinese web search engine Baidu, the phrase “wolf warrior diplomacy” (*zhan lang waijiao*) appeared much earlier. The concept gradually formed in stages.

The word combination *zhan lang* (*wolf warrior*) might be traced back to 2015-2017, but exclusively as the title of the blockbuster Chinese action film that tells the story of a Chinese Rambo defending the interests of China. Western observers also associate the phrase *wolf warrior diplomacy* with the sequel, “Wolf Warrior 2.”⁸

The image of the wolf was chosen as the basis of the metaphor for the following reason – in Western countries, as well as in China and Russia, the image of the wolf has negative connotations. It is in this negative connotation that the English-language media and Western experts used the phrase *wolf warrior diplomacy* in relation to Chinese diplomacy.

The Chinese behaved differently. They took the English phrase *wolf warrior diplomacy* and actualized its positive connotation when translated into Chinese. They essentially left the form (using semantic calquing) and filled it with their own content (replaced the negative connotation with a positive one), finding a proper justification for it – the sensational movie “Wolf Warrior 2”, which brought in a record 5.68 billion yuan at the Chinese box office. Thus, the first part of the blockbuster “Wolf Warrior” already introduces two connotations for

7 战狼外交. URL: <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%88%98%E7%8B%BC%E5%A4%96%E4%BA%A4/55451735?fr=aladdin> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

8 Bandursky D. Xi Jinping: Leader of the Wolf Pack. Global Asia, September 2020. URL: https://www.globalasia.org/v15no3/focus/xi-jinping-leader-of-the-wolf-pack_david-bandurski (accessed: 15.07.2022)

“wolf warriors”: positive and negative. The positive connotation is a special unit of the People’s Liberation Army called the “Wolf warriors”, which carries out special tasks to protect China’s national interests. The negative hypostasis of the wolves is represented by external forces – firstly, the wild wolves that attack the unit, and secondly, a criminal drug cartel of foreigners in the first film, and African rebels and their foreign collaborators in the sequel.

The need to build a positive connotation for the image of the wolf arises from the fact that in traditional Chinese culture the wolf has always had negative features, which is reflected in numerous phraseological expressions, such as 狼心狗肺 *ferocious, inhuman (lit. wolf’s heart, dog’s lungs)*, 豺狼成性 *hardened villain (lit. jackal and wolf became character traits)*, 官虎吏狼 *greedy inhuman officials (lit. tiger officials and wolf officials)*, etc. The wolf was considered as a symbol of cruelty, greed, heartlessness, and a lack of understanding of moral norms.

The word combination “wolf patriotism” (*zhanlangshi aiguo*) has negative connotations, first appearing in the Chinese media in 2018 and applied to Chinese tourists who behave indecently while emphasizing that they are Chinese. For example, the Chinese Internet published articles about the provocative behavior of the Chinese at airports of Iran⁹ and Bali¹⁰, where they started singing the national anthem or shouting the word “China” to attract the attention of the Chinese embassy to solve the problems with flight delays. This behavior clearly demonstrates that as the country grows in power, its citizens begin to feel a certain permissiveness. However, the positive image of the “wolf warrior” from the movie displaced the negative connotation associated with this zoomorphic symbol from the consciousness of the Chinese speakers, which served as the basis on which the positive assessment of “wolf warrior diplomacy” within China later grew.

The positive understanding of the Chinese “wolf warrior diplomacy” was strengthened by the fact that the phrase “wolf warrior” (战狼) was contrasted with other phrases carrying a clear negative connotation and embodying exter-

⁹ 战狼式爱国？三家中国大使馆连发声明，都强调这两个字 01.02.2018. URL: https://www.sohu.com/a/220296466_349954 (accessed: 15.07.2022)

¹⁰ 战狼式“厉害了，我的国”怎么让外交部受不了了呢？ URL: <https://tieba.baidu.com/p/5514683622> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

nal negative forces, such as *wolves* (狼), *wild wolves* (野狼), *evil wolves* (恶狼), *evil people* (恶人), *enemies* (敌人), *dancing with wolves* (与狼共舞). It is against these “evil forces” that Chinese “wolf warrior” diplomats fight.

In addition, Chinese authorities talked about putting the hat of “*wolf warrior diplomacy*” (扣帽子) on China, *attaching a label of “wolf warrior diplomacy”* (打标签), which in the minds of Chinese speakers directly corresponds with the Cultural Revolution period and unfair accusations, a sense of shame and disgrace for their inability to justify themselves. Thus, through the Chinese language in the situation with “wolf warrior diplomacy”, China characterizes itself as a victim, defamed, slandered, vilified and unjustly accused (these words are also used in speeches about China’s position on “wolf warrior diplomacy”). For example, Le Yucheng, Deputy Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, speaking at a forum on think tanks in Beijing in December 2020, said that “China is labelled as having ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’, and at the very least this is a misunderstanding... In fact ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ is just a new version of ‘Chinese threat theory’ and a ‘discourse trap’ that aims to make China not respond to offenses and insults and stop fighting.”¹¹ Since China feels itself to be a great power, it considers silent tolerance of insults unacceptable, thereby justifying “wolf warrior diplomacy”, and emphasizing its defensive nature.

In early 2019, the Chinese media was not yet using the phrase “wolf warrior diplomacy” (*zhan lang waijiao*), although the trade war between the US and China had already heated up. In March 2019, responding to reporters’ questions regarding the arrest and detention of Meng Wanzhou, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China Wang Yi still stuck to rather sensitive language: “This is not just a legal case against a company or an individual, this is deliberate political pressure... We also support companies and individuals to legally defend their interests rather than being voiceless lambs.”¹² Following Wang Yi, the metaphor of voiceless lambs became a leitmotif and has been repeatedly used by other Chinese MFA officials as an antagonist of “wolf warrior diplomacy”, thereby reinforcing the positive connotation of “wolf warrior diplomacy”.

¹¹ 乐玉成: “战狼外界”是“中国威胁论”的又一翻版 // 北京日报 (05.12.2020). URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1685215313515724923&wfr=spider&for=pc>

¹² Ibid.

This may well have been a signal that other models of response are needed to make China's voice heard, which directly correlates with the intensification of the theme of China's "discursive power" in the international arena and the emergence of "wolf warrior diplomacy."

In mid-2019, the Chinese Internet featured the derivative word combination *zhan lang hua* (战狼化) "turning into a wolf", and headlines contained the phrase "中国外交越来越“战狼化”了吗？ *Is Chinese diplomacy getting more wolfish?*", and *zhan lang* (战狼) is used as a verb, for example "中国外交战狼了吗？ *Has Chinese diplomacy become wolfish?*"¹³ The expression "战狼 外交官 *wolf warrior diplomat*"¹⁴ began to be applied to Zhao Lijian. The starting point for the promotion of the concept of "wolf warrior diplomacy" was the altercation between Zhao Lijian and Susan Rice on Twitter.¹⁵ Hu Xijin, the Global Times editor, noted that the West reacted so strongly to Zhao's answers because the West is not used to Chinese diplomats launching sharp criticism against the Western countries¹⁶ – the West has always considered it a priority to accuse other countries, while Chinese criticism was quite accurate and revealed the lies of the West. After this event, the media lexicon began to include first the phrase *zhan langshi waijiao* (战狼式外交) and then *zhan lang waijiao* (战狼外交) "wolf warrior diplomacy".

The notion was baptized in 2020, when the Western countries, led by the United States, accused China of spreading the coronavirus. A series of accusations and claims against China were echoed by the diplomatic corps. Peter Martin, the Bloomberg reporter and author of "China's Civilian Army", noted in an interview that "after the COVID-19 pandemic outbreak, Chinese diplomats felt attacked, but also proud of the way their country handled the crisis. A new mixture of confidence and growing uncertainty came together to create what we now call "wolf-warrior diplomacy."¹⁷

¹³ 中国外交战狼了吗？ // 环球时报新媒体. URL: <https://view.inews.qq.com/a/20200525V00AYE700?tbkt=1&uid=> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

¹⁴ 华春莹新同事报到：推特上最红的“战狼”外交官. URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1642843210855477493&wfr=spider&for=pc>

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ 胡锡进：中国外交越来越战狼化？看看这场骂战就知道了. URL: <https://v.ifeng.com/c/v/7oNuFDHTEaG> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

¹⁷ Understanding Chinese "Wolf Warrior Diplomacy". The National Bureau of Asian Research, 22.10.2021. URL: <https://www.nbr.org/publication/understanding-chinese-wolf-warrior-diplomacy/> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

The Chinese reacted particularly sensitively if the virus was called the Chinese or Wuhan virus, if the country was accused of silencing the initial spread of the coronavirus, blamed for its emergence and spread, as well as claims for damages or negative assessments of Chinese actions in countering the waves of COVID-19. Liu Xiaoming, China's ambassador to the United Kingdom, said in May 2020: "It is noted that China now has many 'wolf warriors'. That's because 'wolves' have appeared in the world. And if there are wolves, there must also be those who will fight them. So we welcome diplomats at all levels to actively join the fight. Where there is a 'wolf', it is necessary to actively fight back, defending national honor and interests."¹⁸

Chinese "wolf warrior diplomacy" is not impersonal, but rather personalized. The MFA spokesperson Zhao Lijian is one of the leaders of China's new diplomatic "pack". Both domestic and Western observers noted that Zhao Lijian's militant tone on Twitter when he served as an envoy advisor to Pakistan contributed to his promotion. On February 24, 2020, he gave the first official briefing as the 31st spokesperson of the MFA Press Service.¹⁹ It seems that his appointment was not accidental, because after China imposed a total lockdown on January 23, 2020 due to the spread of the COVID-19 virus, China was hit by a wave of criticism, which could no longer be answered by "voiceless lamb diplomacy", and the "wolf warrior" Zhao Lijian came in handy.

Other "wolf diplomats" singled out by the foreign and Chinese researchers include Zhao Lijian's colleagues in the Foreign Ministry's Press Service, Hua Chunying and Wang Wenbin, as well as Qin Gang, Ambassador to the United States, Liu Xiaoming, Ambassador to Great Britain, Zhang Hanhui, Ambassador to Russia and Zhang Xiao, Ambassador to Kazakhstan. Thus, the so-called "wolf warriors" are represented by two "packs" – the Foreign Ministry press service and Chinese ambassadors abroad. Wang Yi, the head of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and his deputies, Le Yucheng and Qin Gang, prior to his appointment as Ambassador to the United States, are more diplomatic and do not use harsh

¹⁸ 中国驻英国大使：之所以有“战狼”是因为这个世界有“狼”。 URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1667618492052055714&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

¹⁹ 赵立坚就任外交部第31任发言人 首场发布会“火力全开”// 人民日报 (24.02.2020). URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1659421033448722343&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

language in their speeches. But they do not prohibit their subordinates from employing this style of language. In one of his speeches, Wang Yi stressed: “We will give a resolute response to deliberate slander, we will firmly guard national honor and national dignity. As for gratuitous slander, we will demonstrate the true state of affairs in order to preserve impartiality, justice and human conscience... And all those who keep trying to put a hegemonic hat on China are themselves the ones who cannot part with their dominance.”²⁰ Wang Yi thus gives the green light for his subordinates to engage in tough response tactics.

Chun Han Wong and Chao Deng, journalists at Wall Street Journal, note: “In the past, Chinese diplomats have allowed outbursts of harshness, mostly over core interests such as disputed territorial claims, foreign visits by the Dalai Lama and alleged independence activism by other figures whom Beijing views as separatist threats. More recently, they have been pushing Beijing’s narratives on a much broader range of topics, from the treatment of Muslim minorities to Chinese aid and loans to developing countries.”²¹

It is clear that China tries to apply “wolf warrior diplomacy” in a variety of ways. In December 2020 Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for China’s Foreign Ministry, said that “to protect China’s own legitimate interests, its sovereign security and development, national honor and dignity as well as international justice, why don’t we use ‘wolf warriors’?”²² From this statement one can conclude that China can use “wolf warrior diplomacy” on a wide range of issues.

In 2021, “wolf warrior diplomacy” continued to strengthen its position. On January 2, 2021, Wang Yi, China’s Head Foreign Minister, said in an interview with CGTN: “We treat friends with hospitality, we are ready to cooperate with partners, we will fight against evil people. As for benevolent criticism, we are ready to listen humbly; as for sensible advice, we are always ready to move towards it. However, if it is unreasonable to blacken and maliciously attack us,

²⁰ CNN 记者提问“战狼外交”·王毅霸气回应! (24.05.2020). URL: https://www.sohu.com/a/397399762_157164 (accessed: 15.07.2022)

²¹ Chun Han Wong, Chao Dan. Chinese diplomatic “war wolves” are ready to fight. The Wall Street Journal (InoPressa), 05/20/2020 URL: <https://www.inopressa.ru/article/20May2020/wsj/wolfwarriors.html> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

²² 华春莹: 为维护国家荣誉与尊严·就做“战狼”又何妨? // 人民日报 (11.12.2020). URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1685739805069904233&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

we will certainly fight back vigorously. If it is psychological terror (bullying) that threatens peace, then we have an even greater need to restore justice.”²³ On February 9, 2021, Qin Gang, the Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister, answering questions from German journalists, called those who slander and blacken China *elan* “wild wolves.”²⁴ March 2021 was marked by a furious squabble between the Chinese and US representatives at the Anchorage talks. “The United States has no right to speak to China in a condescending tone, the Chinese people will not accept it”, Yang Jiechi, the head of the Chinese delegation and Party foreign policy handler, said at the time.²⁵ In December 2021, Qin Gang, the Chinese Ambassador to the United States, answering questions from the US media, said, “Chinese diplomats are not fighting wolves, but dancing with wolves.”²⁶

The metaphor of “wolf warrior diplomacy”, coined in the West, has taken root in Chinese media discourse. Tough response tactics became regular and entrenched in the arsenal of Chinese diplomats after 2019. The metaphor even began to be considered by Chinese experts as one of the problems of modern Chinese diplomacy. For example, Professor Jiang Shisue, the professor at Shanghai University, cites discussions on whether Chinese diplomacy has departed from one of Deng Xiaoping’s basic principles of *hiding capabilities and biding time*, how to treat “wolf warrior diplomacy”, what China’s international “discursive power” is, and the fact that building a theory of international relations with Chinese specifics is a difficult and lengthy process.²⁷ Professor Jiang, like many others in China, emphasizes that “wolf warrior diplomacy” is China’s defensive tactic. “Whether ‘wolf warrior’ or ‘voiceless lamb’ are merely metaphors for national diplomatic style... In special conditions, ‘wolf warrior diplomacy’ may be the best choice, and in other conditions, it will be difficult to avoid ‘voiceless lamb diplomacy’. Each country’s diplomatic style is a unity of ‘wolf warrior di-

²³ VideoCina News. URL: <https://video.sina.cn/news/2021-01-02/detail-iiznctke9815058.d.html>

²⁴ 中国外交部副部长秦刚回应“战狼外交”. URL: <https://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/2021/02-10/9409370.shtml> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

²⁵ Мингазов С. США и Китай обменялись резкостью в начале встречи на Аляске. Forbes 19.03.2021. [] URL: <https://www.forbes.ru/newsroom/obshchestvo/423965-ssha-i-kitay-obmenyalis-rezkostyami-v-nachale-vstrechi-na-alyaske> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

²⁶ 秦刚：中国外交官不是战狼，而是与狼共舞// 中国新闻网. URL: <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1720033065708873979&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

²⁷ Westcott B., Jiang S. China Is Embracing a New Brand of Foreign Policy. Here’s What Wolf Warrior Diplomacy Means. CNN, 29.05.2020. URL: <https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/28/asia/china-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-intl-hnk/index.html> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

plomacy' and 'voiceless lamb diplomacy'. Except that the frequency of use and degree will be determined following changes in that country's external and internal conditions and diplomatic policy."²⁸ What stands out in Professor Jiang's statement is that the use of "wolf warrior diplomacy" is a deliberate choice (hence, less aggressive styles could well have been used), whereas the "voiceless lamb diplomacy" is clearly forced behavior. Professor Jiang thus views "wolf warrior diplomacy" itself and its application positively.

The Chinese would be acting out of character they did not turn inventions of the West directed against China to their advantage – it is no coincidence that the Chinese language has the expression 洋为中用 (*yangwei zhongyong*) – *to use foreign achievements in the interests of China*. This is what happened to the vivid metaphor of "wolf warrior diplomacy", which began to be used by Chinese newsmakers with a focus on the domestic audience. I. Denisov and I. Zuenko rightly note that "it is not a fact that 'wolf warrior diplomacy' is aimed specifically at the outside world. It would be logical to assume that it is aimed at China itself and even more specifically at the Communist Party, which Xi Jinping wants to unite and mobilize as much as possible to solve internal problems (economic stagnation) and external problems (Western pressure)"²⁹.

It even seems that the diplomacy of the wolf warriors is aimed not only at uniting the party, but also to a greater extent at the broader Chinese public. Jessica Chen Weiss, an associate professor at Cornell University, who has studied the role of nationalism in China's international relations, argues that the Chinese citizens increasingly expect the Chinese government to stand tall on the world stage and meet challenges with dignity. In confirmation, the Global Times published a poll on December 30, 2020, showing that 71.2% of the Chinese support "wolf warrior diplomacy" since the West has not yet learned to coexist on the principles of equality with China.³⁰

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Денисов И., Зуенко И. Почему новый язык китайской дипломатии звучит так грубо. Профиль, 26.05.2020. [Denisov I., Zuenko I. Why the New Language of Chinese Diplomacy Sounds so Rude. Profile, 05/26/2020] URL: <https://profile.ru/abroad/pochemu-novyy-yazyk-kitajskoj-diplomatii-zvuchit-tak-grubo-320380/> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

³⁰ 七成中国人支持“战狼外交”：西方还没学会与崛起的中国平等共处. URL: <https://new.qq.com/rain/a/20210102a0byw600> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

Zhao Lijiang himself expressed approval of “wolf warrior diplomacy” at the beginning of 2020 both at home and abroad; an article posted on the Chinese portal for ethnic Chinese living abroad stated: “Recently a new spokesperson for the Foreign Ministry was appointed, who just took office and started with denials! This ‘wolf warrior’ diplomat is really not to be trifled with, and all of us Chinese expatriates can breathe a sigh of relief. Our diplomats should not all be the embodiment of the Five Confucian virtues.³¹ In addition to “Confucian diplomats”, we need the power of “wolf warriors” who strike without a miss.”³² This consolidated Chinese endorsement of “wolf warrior diplomacy” and also linked to traditional attitudes to strategy. V.S. Miasnikov states that if a hero acts in the interests of the state and for the welfare of the people, he has a positive image, his strategies and the steps and measures based on them are noble by definition” (Мясников, 2004).

The focus of “wolf warrior diplomacy” on the Chinese public is also noted by Peter Martin, who said in an interview with the Indian newspaper *The Hindu*: “the truth is that we are not spectators. They do it to show people in Beijing that they are loyal to the regime, they are loyal to Mao or Xi Jinping or whoever. The foreign audience there is really a kind of byproduct.”³³

Initially, the representatives of the Chinese Foreign Ministry began to make harsh statements on Twitter, blocked on the territory of China, and so the original message was really addressed to the outside. However, this behavior does imply that one of the goals was to attract the attention of the Chinese leadership, to serve as a show of loyalty to the regime. Meanwhile, it is precisely the information about how the “wolf warriors” sharply criticize Western politicians in foreign social networks that quickly spread on the Chinese segment of the Internet, becoming a kind of confirmation of China’s strengthening voice in the international arena, something that the Chinese people have long desired.

Chinese and foreign experts and journalists alike began to look for other examples of “wolf warrior diplomacy”, and met many examples of undiplomatic and even offensive statements and actions made by Chinese diplomats.

³¹ The five Confucian virtues are benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and kindness.

³² Huayiw. URL: <http://www.huayiw.com/information/html/2020/2/26/1395.html> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

³³ The making of China’s ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy. In Focus podcast. The Hindu. URL: <https://www.thehindu.com/podcast/the-making-of-chinas-wolf-warrior-diplomacy-in-focus-podcast/article35538120.ece> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

Peter Martin, speaking of the undiplomatic behavior of Chinese ambassadors, says: “If Chinese diplomats were at a disadvantage and afraid of losing their reputations, even the smallest offenses or insults would be magnified into major international problems. They were, I think, driven by the fear that if they did not, they would be considered traitors at home. Thus a ‘wolf-warrior diplomacy’ has emerged.”³⁴ It seems that this statement is only half true, because such “undiplomatic” behavior should not be retrospectively attributed to “wolf warrior diplomacy”; it is more correct to view it as evidence of diplomatic intemperance rather than a systemic phenomenon in Chinese diplomacy, since there was no concept of “wolf warrior diplomacy” before Zhao Lijian’s appointment. The metaphor “wolf warrior” appears only in 2019, and “wolf warrior diplomacy”, with the tacit consent of China’s leadership and the support of the Foreign Ministry leadership, becomes a trend in 2020, the year of the COVID-19 epidemic. On the other hand, from the ethno-psychological point of view, Chinese diplomats who use harsh language may indeed do so because of the fear of losing their reputation and losing face (*mianzi*) or, on the contrary, because they wish to improve their reputation, attract the attention of their superiors, and to earn approval.

It might be concluded that “wolf warrior diplomacy” is not something completely new for China and has deep historical-cultural and ethno-psychological roots. This strategy explains not only the reasons, goals and actions of the Chinese side, but also helps to understand why “wolf warrior diplomacy” has been perceived positively by the Chinese society. On the other hand, the Chinese language’s skillful play on the initially negative imported concept of *wolf warrior diplomacy* demonstrates the real possibilities of the language to replace the content of the concept and create an emotional background around it that meets public expectations and serves the goals of the Chinese leadership. The linguistic formalizations of the concept also indicate its conceptual consistency and its transition from the media discourse to the diplomatic narrative and the field of theoretical reflection.

³⁴ Фрэнк Фан. Политика Китая породила дипломатию «волков-воинов». The Epoch Times, 05.11.2021. [Frank Fan. China’s Policy Has Given Rise to “Wolf-Warrior” Diplomacy. The Epoch Times, 05.11.2021] URL: <https://www.epochtimes.ru/mnenie/politika-kitaya-porodila-diplomatiyu-volkov-voinov-130777/> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

Получено в редакции: 2 февраля 2022 г.

Принято к публикации: 1 мая 2022 г.

УДК: 323, 327

«Дипломатия боевых волков» – внешняя политика для внутреннего использования в Китае

Наталья Викторовна Селезнёва, к.фил.н., кафедра международных отношений
и регионоведения, Новосибирский государственный технический университет,
Новосибирск, Россия
E-mail: xie-ling@yandex.ru

Аннотация: В статье раскрывается содержание нового понятия «дипломатия боевых волков», которое появилось в 2019 г. «Дипломатия боевых волков» является метафорическим оборотом, обозначающим новую манеру поведения китайских дипломатов, характеризующуюся особой напористостью и настойчивостью. Автор, основываясь на хронологии появления данного оборота в СМИ, раскрывает эволюцию формирования понятия в китайском медийном дискурсе и приходит к выводу, что подобная тактика китайских дипломатов не только не была осуждена со стороны руководства Китая и китайским обществом, но и, наоборот, была поддержана и одобряется в обществе, что напрямую согласуется с новыми концептуальными внешне- и внутривнутриполитическими идеями Китая – усилением «дискурсивной силы» на международной арене и укреплении «четырех уверенностей» внутри страны. Дипломатия боевых волков на практике демонстрирует возрастающие возможности Китая оборачивать в свою пользу даже те идеи, концепции и формулировки, которые изначально имели антикитайский характер и разрабатывались странами Запада для дискредитации Китая и подрыва его международного имиджа.

Ключевые слова: дипломатия боевых волков, Китай, дипломатия, внешняя политика, дискурсивная сила

References

- Denisov, I. E. (2020). Kontseptsiya «diskursivnoy sily» i transformatsiya kitayskoy vneshney politiki pri Si Tszin'pine [The Concept of “Discursive Power” and the Transformation of Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping]. *Comparative Politics Russia*, 4, 42–52. DOI: 10.24411/2221-3279-2020-10047 (In Russian)
- Denisov, I. E. (2017). Vneshnyaya politika Kitaya pri Si Tszin'pine: preymstvennost' i novatorstvo [Foreign Policy of China under Xi Jinping: Continuity and Innovation]. *Kontury global'nykh transformatsiy: politika, ekonomika, pravo*, 5, 83–98. DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-5-83-98 (In Russian)
- Kashin, V. B. & Pyatachkova, A. (2020). Kitayskaya diplomatiya: suzheniye koridora [Chinese Diplomacy: Narrowing the Corridor]. *Rossiya v global'noy politike* [Russia in Global Affairs], 20.04.2020. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/kitaj-suzhenie-koridora/> (In Russian)
- Kozykina, N. V. & Muratshina, K. G. (2017). *Osobennosti diplomatii sovremennogo Kitaya* [Features of the Diplomacy of Modern China]. Yekaterinburg: Izd-vo Ural. un-ta, 2017. 148 p. (In Russian)
- Myasnikov, V. S. (2004). Vvedeniye. In Zenger H. *Stratagemy. O kitayskom iskusstve zhit' i vyzhivat'* [Introduction / Zenger H. Stratagems. On the Chinese art of Living and Surviving]. Moscow: Eksmo. Vol. 1. 512 p. (In Russian)

Panarin, I. N. (2015). *Informatsionnaya voyna, PR i mirovaya politika*. M.: Goryachaya liniya-Telekom [Information War, PR and World Politics]. 352 p. (In Russian)

Sun Tzu. (2002). *Traktat o voyennom iskusstve*. In *Iskusstvo strategii – drevnekitayskiye traktaty* [Treatise on the Art of War / The Art of Strategy – Ancient Chinese Treatises]. Moscow: AST. 558 p. (In Russian)

Литература на русском языке (Literature in Russian):

Денисов И.Е. (2017). Внешняя политика Китая при Си Цзиньпине: преемственность и новаторство // *Контуры глобальных трансформаций: политика, экономика, право*. № 5. С. 83–98. DOI: 10.23932/2542-0240-2017-10-5-83-98

Денисов И.Е. (2020). Концепция «дискурсивной силы» и трансформация китайской внешней политики при Си Цзиньпине // *Сравнительная политика*. № 4. С. 42–52. DOI: 10.24411/2221-3279-2020-10047

Кашин В.Б., Пятачкова А. (2020). Китайская дипломатия: сужение коридора // *Россия в глобальной политике*, 20.04.2020. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/kitaj-suzhenie-koridora/>

Козыкина Н.В., Муратшина К.Г. (2017). Особенности дипломатии современного Китая. Екатеринбург: Изд-во Урал. ун-та. 148 с.

Мясников В.С. (2004). Введение / Зенгер Х. Стратегемы. О китайском искусстве жить и выживать / предисл. и коммент. В.С. Мясникова: в 2-х т. М.: Эксмо. Т. 1. 512 с.

Панарин И.Н. (2015). *Информационная война, PR и мировая политика*. М.: Горячая линия-Телеком. 352 с.

Сунь-цзы. (2002). *Трактат о военном искусстве / Искусство стратегии – древнекитайские трактаты* / пер., предисл. и коммент. Н.И. Конрада. М.: Изд-во АСТ. 558 с.

Development of China's Demographic Policies

SHIDE FENG¹

Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, MGIMO University (Russia)

Abstract

The paper examines the development of demographic policies throughout the history of the People's Republic of China, makes predictions for future trends and offers potential solutions based on quantitative analysis. The policies focused on controlling the fertility rate control, with measures first advocated by the government and then made a part of administration regulation, with further changes at legislative level. The author shows that while the Chinese population is growing, but fertility is decreasing and concludes that the population will decrease in the near future unless the situation changes. That explains the adjustments made by the Chinese government which is integrating demographic policies into the country's long-term strategies.

Key words

China, Demography, Employment policy, Family Planning Policy, Population Aging, Development

For citation

Shide Feng (2022). Development of China's Demographic Policies. *Управление и политика*, 1(2), P. 59–81.

Introduction and methodology

Demography policy affects long-term national development. China's population is the largest in the world and will reach around 1.4 billion by 2035. The large total population will have a long-term impact on economic development and the allocation of public service resources.

¹ **Shide Feng** – PhD Student, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, MGIMO University, Russia.
E-mail: 872147724@qq.com
The author declares the absence of conflict of interests

This paper contains both qualitative and quantitative methods of analysis. Qualitative research is based on the institutionalist approach. The quantitative method includes time series analysis and regression analysis used to make forecasts and statistically support the ideas put forward in this paper. We have used the Cobb-Douglas Production Function², Adequate Population theory (Chen, 2016), and the Malthusian theory of population growth³. The data for the quantitative analysis comes from the National Bureau of Statistics of China⁴.

Population quantity in China is well controlled by the government's policies which efficiently alleviated the pressure on economic development at the beginning of economic reform (Chen, 2016). The policies were implemented soundly and were subsequently adjusted, and the population structure was reshaped by these policies (Zhang and Chen, 2020).

The situation has a number of causes. At the beginning of economic reform, the Chinese government believed that fewer children would relieve the urban family burden, so that capital would be accumulated in the country to develop the economy (Guo and Yu, 2015). Thus, family planning policies were strictly implemented in urban areas. For families in rural areas, the plan was implemented relatively less strictly, because the government had developed a labor-intensive industry, and additional labor in rural areas could be used in the secondary industry sector. The number of children born was kept under control, and decreased.

The consequence of this has a potentially negative impact. One factor is the aging issue, which China is facing in the near future. The pandemic made the situation worse. After 2025, the aging problem will be more severe, and the population will reach a ceiling in subsequent years (Zhou and Li, 2018). As a consequence, there will be problems such as a high percentage of elderly people, gender imbalance, and imbalanced distribution of population in regions.

Most scholars believe that the adjustment should be implemented immediately. Adjustments are already being made, with the limit on children per family

² Cobb–Douglas production function https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cobb%E2%80%93Douglas_production_function (accessed: 20.02.2022)

³ Malthus' population theory <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E9%A9%AC%E5%B0%94%E8%90%A8%E6%96%AF%E7%9A%84%E4%BA%BA%E5%8F%A3%E7%90%86%E8%AE%BA/3890735?fr=aladdin> (Accessed 20 February 2022)

⁴ National Bureau of Statistics of China <http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

already increased from 1 to 3. The limitation may be abolished in the near future (Zhuang and Melnikov, 2017).

Development of demography policy

Demography policy: foundation

In 1949, despite its population of about 550 million, China lacked capital and technology to develop, and threats to China's borders remained. Sufficient human resources were extremely important for economic recovery and development. The national defense force depended on sufficient population. Therefore, the Chinese government encouraged childbirth, and after the end of the civil war, China's living conditions stabilized, improvements in health care reduced mortality, and the population increased rapidly.

Mao Zedong stated that China's large population is a great thing, that there is always a way to support the increasing population and the method is production. In 1950, National Health Ministry promulgated the Interim Measures for the Restriction of Birth Control and Induced Abortion, and abortions were banned for a short time.

The first census in 1953 showed that the total population was 590 million, 46 million more than in 1949⁵. The previous phase of the policy of encouraging childbirth led to the rapid growth of the population. The growth of food and foodstuffs was lower than population growth.

At the end of 1954, Chairman Liu Shaoqi and the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Light Industry, the Ministry of Commerce, and the All-China Women's Federation held meetings to discuss the population issue at different levels, and in early 1955, the "Report of the Party Group of the Central Ministry of Health on Family Planning⁶ was published. In an important speech on "Promoting Birth Control" the government considered it to be a personal matter of the people, and refrained from force or intervention by legislation. Thus citizens were encouraged to be responsible for their own birth control measures.

⁵ First Census <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E7%AC%AC%E4%B8%80%E6%AC%A1%E5%85%A8%E5%9B%BD%E4%BA%BA%E5%8F%A3%E6%99%AE%E6%9F%A5/1605970?fr=aladdin> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

⁶ Report of the Party Group of the Central Ministry of Health on Family Planning <https://m.huxiu.com/article/279375.html> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

The “Report of the CPC Central Committee on the Report of the Party Group of the Ministry of Health on Birth Control” on March 1, 1955, also indicated that the CPC Party was in favor of proper birth control, which would be beneficial to future generations. This can be considered as the beginning of family birth control policy. The attitude changed from “opposing birth control” to “appropriate birth control.” The 1956 “Report on the Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy” emphasized that “in the period of the 2nd five-year plan, we must continue to develop health and medical services and appropriately promote birth control”⁷. As by this time the Chinese government’s attitude had changed from opposing birth control policies to supporting appropriate birth control, the 1956 Report emphasized the need to continue to develop medical and health services and to promote birth control.

The government continued to support birth control for a number of reasons, including problems with food supply, and encouraged birth control among the population, except in areas inhabited by ethnic minority areas, especially rural areas.

In 1956, Zhou Enlai delivered the “Report on the Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy”⁸ at the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, stating: “We are in favor of birth control measures.”

In 1957, Chen Yun stated: “China has a large population and must optimize birth control policies. This is a major issue related to economic construction.” “Measures for birth control will take ten or twenty years. The central government and all provinces and cities must set up special committees to take care of this matter.”

⁷ 1956 Report on the Proposals for the Second Five-Year for the Development of the National Economy <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95%E5%9B%BD%E6%B0%91%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E7%9A%84%E7%AC%AC%E4%BA%8C%E4%B8%AA%E4%BA%94%E5%B9%B4%E8%AE%A1%E5%8-8%92%E7%9A%84%E5%BB%BA%E8%AE%AE%E7%9A%84%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A/56668977?fr=aladdin> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

⁸ Report on the Proposals for the Second Five-Year Plan for the Development of the National Economy <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E5%8F%91%E5%B1%95%E5%9B%BD%E6%B0%91%E7%BB%8F%E6%B5%8E%E7%9A%84%E7%AC%AC%E4%BA%8C%E4%B8%AA%E4%BA%94%E5%B9%B4%E8%AE%A1%E5%8-8%92%E7%9A%84%E5%BB%BA%E8%AE%AE%E7%9A%84%E6%8A%A5%E5%91%8A/56668977?fr=aladdin> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

In 1957, the “People’s Daily” published Ma Yinchu’s “New Demography Theory”⁹, in which he stated that “the economy is a planned economy and births must be planned”. Some people even believed in “limiting grain and oil supplies for birth control”. However, the “New Demography Theory” was widely criticized, and birth control policy was not made compulsory by law.

The initiation of demography policy on the administration level

In 1962, the government issued the “Instructions on promoting Family Planning”¹⁰, which gradually increased control of the rapidly increasing population, scheduled family planning in urban areas, and aimed to reduce unemployment. Some rural areas with a high population density also began family planning. The growth rate of the population was controlled so that the attitude to the population problem would gradually become more serious. These instructions were sent down to local governments.

In 1964, the Family Planning Commission of the State Council was established, with family planning agencies set up in some areas, and family planning work began to be conducted in the field. The population in 1964 was close to 700 million.

Birth control became more strictly enforced when the State Council established the Family Planning Commission, which had branches in various areas.

After the start of the “Cultural Revolution” in 1966, China suffered from crises in economic and social development. Although the demography policy was retained and family planning did not change, chaos in society made the policies hard to implement fully. Later, the Family Planning Commission of the State Council was abolished, and family planning agencies in various regions were unable to carry out their work normally.

In 1966, the People’s Movement of the Cultural Revolution was launched and China’s social development was shaken. Social instability made it difficult

⁹ New Demography Theory <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E6%96%B0%E4%BA%BA%E5%8F%A3%E8%AE%BA/1653530?fr=aladdin> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

¹⁰ Instruction on promoting Family Planning <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%B8%AD%E5%85%B1%E4%B8%AD%E5%A4%AE%E3%80%81%E5%9B%BD%E5%8A%A1%E9%99%A2%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E8%AE%A4%E7%9C%9F%E6%8F%90%E5%80%A1%E8%AE%A1%E5%88%92%E7%94%9F%E8%82%B2%E7%9A%84%E6%8C%87%E7%A4%BA/56669214?fr=aladdin> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

for some state institutions to function properly, including the Family Planning Commission which was later abolished.

In 1970, Zhou Enlai stated that family planning is within the scope of national planning, it is not a health issue, but a planning issue. As family planning policy was not strictly enforced in the 1970s, China's population continued to grow at a rapid rate, and the population growth had reached a point where it could not be ignored. The government proposed "late and few" policy, which encouraged couples to have children at a relatively older age and have one or two children.

In 1971, the State Council approved the Report on Good Family Planning Work, which proposed that the natural growth rate should be reduced to about 1% so that the population could be controlled in the long run. The birth rate was to be controlled within 1/15 in rural areas and 11% in urban areas, and the government had different policies for different groups of people.

The international environment changed. The relationship between China and the Western world began to ease. China no longer needed a large quantity of human resources as a national defense reserve. In 1972, the government proposed implementing family planning and adapting population growth to the development of the national economy. In 1973, the Office of the Family Planning held the first meeting on family planning work in the country and proposed a "late and few" birth policy. The Central People's Government reorganized the family planning working group to manage China's family planning policy.

The phase of using administrative orders to implement family planning began in 1973, when China was still in the midst of a people's movement and the efficiency of implementing family planning was greatly limited. But by this time family planning was clearly in the national interest, and the government could not wait any longer. The total fertility rate began to decline in 1973.

In 1975, the "Report on the National Economic Plan for 1975" stated that family planning was highly recommended by Chairman Mao, and population control is feasible.

The initiation of demography policy at legislative level

In 1978, the “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China”¹¹ was adopted at the first session of the Fifth National People’s Congress. The Constitution stated that the state promotes family planning, thus family planning was included in the Constitution for the first time. In 1979, the “Government Work Report” adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress proposed practical measures to be established to reward couples who have only one child.

In 1980, the “People’s Daily” published an editorial entitled “We must control population growth with a plan” stating that China’s population should not exceed 1.2 billion before the next century.

In 1980, the government stated that except in sparsely populated minority areas, it is generally recommended to have only one child per couple, in order to control the population growth rate as soon as possible. Later, the government issued “An Open Letter to All Communists and Communist Youth League Members on Controlling the country’s Population Growth”¹². The government encouraged party members to take the lead in following the new family planning policy. The letter stated: “In order to strive to keep the total population of China under 1.2 billion by the end of this century, the State Council encourages couple to have only one child”. The open letter stated that while the average age of the population is increasing, and there is a shortage of labor. This aging phenomenon had now begun to affect the development of China, although at this time the situation was not so obvious because of the population growth, with less than 5% of the population over the age of 65. Here, the government was anticipating the future.

In 1981, the population rebounded and the demographic policy was aimed at limiting the number of the population and improving its quality. In 1982, the government issued the “Instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on a Further working guide to Family

¹¹ Constitution Law <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E4%B8%83%E5%85%AB%E5%AE%AA%E6%B3%95/9547682?fr=aladdin> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

¹² Open Letter to All Communists and Communist Youth League Members on Controlling the country’s Demography Growth <https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1647241567006613626&wfr=spider&for=pc> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

Planning¹³. This instruction specified that demographic policies were core policies of China, and in order to improve the quality of the population and control the quantity of the population, it also suggested late marriage age and late birth.

Rural areas had different standards because the situation varied from place to place. Most couples were allowed to have only one or two children, while those from minority ethnic groups were generally allowed to have two children. For the state public service staff and urban residents, they could generally have only one child, but under special circumstances, they could apply to the state. In this way, the government limited the number of children to control the birth rate.

This limit on the number of children born was decided by the governments of the administrative regions and autonomous regions administered by the state, and the corresponding policy was sent to the people's congresses for review and approval, after which it could be implemented in the respective regions.

In 1982, Article 25 of the “Constitution of the People’s Republic of China” at the National People’s Congress stated that the state promotes family planning¹⁴ to adapt population growth to economic and social development plans. ... Both spouses have the obligation to implement family planning”. In 1982, the Twelfth National Congress of the Communist Party determined that “the implementation of family planning is a foundational national policy of our country.” This constitution established the strong legal position of family planning, and family planning became a national policy.

In 1981, the State Council turned the Family Planning Working Group, a temporary agency established in 1973, into the National Family Planning Commission. Family planning committees began to be reinstated as administrative units at all levels of local government, and family planning committees were organized to establish professional organizations in different regions to promote and monitor family planning. China’s population development came to be regulated by legal and administrative measures.

¹³ Instructions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on the Further working guide in http://www.law-lib.com/law/law_view.asp?id=44889 (accessed: 20.02.2022)

¹⁴ Family planning <https://baike.baidu.com/item/%E8%AE%A1%E5%88%92%E7%94%9F%E8%82%B2%E5%A7%94%E5%91%98%E4%BC%9A> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

In 1984, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China approved and forwarded the “Report on Family Planning Work” of the Party Group of the National Family Planning Commission to local governments and implemented the policy of blocking a big leak and opening a small leak. The central government continued to require that local governments at all levels should implement family planning policies in all regions and according to different circumstances, while continuously improving existing policies and regulations.

In 1986, Deng Xiaoping reiterated in the “People’s Daily” that “strictly controlling population growth is based on our immediate interests.... This is China’s major strategic decision.”¹⁵

In addition to the central government’s goal of focusing on economic construction set at the beginning of economic reform, the central government in the 1990s required governments at all levels and autonomous regions to make family planning policies as important as economic construction, and to establish leading working groups on population and family planning at all levels of government. At the same time, the central government required that population should be added as an important indicator in the medium- and long-term plans for regions.

In 1998, the government and people’s congresses discussed the basic policies, systems, guidelines, and measures for family planning in the form of special laws. Family planning policies occupied a more critical position in the national development strategy, providing legal protection for family planning rights.

In 2000, the Central Committee and the State Council issued the “Decision on Strengthening Population and Family Planning Work” to Stabilize Low Fertility Levels, stating that after the shift in the type of population reproduction is achieved, the main task of population and family planning work will shift to stabilizing the low birth rate and improving the conditions of the population.

After 2000, government tried to stabilize the low birth rate and solve the demography problem in different ways. The family planning work had some success, and the “Population and Family Planning Law”, the “Migrant Demography

¹⁵ Deng Xiaoping’s ideas on population, coordinated economic and social development and sustainable development in his discourse on the population. <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/33839/34943/34983/2641931.html> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

Family Planning Management Measures”, “Family Planning Technical Services Management Regulations” and other relevant legal provisions were introduced to ensure the effective implementation and compliance of demography family planning policies. Local governments made adjustments for the provisions of the birth policy under the Family Planning Regulations, and gradually improved the current birth policy.

The family planning policy was implemented stably, the demography problem was solved in a coordinated manner, the population was effectively controlled, and the fertility level was reduced, which created favorable conditions for economic and social development. The “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council on Strengthening Demography and Family Planning Work to Stabilize the Low Fertility Level stated that after the transformation of demography reproduction type is achieved, the main task of population and family planning work will shift to stabilizing the low fertility level and improving conditions for the newborn population.

In 2001, the Ninth National People’s Congress approved the Demography and Family Planning Law of the People’s Republic of China, and family planning policy formally became national law. The promulgation of the “Demography and Family Planning Law” and the “Administrative Measures on Family Planning Work of Floating Demography”, “Administrative Regulations on Family Planning Technical Services”, and “Administrative Measures on Collection of Social Maintenance Cost” constitute the current framework of demography and family planning work.

In 2003, the former National Family Planning Commission was renamed to National Demography and Family Planning Commission.

As Premier Wen Jiabao stated in a speech at Harvard University in 2003: “No matter how small a problem is, when it is multiplied by 1.3 billion, it is a huge problem; if the gross national product is divided by 1.3 billion, it may be a very small problem¹⁶”.

¹⁶ Wen Jiabao’s speech at the welcoming banquet in the U. S. <https://news.sina.cn/sa/2003-12-09/detail-ikkntiak8806733.d.html> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

In 2006, Hu Jintao said: "Owing to the large population, weak production foundation and unbalanced development, we insist on development and reform to solve problems, so that the outcome of development will benefit all people"¹⁷.

The modern demographic policy

With the imbalance of labor supply and demand, the central government began to adjust the population policy in 2013, the one-child policy began to end in some regions, and a partial 2-children policy was launched. Family planning policy had led to a low birth rate and the problem of the aging population.

In 2016, China's State Council released the China Population Development Plan, which stated that between 2016 and 2030 the population structure will enter a period of transition. For policy, economic and social reasons, China's fertility rate had rebounded to slow down the aging problem, but the demographic structure still had not significantly improved. After the implementation of the comprehensive two-child policy, the total fertility rate for women of childbearing age increased from 1.63 in 2013 to 1.69 in 2018, but the family planning that began 40 years ago led to a smaller set of young generations, and China's natural growth rate was declining every year by 0.003%.

The report of the 19th National Congress elaborated on the implementation of the Healthy China strategy and called to promote the link between the birth planning policy and relevant economic and social policies and strengthen research on demography development strategies. This strategy promotes the integration of the fertility policy and related economic and social policies. The National Health and Family Planning Commission will work with relevant departments at the request of the central government, apply a problem-oriented approach and collect local experience. According to the work plan of the comprehensive two-child policy, the government will optimize tax, social security, housing and employment policy, and prioritize the allocation of maternal and infant health care, infant care services, public service resources, including preschool education and K12 education, which would encourage and support

¹⁷ Hu Jintao's speech "Insist on peaceful development and promote win-win cooperation" <http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0916/c40531-22935897-2.html> (accessed: 20.02.2022)

families intending to have two children. The government will maintain an appropriate level of fertility and promote a long-term and balanced demography development.

In the past, previous policies proved to be very efficient while they were being implemented, but the long-term effects were not well considered. Over-adjustments brought fluctuations. Based on previous experience, China's government now pays more attention to long-term strategies. Research on long-term strategy is not only the basis for appropriate demographic policies, but also the basis for the efficient development of society. Key indicators should be monitored and adjusted, for instance, the fertility rate, mortality rate, migration etc. These are the leading indicators that reveal long-term demography development patterns and trends.

With macroeconomic control as the "General Route" of the party, the Cobb-Douglas model would be an appropriate model to explain the current situation in China. The Cobb-Douglas model is applied as the basic model to break down economic growth. L stands for the quantity of labor. P stands for the population, e stands for the employment rate.

$$L(T) = P(t) \cdot e(t) \quad (1)$$

Y stands for GDP, K stands for the capital reserve.

$$Y(t) = K(t)^\alpha A(t)L(t)^{1-\alpha} \quad (2)$$

$$\dot{Y}(t) = \frac{\partial Y(t)}{\partial A(t)} \dot{A}(t) + \frac{\partial Y(t)}{\partial K(t)} \dot{K}(t) + \frac{\partial Y(t)}{\partial L(t)} \dot{L}(t) \quad (3)$$

$$\dot{Y} = K^\alpha L^{1-\alpha} \dot{A} + \alpha A K^{\alpha-1} L^{1-\alpha} \dot{K} + (1-\alpha) A K^\alpha L^{-\alpha} \dot{L} \quad (4)$$

$$\dot{Y}(t) = Y(t) \frac{\dot{A}(t)}{A(t)} + Y(t) \alpha \frac{\dot{K}(t)}{K(t)} + Y(t) (1-\alpha) \frac{\dot{L}(t)}{L(t)} \quad (5)$$

$\frac{\dot{K}(t)}{K(t)}$, $\frac{\dot{A}(t)}{A(t)}$, and $\frac{\dot{L}(t)}{L(t)}$ stand for the growth rate of capital reserve, TFP, and labor.

$$\frac{\dot{Y}}{Y} = \frac{\dot{A}}{A} + \alpha \frac{\dot{K}}{K} + (1-\alpha) \frac{\dot{L}}{L} \quad (6)$$

Therefore, the model is contracted based on function (5) to estimate a

$$\frac{\dot{Y}}{Y} - \frac{\dot{L}}{L} = \frac{\dot{A}}{A} + \alpha(\frac{\dot{K}}{K} - \frac{\dot{L}}{L}) \quad (7)$$

$$I_Y - I_L = SR + \alpha(I_k - I_L) \quad (8)$$

I_Y is the growth rate of GDP, I_L is the growth rate of Labor quantity, and SR is the Solow Residual.

$$I_Y - I_L = \beta_0 + \beta_1(I_k - I_L) \quad (9)$$

Table 1: Coefficients and Variables

Variables	Coefficients
$\frac{\dot{K}}{K}$	0.471
$\frac{\dot{L}}{L}$	0.529
Intercept	0.004

Source: Author's calculation based on data from the National Statistics Bureau of China

Demography policy affects population and labor, and macroeconomic control affects economic growth. These indicators correspond to the variables in the model to prove that macroeconomic control is related according to some certain perspectives. Unlike some developed countries, the coefficient of China is higher, roughly 0.52, and more than half the contribution to economic growth comes from labor quantity based on the current model. Thus, it is necessary to integrate labor policies under the macroeconomic control system. Appropriate demographic policies will maintain the supply of labor.

China's demographic policy started as a series of guidelines and suggestions made by the government. It later became part of administration regulation when the demographic structure worsened. Eventually, the family planning law was passed by the People's Congress of China, and it is now also part of the con-

stitution. This long path means that China is aware that demographic policies matter to the whole country. The government is trying to control it more and more strictly.

The government also constructs and improves the public service system for the implementation of demography policies. It also ensures a steady growth in investments and budgets for demography policies. The input into demographic policies and family planning has increased more than regular fiscal revenue growth. Funds are distributed to implementing subsidiary policies, facilities, and human resources, which guarantees the policies can be fully and efficiently implemented. Local governments increase their fiscal budgets year every year. By 2010, the national per capita expenditure on demography and family planning had risen to 22 yuan from 10 yuan per capita at the end of the Tenth Five-Year Plan period. The government funds for demographics and family planning have now reached 30 yuan per capita. They also encourage enterprises, public organizations, and individuals to invest in projects relating to demographic issues, such as Nursing Homes, kindergartens, etc. Because of the aging demographic structure, the problem of insufficient labor force has come sooner than expected.

Compromises and integration exist between policy, traditional culture, and values. For instance, “respect for the elderly” and “taking care of the elderly” are traditions of Chinese society. After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, new demographic policies for retirement regulation and a social security system were passed to take further care of the elderly. Additionally, “taking care of the elderly” as an individual obligation towards one’s own parents are part of the constitution. On the other hand, traditional Chinese culture leads many families to want male children as heirs, which breaks the balance of gender. There are currently slightly more male infants than female infants, and the government outlaws learning the infant’s gender in advance. The problem of the gender imbalance originates from detecting the infant’s gender illegally, as women could have an abortion if the baby was a girl. This method of selection has led to an imbalance in China’s male-to-female ratio, and this unbalanced and unhealthy demographic structure can affect the development of society.

There are also some exceptions for demographic policies. The government has implemented a demography policy to control the number of children for all ethnic groups, but the policy for ethnic minorities is relatively less restricted.

In general, ethnic minorities with a population of over 10 million are advised to have one child per couple. Small ethnic groups with a population under 10 million population are allowed to have two children, or three in some cases, but not more than three. All regions have specific provisions on the birth policy for the demography of ethnic minorities, which guarantees that the culture of small ethnic groups is kept alive.

There are minor regional differences in demographic policies. The urbanization rate of China increased from 39% in 1950s to 89% in 2020, and the proportion of urban population is getting higher and higher. Family planning policy also applied specific provisions for different regions. During the family planning period, rural families could only have one child, and only special cases were taken into consideration. For instance, some couples are allowed to have a second child if both parents are only children from their own families, or if the first child is disabled and unable to work.


Currently, families in rural area who have only one child can apply to have a second child, and people who work in the fishery industry may have two or even three children. There are also differences between provinces. Couples in rural areas can have a second child if they have two or more brothers, and only one of them is fertile and only has one child, and the other brothers do not adopt children. Some regions, such as Jiangsu province, allow couples in certain industries to have a second child if their first child is a girl. In Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Jilin, Anhui, Henan and Hebei provinces, couples in rural areas can have a second child if certain conditions are met.

The demographic structure can be influenced by the birth rate, death rate and other indicators. The birth rate is the most practical adjustment index, which is the core measure of China's demographic policies to control the birth rate to affect the demographic structure in future.

Trend analysis

The paper analyzes the future trend in China's demographic policies with the time series analysis model (ARIMA). For the forecast of population growth and total population, 52 years of data are collected to forecast 5 years of growth respectively.

Graph 1. Population forecast (millions) (2010-2026)



Source: Author's calculations based on data from the National Statistics Bureau of China

Table 1. Population data and forecast (millions) (2010-2026)

	Lower Limit	Population (millions)	Upper Limit
2010	1337.705	1337.705	1337.705
2011	1344.13	1344.13	1344.13
2012	1350.695	1350.695	1350.695
2013	1357.38	1357.38	1357.38
2014	1364.27	1364.27	1364.27
2015	1371.22	1371.22	1371.22
2016	1378.665	1378.665	1378.665
2017	1386.395	1386.395	1386.395
2018	1392.73	1392.73	1392.73
2019	1397.715	1397.715	1397.715
2020	1412.12	1412.12	1412.12
2021	1412.6	1412.6	1412.6
2022	1420.585	1424.71	1428.836
2023	1420.774	1427.107	1433.44
2024	1427.126	1437.617	1448.107
2025	1427.186	1441.35	1455.514
2026	1431.733	1450.743	1469.753

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the National Statistics Bureau of China

Graph 2. Forecast of Demographic Growth Rate (%) (2000-2026)

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the National Statistics Bureau of China

Table 2. Population Growth Rate data and forecast (%) (2010-2025)

	Lower limit	Growth Rate (%)	Upper limit
2010	0.479%	0.479%	0.479%
2011	0.613%	0.613%	0.613%
2012	0.743%	0.743%	0.743%
2013	0.590%	0.590%	0.590%
2014	0.671%	0.671%	0.671%
2015	0.493%	0.493%	0.493%
2016	0.653%	0.653%	0.653%
2017	0.558%	0.558%	0.558%
2018	0.378%	0.378%	0.378%
2019	0.332%	0.332%	0.332%
2020	0.145%	0.145%	0.145%
2021	0.034%	0.034%	0.034%
2022	-0.243%	-0.008%	0.226%
2023	-0.200%	0.100%	0.401%
2024	-0.465%	-0.100%	0.265%
2025	-0.551%	-0.108%	0.335%
2026	-0.697%	-0.121%	0.455%

Source: Author's calculations based on data from the National Statistics Bureau of China

As the graph shows, China's population will continue to grow, but the growth of the population is close to zero, which means the population will decrease in the near future. The previous family planning policies were quite effective, and population growth is now decreasing, with a clear decrease over the last few years. The factors leading to the change in the age structure are varied, and although the policies are an essential part, there are other social factors, such as the cost of education for children, etc.

Demographic structure is an important factor in the development of the country. According to forecast data, China's population growth will decline, and the government will increase the proportion of the working population, and increase the number of children, which would slow down the aging process.

As mentioned above, the government is trying to change the urban demographic structure by controlling the birth rate, and the limit on the number of children is still in force. China will soon face an aging problem; it is expected to come during the 14th five-year plan, as a large amount of the working population born in the period of high fertility in the 1950s and 1960s gradually retire, causing the proportion of China's workforce in the total population to decline rapidly.

However, demographic policies will be improved in the future, with more detailed policies and support programs, and more cooperation with government, NGOs, and enterprises to promote efficiency of implementation. The China People's Congress is reviewing amendments to the Population and Family Planning Law, with a third-child policy planned.

Potential solution

The previous policies certainly had a positive effect on controlling the size of the population, and also reached primary targets. China has the largest population in the world, and without these policies, the insufficient natural and social resources per capita would have shrunk tremendously.

Unfortunately, the birth control policy significantly changed the demographic structure, causing problems such as an insufficient number of children and an imbalance in the gender ratio.

The solutions are based on the demographic structure as a benchmark. China's demographic structure is currently in a state of low mortality and low fertility, and it is entering an aging demography status where the dependency ratio and social pressure is high. The most effective solution is to increase the birth rate, although in the short term this will continue to increase the dependency ratio and increase social pressure temporarily. However, in the long run, the demography structure will be adjusted to an appropriate level, which is beneficial for long-term development.

The government should rescind childbirth restrictions and increase the number of children to balance the demographic structure with a higher teenage dependency ratio, which would contribute significantly to economic growth. It would also improve the supply of labor.

The government can adjust the legal age of marriage, to increase the number of children. If the average age of childbirth is 25 years, there are only four generations every 100 years, but if the average age of marriage is 20 years, there will be five generations in 100 years. Lowering the legal marriage age can lower the age of childbirth.

During the 40 years since the beginning of economic reform, the government's birth control policy has not only delayed the age of marriage, but also created the concept of "late marriage and late childbearing" in people's minds. This concept should be changed first of all, and the government should use publicity campaigns to change it.

In addition to these campaigns, the government can provide financial assistance to families with several children. The economic situation has improved, so that the cost of raising children is higher, and the main investments in children are education, insurance, and health care, all of which impact the living standard of families with several children more than families with one child. The government should invest more in education and health care for children, to reduce the cost of raising children and increase the fertility rate.

The government should increase penalties for violations of demography policy. The government should increase penalties for gender detection, while advocating gender equality, which could help China to gain a stable demographic structure.

The government should adjust the retirement age so that the working age population increases and the non-working population decreases. This directly changes the dependency ratio, which will slow down the pressure of aging. The government should continue to invest in higher education, in technology and human resources. Technology can increase productivity, and human capital will ensure the future ability to develop science and technology, but also to ensure future productivity growth, as greater output can delay the pressure of aging on society.

Conclusion

Over the past few decades, population policies have become more and more critical. The main measures were initially advocated by the government, later became part of administration regulation, and were then passed into legislation,

Population policy is a crucial factor for social and economic growth and the policies in China focused on controlling the fertility rate. Demography policies were implemented with some variations in different aspects, such as major ethnic groups and minorities, urban and rural areas, etc.

Modern demographic policies are gradually being integrated into China's long-term strategies, and also gradually being strictly implemented with multiple measures.

At present, the population of China is growing but fertility is decreasing, which means that the population will decrease in the near future. In future, the target of policies will shift from controlling the population size to stabilizing the demographic structure.

Получено в редакции: 25 мая 2022 г.

Принято к публикации: 6 июня 2022 г.

УДК: 351/354, 325.1, 323.2

Развитие демографической политики в Китае

Шидэ Фэн, аспирант, Институт Дальнего Востока РАН, МГИМО МИД России, Россия

E-mail: 872147724@qq.com

Аннотация: В статье анализируется эволюция демографической политики в Китайской народной республике, на основе количественного анализа делается прогноз тенденций развития и предлагаются потенциальные решения. Политика, направленная на сокращение уровня рождаемости, была сначала поддержана на уровне правительства и затем соответствующие изменения были внесены на законодательном уровне. Автор показывает, что при росте населения КНР, уровень рождаемости снижается и заключает, что численность населения будет сокращаться, если не произойдут изменения. Это объясняет коррективы политики со стороны правительства КНР, которое интегрировало демографическую политику в долгосрочную стратегию развития страны.

Ключевые слова: Китай, демографическая политика, политика занятости, политика планирования семьи, старение населения, развитие

References

- Bai, Z. (2016). Study on the Impact of Population Aging on Economic Development - Based on Comparative Perspectives between Korea and China. *Qingdao University*, 19–46. (In Chinese). URL: <https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CDFD&dbname=CDFDLAST2017&filename=1017839534.nh&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=SgDdMeGRqQOXsdsrxoJ7yZSykFsKP1SGTZxmTbus-rNq7GpflrAjr-6mam3vEm4pg>
- Cai, F., Lu, Y. (2016). Take-off, Persistence and Sustainability: The Demographic Factor in Chinese Growth. *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 3(2), 203–225. DOI: 10.1002/app5.139
- Chen, C. (2016). Research on The Influence of Chinese Fertility Policy on Population. *Chongqing University*, 22–25. (In Chinese). URL: <https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CMFD&dbname=CMFD201701&filename=1016908716.nh&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=gunNCPlotrcfyEOEW-BQG-KT2L1qoAwWX-7U5RKArHEI5pWcV8JXr7HbOcnzAVP>
- Dotsey, M., Li, W., Yang, F. (2019). Demographic Aging, Industrial Policy, and Chinese Economic Growth. *Working Papers 19-21, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia*. DOI: 10.21799/frbp.wp.2019.21
- Feng W., Cai Y., Gu B. (2013). Population, Policy, and Politics: How will History Judge China's One-Child Policy? *Population and Development Review*, 38 (s1), 115–129. DOI: 10.1111/j.1728-4457.2013.00555.x
- Feng W., Gu B., Cai Y. (2016). The End of China's One-Child Policy. *Studies in Family Planning*, 47(1), 83–86. DOI: 10.1111/j.1728-4465.2016.00052.x
- Feng, W. (2011). The Future of a Demographic Overachiever: Long-Term Implications of the Demographic Transition in China. *Population and Development Review*, 37, 173–190. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41762404>
- Garnaut, R., Song, L., Fang, C. (2018). 40 years of China's reform and development: How reform captured China's demographic dividend. In Garnaut, R., Song, L., & Fang, C. (Eds.). *China's 40 Years of Reform and Development: 1978–2018*, Pp. 5–26. ANU Press. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv5cg-bnk>

Guo, K., Yu, Q., Gong, L. (2015). Family Planning Policy, Urbanization and Economic Growth, *Finance Research*, 11(1), 47–63. (In Chinese). URL: <http://www.jryj.org.cn/CN/abstract/abstract415.shtml>

Li, C., Zhang, Y. (2019). The impact of China's aging population on macroeconomics. *Chinese Social Work*, 35, 28–30. (In Chinese). URL: https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2020&filename=ZSGZ201935015&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=d4L2L_e4d1Syx-tXZ8ht-loxNQe2BEyqQdSoyw9C2U7F4qS8dvL3lvKBgwNTCMFm

Liu, R., Liu, Q. (2019). Urban and rural income growth, pensions and fertility levels. *Population and Development*, 3 (1), 73–80. (In Chinese). URL: https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2020&filename=SCRK202003003&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=V-vUXTp-cWdh7mjVg3NpC0lsQzN7gfdHX9LIWvHvUdpGcaPkU_mvJ474dwAv5FUwA

Lu, H., Cui, H., Yang, X. (2016). The Family Planning Reward and Assistance Policies under the Two-Child Policy. *Population Research*, 3, 82–89. (In Chinese). URL: http://caod.orioprobe.com/articles/48502321/The_Family_Planning_Reward_and_Assistance_Policies.htm

Lu, W., Zhang, B. (2016). The Impact of China's Fertility Policy on the Status of Women. *Population Study*, 40(4), 73–80. URL: <http://rkyj.ruc.edu.cn/CN/abstract/abstract3423.shtml>

Meng, L.-G & Li, C.-L & Hu, G. (2014). Predictions of China's population structure based on the PDE model. *Zhongguo Renkou Ziyuan Yu Huan Jing. China Population Resources and Environment*, 24, 132–141. (In Chinese). URL: https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFD2014&filename=ZGRZ201402019&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=9ZYqeG_-nKhxxYcSshHT9ZRB9Y-WLrS1NZBDyMx3y2vgHHRZhUWB5DzvnZkV0ptWj

Qi, Y. (2017). A Second Child? No, Thank You! The Impact of Chinese Family Planning Policies on Fertility Decisions. *Scripps Senior Theses*. 926. URL: http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/926

Wang, Q. (2014). long-term necessity of China's population policy and its reform expectations. *Macroeconomics*, 4, 35–46. (In Chinese). URL: <https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFD2014&filename=REFO201404005&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=P6eTUKUf7skciZ-qa-kGbDBsU8ojlg36xNA0OBclbtwwKB1mQ04pHdDPBYu8Y69H->

Wang, W. (2017). Population Aging, Family Planning Policy Adjustment and China's Economic Growth. *China Economic Quarterly*, 1, 67–96. (In Chinese). URL: <https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2017&filename=JJXU201701003&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=LgakCEJYZN4mU9KfoJGRRJp209nKHhK9TYPWKzKZux973hGUTzmo4aRmXmt6PsVt>

Wei, X., Wu, R. (2013). Reflection on the Chinese Family Planning Policy. *Journal of Harbin Institute of Technology (Social Sciences Edition)*, 15(6), 32–36. (In Chinese). URL: http://caod.orioprobe.com/journals/hebgdyxb-s/%e5%93%88%e5%b0%94%e6%bb%a8%e5%b7%a5%e4%b8%9a%e5%a4%a7%e5%ad%a6%e5%ad%a6%e6%8a%a5_%e7%a4%be%e4%bc%9a%e7%a7%91%e5%ad%a6%e7%89%88_.htm

Xu, J. (2010). China Population Effect Analysis. *Jilin University*, 58–70. (In Chinese). URL: https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CDFD&dbname=CDFD0911&filename=2010107493.nh&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=oaaRGyGE4YFRMGs9VO7L5Gb6mlUmd3DG0gdL_tPdUzLc059vXEV5G-m8FRQdpuWd

Zhang, Y. (2019). China's demographic changes and future policy reforms in the 70 years since the founding of People's Republic of China. *Studies on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics*, 4, 18–32. (In Chinese). URL: https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2019&filename=SPEC201904003&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=SilhEeRDPgx3RKsamZ0uyZRE4_vkx-nvTOChlLaTDn4xIJst_UycniM71SgYE3hQ

Zhang, Y., Chen, D. (2020). 70 Years of Population Policy Changes in People's Republic of China and Contemporary Population Development. *Macroeconomic theory*, 5(3), 62–70. (In Chinese). URL: <https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal-HGJG202005011.htm>

Zhou, L., Li, J. (2018). China's population policy and demographic structure and its future development trend, *Economics Dynamics*, 12(3), 17–36. (In Chinese). URL: https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CJFD&dbname=CJFDLAST2019&filename=JJXD201812004&uniplatform=NZ-KPT&v=wCtS35lxgXQebPOreCiOkcRatsfqvGA_D4fbHzD-CKcKIZ45CPX24FQ2Gsoq_Z1S

Zhuang, G., Melnikov, Y. (2017). A Study on the Evolution and Impact of China's Family Planning Policy, *Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics*, 73–80. (In Chinese). URL: https://kns.cnki.net/kcms/detail/detail.aspx?dbcode=CDFD&dbname=CDFDLAST2019&filename=1019801119.nh&uniplatform=NZKPT&v=i9ge4_XNz0zQIX6-TNz6_YGN7n1m-8MW8mODPiAY-28_yMcUA0B4o5m-ITd_QaNn

Migration in the Republic of Moldova: Trends, Determinants, and State Policy

SVETLANA RUSU¹

MGIMO-University (Russia)

ION PARTACHI²

Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova (Republic of Moldova)

ELENA RUSU³

the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia)

Abstract

In the article the authors examine the state policy of the Republic of Moldova in the field of migration. Since the country is mainly a donor of migrants, there are a number of state bodies in the country whose purpose is to control and ensure the right to free movement both inside and outside the country, as well as facilitate the return of migrants to their homeland from abroad. Among the main reasons for migration, the authors identify such problems as poverty, high unemployment, the unstable political situation and corruption at state level, a desire to improve the quality and standard of living, moving to live with relatives or to study.

The research methodology is based on the following general scientific and special cognitive methods: system-structural analysis, the comparative method and formal logical method. The article analyses the materials and data provided by the national institutes of the Republic of Moldova, as well as the data and materials of international organizations.

As a result of the study, it became clear that the Republic of Moldova is actively working towards the implementation of the principles of effective public administration in the field of migrations. There are a number of laws adopted at state level that contribute to the regulation of migration in the country. The Republic of Moldova is facing many challenges. Although significant pro-

¹ **Svetlana Rusu** – PhD Student, MGIMO-University, Russia.
E-mail: svetlana_167467@mail.ru

The authors declare the absence of conflict of interests

² **Ion Partachi** – PhD in Economy, University Professor, Head of the Department “Econometrics and Economic Statistics”, Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova, Republic of Moldova.
E-mail: ionpartachi@yahoo.fr

³ **Elena Rusu** – The Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia.
E-mail: lenar9909@mail.ru

The authors declare the absence of conflict of interests

gress was recorded, much work remains to be done on migration policy at all levels of public administration. People continue to migrate and only a small percentage of them return to their homeland.

Key words

The Republic of Moldova, emigration, state policy, European Union, The Russian Federation, law.

For citation

Svetlana Rusu, Ion Partachi, Elena Rusu (2022). Migration in the Republic of Moldova: Trends, Determinants, and State Policy. *Управление и политика*, 1(2), P. 82–101.

The 20th–21st centuries are known as the era of migration, as international migration of the population is a dynamical global social process. According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), there are 281 million migrants in the world, or 3.6% of the world's total population.⁴ Migration is one of the phenomena that make up the social environment of the political system and has a direct impact on the state as a whole. It positively or negatively affects the social, demographic, ethnic, and confessional composition of various states. Today, migration is an important resource both for the demographic and economic development. Thus, migration policy is an important political tool for the implementation of social goals in such areas as the economy, demography and the national security of the country.

Theoretically the research is based on the publications of scientists, politicians, experts in the field of statistics and migration, and economists, such as K.P. Ecko (Ecko, Gorbunova, 2017), V.G. Moshnyagi (2007), S.V. Rusu, S.V. Ryazantsev (Rusu, Ryazantsev, 2020), who specialize in the issue of migration and whose articles describe the impact of migration on the political and economic situation in the Republic.

Translated from Latin, the word “migrant” means relocation or relocation. In 1885, the English scientist E. Ravenstein first introduced an academic definition of the concept of “migration”. He argued that migration is a permanent or temporary change of a person's place of residence and that this movement is associated with four groups of factors: factors that operated at the migrant's ini-

⁴ World Migration Report 2022. International Organization for Migration. URL: <https://publications.iom.int/books/world-migration-report-2022> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

tial place of residence, factors that operate during the migration process, factors related to the migrant's place of arrival and factors of the migrant's personal nature. Since migration processes in the modern world occur simultaneously both in space and in time, in the context of globalization, people's movements have become not only more diverse and intense, but also more diversified from a geographical point of view. Thus, based on all of the above, population migration can be considered both in a narrow and in a broad sense.

Migration in the narrow sense means resettlement, namely a complete type of territorial displacement, which ends with a change of permanent place of residence. In a broad sense, population migration is any movement of people across the borders of certain localities, regardless of regularity, duration and target orientation. Moreover, the main and most important feature is a change of residence, which usually has a permanent, long-term, or temporary character.

In a broader sense, population migration covers the following types of displacement: seasonal, episodic, pendulum and irrevocable. Seasonal migration is one of the most common types of population migration. This type of migration is characterized by temporary movement in order to provide additional labor for industries that require it. Also, this type of migration is characterized by trips for study, medical treatment, tourism and recreation. Episodic migrations are trips for business, recreation, tourism and other purposes that are made not only irregularly in time, but also not necessarily in the same directions (Yudina, 2007). As for pendulum migration, this mainly involves regular return trips by the population from one locality to another to study or work. And finally, irrevocable migration, which is the most important source of the formation of the population: people move from one locality to another and these movements are accompanied by a change of permanent residence (Yudina, 2007).

When considering migration, it is necessary to focus on the state migration policy, which, according to the Constitution guarantees, a legitimate concept of fairly set goals, tasks, trends in the formation of social relations, elements of legislation in the field of migration, including ways of governing the country used by migration entities (individuals, public organizations, state bodies) and aimed at resettlement, integration and arrangement of individuals in the state and its regions.

According to S.V. Ryazantsev, migration policy is a system of generally accepted ideas and conceptually unified means by which, first of all, the state, as well as its public institutions, observing certain principles corresponding to the specific historical conditions of the country, assume the achievement of goals adequate to both this and the subsequent stage of development of society (Rusu, Ryazantsev, 2020). The main task of migration policy is to regulate migration flows, to control the crossing of state borders by foreign citizens, register the staying and activity of foreign citizens in the country, and legalization of migration. Migration policy is also aimed at protecting the interests and rights of migrants, creating various conditions for the accommodation and reception of migrants, which stimulate their active participation in adaptation in the host country. One of the priorities here at present is combating illegal migration.

* * *

Moldova is a parliamentary republic in Eastern Europe, with an area of 33 000 square kilometers and a population of 2597100 as of 2022. Despite such a small number of inhabitants, the country remains the poorest country in Europe, and almost every third resident of the country is a migrant. Since gaining independence on August 27, 1991, the Republic of Moldova has become a participant in international migration processes, and primarily a country that sends migrants to other countries.

The Republic of Moldova is a country of origin of migration to a much greater extent than it is a country of destination or transit of migrants. The migration situation is predominantly characterized by the emigration of Moldovan citizens, with about 17.5% of the population permanently living abroad, leaving for work, studies or for the purpose of family reunification. Many countries with more than 15% of the population living abroad are islands or landlocked states with well-established and long-lasting migration patterns (Rusu, Ryazantsev, 2020). Their citizens usually migrate to neighboring or culturally similar countries. The Republic of Moldova fits this profile, while also having certain specific and distinctive features. Although the level of migration to the Russian Federation, Ukraine and other CIS states is very high, migration flows to the European Union and North America are increasing significantly. In addition to the large diasporas in Italy, migration to other European Union states could increase, in

particular to Ireland, Portugal and Spain, especially since the visa regime was abolished on April 28, 2014, and with the possibility to gain citizenship of EU member states.⁵

There are several types of emigration that are specific for the Republic of Moldova:

1) permanent emigration. So far, 101 000 people have gone abroad permanently. The main destinations for these people are the USA, Canada, Germany, Israel, and in the CIS, the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

2) international migration. 520 000 citizens are involved in long-and short-term external migration processes, according to data collected by migrant and household surveys conducted between December 2019 and June 2020 as part of the CIVIS study / NEXUS Moldova:

1) 411 000 people are involved in long-term international migration: 370 000 people for work purposes (56% men, 44% women; 68% rural, 32% urban). In the Russian Federation 56% (or 206 000 people), 22% (or 81 000) in Italy, between 2% and 3% (8000 -10 000) in France, Turkey and Portugal; 18 700 people for the purpose of family reunification; 18 400 – for studies;

2) 109 000 seasonal migrant workers (72% male and 28% female, 70% rural and 30% urban). In the Russian Federation, 81% (or 88 000 people) work seasonally, 7% in Italy (or 7 700 people).⁶

The migration policy of the Republic of Moldova is a set of legal norms, theoretical provisions and practical directions for the movement of citizens from their permanent place of residence to other places. Conceptually, migration policy develops taking into account the political and legal environment, as well as the ongoing changes in the economic and social sphere of society. It embraces the legal relations that arise between a migrant and state authorities or management bodies, their officials, public organizations, local self-government bodies, their representatives, the attitudes of the authorities towards migrants and their place in society.⁷

⁵ Visa-free regime with the EU. Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration of the Republic of Moldova. URL: <https://ue.mfa.gov.md/en/content/visa-free-regime-eu> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

⁶ IOM GMDAC Migration Data Survey. Report for Moldova. International organization for Moldova. URL: https://moldova.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1266/files/documents/MOLDOVA%20GMDAC%20Report%202021.04.22_rev-IOM_cleaned.pdf (accessed: 15.07.2022)

⁷ Unemployment Rate in Moldova. Biroul Național de Statistică. URL: <https://statistica.gov.md/category.php?l=ru&idc=107> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

In Moldova there is a network of state bodies responsible for the implementation of migration policy illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1.

**State bodies responsible for the implementation
of migration policy in Moldova**

The body	Responsibilities in the field of migration
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MFAEI)	in charge of foreign policy and visa policy, holds extended meetings of the Local Platform Mobility Partnership of the Republic of Moldova and the EU and monitors the process of implementation of the Agreement on Moldova's association with the European Union and the liberalization of the visa regime with the EU countries
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA)	develops public policies and monitors their implementation in the field of migration and asylum, as well as coordinating the process of integration of foreigners in the Republic of Moldova
The Bureau for Migration and Asylum	an administrative body under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Internal Affairs created in order to implement the policies related to migration and asylum, manage migration by receiving and documenting foreigners with identity documents, recognize refugee status, grant humanitarian protection, coordinate the process of integration of foreigners in the Republic of Moldova, to control the legality of stay of foreigners in the Republic, to grant state funding and take appropriate measures for removal and restraint
The Ministry of Labor, Social Protection and Family (MLSPF)	develops policy and regulates the processes in the field of labor migration. MLSPF has taken steps to negotiate and conclude bilateral agreements to regulate the flow of labor migration and their protection, as well as for the prevention of domestic violence and human trafficking
The State Chancellery (Bureau for Relations with the Diaspora)	coordinates state policy in the sphere of relations with the Diaspora
The National Employment Agency (NEA) of the Ministry of Labor, Social Protection and Family and its regional divisions	performs four basic functions that are broadly aimed at preventing migration abroad and employing citizens in the Republic of Moldova: it informs the population about the situation in the labor market, announces available vacancies, provides brokerage services for employment and introduces active and passive social protection measures, such as job fairs, information campaigns aimed at informing the citizens about the services of the NEA, arranges meetings with potential employers and negotiations with economic agents on the issue of employment, promotes enterprises, selects the labor force, etc. NEA also makes decisions on granting / extending / refusing the right to employment to foreigners on the basis of available vacancies on the labor market, informs the population on employment opportunities abroad, organizes recruitment and employment of Moldovan citizens abroad in accordance with signed bilateral intergovernmental agreements in the field of labor migration, as well as keeping records of labor migrants according to the established procedures.

The body	Responsibilities in the field of migration
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)	conducts quarterly labor force surveys and household budget surveys. These databases allow for the estimation of the volume of labor migration and the proportion of households receiving remittances

Source: Compiled by the authors using data⁸

The legal framework for regulating migration is grounded in the relevant articles of the Constitution and the Law on the Regime of Stay of Foreigners on the Territory of the Republic Moldova, the Law on Labor Migration, as well as provisions of bilateral and multilateral interstate agreements. In this area, there are also regulatory legal acts included in the system of administrative, customs, tax, investment, banking legislation of Moldova.

The key legislative acts regulating the migration sphere in the Republic of Moldova are presented in Table 2.

Table 2.

Key legislative acts regulating migration in Moldova

Regulation	Legal framework in the field of migration
National Strategy on Migration and Asylum (2011-2020), approved by the governmental decree Nr.655 / 08.09.2011	a national document to ensure the regulation of the movement and mobility of citizens in order to promote their welfare, social-economic development of the country, ensure human rights and social protection of labor migrants; a tool for the integration of existing strategic framework and unification of migration and asylum policies
Action Plans on implementation of the National Strategy on Migration and Asylum	adopted for different periods: 2011-2015, 2011-2020; regulate the cooperation in the wide range of areas of justice, home affairs, migration; clarifies migration laws establishing the rules of entry, stay, documenting and departure from Moldova, foreign nationals and stateless persons, as well as laws defining the legal relations in the sphere of migration processes and the competence of the state authorities in regulating migration processes
National Employment Strategy for 2007-2015	defines the priorities related to the regulation of labor migration relying on the principles of return and prevention of youth migration. Since this strategy expired in 2015, a new project of employment strategy was developed in 2016 for the period of 2017-2021. One of its key priorities is the capitalization of the migration potential for the development of the country

⁸ National Strategy on Migration and Asylum (2011-2020). IOM. URL: https://moldova.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl266/files/documents/MOLDOVA%20GMDAC%20Report%202021.04.22_revIOM_cleaned.pdf (accessed: 15.07.2022); Republic of Moldova. Migration Profile. International Centre for Migration Policy Development. URL: <https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/48367/file/Republic%2520of%2520Moldova%2520Migration%2520Profile%2520Light%2520EN.pdf> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

Regulation	Legal framework in the field of migration
The National Action Plan to support the reintegration of citizens returning home for 2014-2016	provides for creating optimal conditions for the return of citizens, especially highly skilled professionals, and to create opportunities for their employment in the country
National Strategy «Diaspora – 2025 and the Action Plan for its implementation	define a common framework to ensure consistency of the state policy towards the Diaspora and the introduction of a common governmental vision of the issues pertaining to the Diaspora, migration and development
Law № 200 of 16.07.2010 on the regime of stay of foreigners on the territory of the Republic of Moldova; Law on Labor migration (10.07.2008); Law on the citizenship of the Republic of Moldova (02.06.2000); Law on exit from RM and entry to RM (09.11.1994)	In accordance with the provisions of the Law on labor migration, labor immigration to the Republic of Moldova of foreign citizens and/or stateless persons is possible if vacant jobs cannot be filled by Republic's own human resources in accordance with the provisions of the Law and other normative regulations and international treaties of the Republic of Moldova. The State shall ensure, in accordance with the existing legislation, protection of immigrant workers without any discrimination on the basis of race, nationality, ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion, political affiliation, wealth or social background.

Source: Compiled by the authors using data⁹

Foreign nationals and stateless people arriving for the purpose of employment on the basis of individual employment contracts can only be employed with the single employer and may occupy only vacancies registered by the employer with the territorial employment agency. Employment priority is given to highly qualified specialists and / or professionals invited by the government on the proposals of specialized central and local public administration authorities. Foreign nationals and stateless persons engaged in labor activity on the territory

⁹ Action Plan for 2011-2015 on implementation of the National Strategy on Migration and Asylum (2011-2020). European Commission. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/library-document/action-plan-implementation-national-strategy-field-migration-asylum-and_en (accessed: 15.07.2022); Action Plan for 2016-2020 on the implementation of the National Strategy on Migration and Asylum (2011-2020). Ministarstvo sigurnosti Bosne i Hercegovine. URL: http://www.msb.gov.ba/PDF/Strategija_ENG_2016.pdf (accessed: 15.07.2022); National Strategy on Migration and Asylum (2011-2020). IOM. URL: https://moldova.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbd1266/files/documents/MOLDOVA%20GMDAC%20Report%202021.04.22_reviIOM_cleaned.pdf (accessed: 15.07.2022); The National Action Plan to Support the Reintegration of Citizens Returning Home for 2014-2016. International Centre for Migration Policy Development. URL: <https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/48367/file/Republic%2520of%2520Moldova%2520Migration%2520Profile%2520Light%2520EN.pdf> (accessed: 15.07.2022); National Strategy Diaspora – 2025. Biroul Relații cu Diaspora. URL: https://brd.gov.md/sites/default/files/sn_diaspor_a_2025_web.pdf; Law №200 of 16 June 2010 on Foreigners in the Republic of Moldova. ILO. URL: http://ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=86900&p_count=97596 (accessed: 15.07.2022); Law on Labour migration (of 10.07.2008). ILO. URL: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=81081&p_country=MDA&p_count=268 (accessed: 15.07.2022); Law on the Citizenship of the Republic of Moldova (02.06.2000). ILO. URL: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.detail?p_lang=en&p_isn=112630&p_country=MDA&p_count=338&p_classification=01&p_classcount=48 (accessed: 15.07.2022); Law on Exit from RM and Entry to RM (09.11.94) Ensuring the Freedom of Movement. OSCE/ODIHR Database of Legal Reviews and Legislation. URL: <https://www.legislationline.org/documents/id/4816> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

of the Republic of Moldova must obtain temporary residence and employment permits.

The right of temporary stay for labor purposes (hereafter – the right) is given by the decision issued by the Bureau for Migration and Asylum of the Ministry of the Interior. The decision granting the right is the basis for issuing a decision on granting the right of temporary stay for labor purposes. The right can be granted to the following categories of people: a) immigrant workers; b) workers on business trips; c) seasonal workers; g) border workers; e) other categories stipulated by bilateral agreements in this area signed by the Republic of Moldova with other states. The right ceases: a) since the moment of publication of the decision to revoke, b) upon the expiration of the residence permit, c) upon cancellation of a temporary residence and employment permit. Before the expiry of a temporary residence and employment permit a foreign citizen and / or a stateless person may apply for the right to work and right of temporary stay for employment purposes to be employed by another employer on common grounds.

Within the Mobility Partnership¹⁰ between Moldova and the EU, on 5 June 2008¹⁵ EU member-states signed the Common Declaration on the Mobility Partnership with the Republic of Moldova as a pilot project and became the country's partners in its implementation. Priorities of the partnership include consolidation of the system of international protection of migrants, legal support for resettlement of citizens, consolidation of relations with the Diaspora, promotion of labor migrants' return home and reintegration of returned migrants. Through the partnership, careful attention is paid to the development of national border management systems and security documents and cooperation in the international fight against human trafficking. Mobility Partnership with the Republic of Moldova within the EU encompasses (under different migration projects) Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus and France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Poland and Portugal, as well as Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Hungary. The European Commission, FRONTEX and the European Training Foundation are also part of this cooperation format.

¹⁰ Mobility Partnership between Moldova and the EU. MFA of Moldova. URL: <https://mfa.gov.md/en/content/mobility-partnership> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

The Eastern Partnership (EaP)¹¹ was launched within the framework of the Prague Summit in May 2009 and is an EU initiative aimed at strengthening relations between the European Union and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine and helping to achieve the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic integration. The partnership provides for closer cooperation with the EU, namely:

- the prospect of closer political relations under new association agreements;
- closer economic integration with the EU with the help of extended free trade agreements;
- facilitation of travelling to the EU through gradual visa liberalization, along with carrying out measures to combat irregular immigration;
- expansion of interpersonal contacts and greater involvement of civil society.

Citizens of Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan do not need visas to visit Moldova. Entry to the territory of Moldova is possible only with a valid international passport. By the decision of Moldova's Parliament, from 2007 visas were abolished for the citizens of the European Union member states, the United States, Canada, the Swiss Confederation, the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic of Iceland and Japan, and from June 1, 2010 for citizens of the Principality of Andorra, the State of Israel, the Principality of Liechtenstein, the Principality of Monaco and the Vatican, and from June 1, 2014 for citizens of Turkey.

To obtain a residence permit in the Republic of Moldova, a foreign citizen or stateless person must contact the Bureau for Migration and Asylum with a request to obtain the right of temporary stay, which is the basis for issuing a residence permit. The right to temporary stay must be obtained a month before the end of the authorized period of stay in the Republic of Moldova (90 days).

On the territory of the Republic of Moldova foreigners can engage in labor activities only on the basis of a temporary residence and employment permits.

¹¹ The Eastern Partnership. URL: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eastern-partnership_en (accessed: 15.07.2022)

The right of temporary stay may be granted for immigration for employment purposes, to study, for the purpose of family reunification, to carry out humanitarian, volunteer or religious activities, for long-term treatment in a medical facility, for sanatorium or rehabilitation treatment, for the protection of victims of trafficking, to foreign investors, for other purposes.

To obtain the right to stay in the country and extend it, foreign citizens or stateless persons shall apply to BMA within 30 calendar days prior to the expiry of the permission to stay on the territory of the Republic of Moldova. If a foreigner is a citizen of a country with which Moldova has a visa regime, he/she must hold a visa for long-term stay. The decision on granting the right to stay or refusal thereof is made by the competent authorities within no more than 30 calendar days from the date of submission of the application. Depending on the purpose of stay the right to temporary residence may be granted for a period of up to 5 years. In cases stipulated by law a permit may be issued for a different period of duration. As a rule, foreign nationals are granted the right to reside for one year with the possibility of subsequent annual renewal.

The right of permanent stay is granted if an applicant is married to a citizen of the Republic of Moldova for at least 3 years (on the basis of permanent and legal residence), has had the right to legal temporary and continuous stay in the Republic of Moldova for at least 5 years, confirms sufficient livelihood means, has accommodation, speaks the state language at a satisfactory level, has not had a criminal record for the past 3 years.¹²

Experts note that for at least a decade Moldova's economy has been in a deep recession. These years were characterized by a significant decline in economic growth. At the beginning of 2021, Moldova saw a significant slowdown in GDP growth, a weak export level, and a budget deficit higher than usual. Moreover, it was noted that Moldova was characterized by "a low competitiveness rating (86 out of 141), low economic freedom (87 out of 180) and a high level of corruption (120 out of 180)."¹³ In terms of the prospects for socio-economic


¹² Republic of Moldova. Migration Profile. International Centre for Migration Policy Development. URL: <https://www.icmpd.org/file/download/48367/file/Republic%2520of%2520Moldova%2520Migration%2520Profile%2520Light%2520EN.pdf> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

¹³ Ranking of the Countries of the World According to the Global Competitiveness Index. GT Portal. URL: <https://gtmarket.ru/ratings/global-competitiveness-index> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

development, the situation as a whole remains unfavorable. Today Moldova is among the poorest countries in Europe. This is confirmed, among other things, by the IMF rating of the poorest countries in Europe as of 2018 (calculations of GDP by purchasing power parity per capita). According to this rating, Moldova was the poorest country in Europe, followed by Ukraine, Armenia and Georgia.

It is enough to analyze the main economic indicators that will help us determine the economic situation in the country as a whole in a given period of time. Among these indicators, we distinguish gross national product, competitiveness index, gross domestic product, unemployment rate, housing construction, real estate sales, as well as the national wealth of the country.

Figure 1. Gross national product (billions of dollars)




Source: *Gross domestic product (GDP) in absolute value*. UNECE. URL: <https://w3.unece.org/PXWeb/ru/Table?IndicatorCode=7>

The gross national product reflects the value of goods that are created only by its residents, regardless of their location. If we analyze Figure 1, starting from 2016 to 2021, this indicator increases until 2019 and reaches \$38.04 billion, but with the onset of the pandemic, the indicator decreases significantly and only

begins to increase in 2021. If we compare the GNP of Russia and Moldova, we can see that this indicator is much higher in Russia, which attracts migrants from Moldova to leave for Russia and other countries.

The competitiveness index evaluates the capabilities of different countries to ensure a high level of well-being of their citizens. First of all, this indicator determines how effectively a country uses the resources it has, while there is a constant need to improve the quality of goods and services, as well as increase labor productivity. Judging by the indicators shown in Figure 2, Moldova coped well for its level, and the index increases every year relative to the previous year, but compared to Russia, it remains quite low.

Figure 2. Competitiveness index




Source: *Ranking of the Countries of the World According to the Global Competitiveness Index*. GT Portal. URL: <https://gtmarket.ru/ratings/global-competitiveness-index>

Gross domestic product reflects the final level of all goods and services that were produced in one year in all sectors of the economy on the territory of a particular state, for consumption, export and accumulation, regardless of the nationality of the factors of production used. If we look at the data in the Figure 3,

this indicator is growing every year, but with the onset of the pandemic, it began to decline. According to the International Monetary Fund, at the end of 2020, Moldova's GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) was the lowest in Europe – \$5 661 (this indicator is ten times higher in developed countries). If we compare this with other countries: neighboring Ukraine, which has been in a state of de facto civil war for eight years, has a GDP per capita of \$8 713, the Russian Federation \$27 834, and Romania \$24 508. According to calculations by expert analysts, in order to get closer to average European indicators, the country's GDP growth rate in Moldova should be at least 10% per year.¹⁴

Figure 3. Gross domestic product (USD billion)




Source: Gross domestic product (GDP) in absolute value. UNECE. URL: <https://w3.unece.org/PXWeb/ru/Table?IndicatorCode=7>

The unemployment rate measures the percentage of the people who are part of the active population of the country, who want to work, but cannot or do not have the opportunity to find a job. In any country, unemployment is a natural

¹⁴ Gross domestic product (GDP) in absolute value. UNECE. URL: <https://w3.unece.org/PXWeb/ru/Table?IndicatorCode=7> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

indicator and there will always be people in any country who will not be able to find a job, or those places that will be available will not be of particular interest to them. In countries where there is no unemployment, this means that people accept even the most vulnerable and low-paid jobs.¹⁵ Moreover, there are people in the market of any country who want to work, but cannot find a job they like. Moldova is such a country, and this is why many citizens migrate in order to find a job that will be more attractive to them and where they can earn more money than at home.

Figure 4. Unemployment rate (% of the total working-age population)




Source: *Unemployment Rate in Moldova*. Biroul Național de Statistică. URL: <https://statistica.gov.md/categorie.php?l=ru&idc=107>

Based on the data given in Figure 4, the unemployment rate significantly decreased by 2018, but in 2019, it began to rise again and reached a peak in 2020, when due to the pandemic, many Moldovan citizens were forced to return back to their homeland, where jobs were unfortunately not provided for them.

¹⁵ Unemployment Rate in Moldova. Biroul Național de Statistică. URL: <https://statistica.gov.md/category.php?l=ru&idc=107> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

Many of them waited for the pandemic to end and borders to open so that they could leave again and return to their former workplace.

Figure 5. Housing construction, real estate sales (USD billion)



Source: 8. *Housing Construction, Real Estate Sales (USD billion)*. UNECE. URL: <https://unece.org/DAM/hlm/documents/Publications/cp.moldova.2015a.en.pdf>


Housing construction and real estate sales occupy an important place in the development of the Moldovan economy. According to data (Figure 5), this indicator increases annually and is not affected by events that occur in the country. For example, in Chisinau in 2021, a total of 4118 authorizations were issued. Of these, 3026 were issued for the construction of residential buildings, and the remaining 1 092 for non-residential building. The number of authorizations for the construction of residential buildings increased by 48% over the year, and non-residential by 9.9%. It should be noted that the last time that the authorities issued more than 4000 authorizations for the year (4316) was in 2015.¹⁶ The de-

¹⁶ Gross domestic product (GDP) in absolute value. UNECE. URL: <https://w3.unece.org/PXWeb/ru/Table?IndicatorCode=7> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

mand for housing is increasing every year, mainly from citizens from the Diaspora who earn money abroad, accumulate capital and come home and buy real estate. Experts note that after 13 years of decline in the demand for real estate, in 2019 demand increased significantly. This year alone, 29.7 thousand apartments were sold, and in the first quarter alone, 7.6 thousand apartment deals were concluded across the country. For such a small country as Moldova, this number is significant. For example, if 5-6 years ago about 60% of apartments were sold in the capital, today this number reaches 80%.¹⁷

The national wealth of the country is also an important economic indicator. It is a set of assets in monetary terms that are created and accumulated by the country. Since 2018, this indicator in Moldova has been relatively stable and has not changed significantly from year to year. On average, it reached \$12.5 billion a year (Figure 6).¹⁸

Figure 6. National wealth (billions of dollars)



Source: 22. National Wealth (billions of dollars). WB. URL: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/moldova/overview>

¹⁷ Housing Construction, Real Estate Sales (USD billion). UNECE. URL: <https://unece.Org/DAM/hlm/documents/Publications/cp.moldova.2015a.en.pdf> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

¹⁸ National Wealth (billions of dollars). WB. URL: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/moldova/overview> (accessed: 15.07.2022)

It is also important to note for Moldova that the country is completely dependent on foreign energy resources. Lacking its own energy resources, the country is forced to import 98% of energy resources. Energy overspending per unit of GDP is 3-4 times more than in developed countries. Local energy resources cover only 2% of needs. In recent years, the Moldovan Government has taken a number of measures to reconstruct the energy sector by opening this sector to competitors and attracting private investors.

Thus, we may say that the economic situation of the Republic of Moldova is generally quite difficult. According to many indicators, the country lags behind its neighbors and is the poorest country in Europe, which is one of the most important reasons for population migration from the country. People who are unemployed are forced to go abroad to work, including to Russia, where they can feed themselves and send part of the accumulated funds home so that their relatives and friends can survive.

* * *

In recent decades, migration has become a significant factor of development for many countries of the world. This has an impact on the transformation of the political, social and economic spheres of the recipient countries. Migration has unpredictable economic and social consequences for all countries. Migration contributes to a more efficient use of resources, not only labor, but also financial resources, which contributes to the economy of the region as a whole. In most developed countries, migration plays an important supporting role, helping to eliminate the imbalances in the local labor market, ensure the proper functioning of production and activate the investment process, thereby bringing significant benefits to the country.

Thus, the migration of the population from Moldova is essentially irreversible, as when they arrive in another country, many migrants decide to stay there permanently, and also invite their relatives and friends to join them.

It might be concluded that migration policy is closely related to public administration and the laws adopted in the country. A number of documents have been adopted at state level to regulate migration policy in Moldova. The main challenge facing the Republic of Moldova at present is ensuring that these laws are put into practice, and that they are correctly understood and realized by the

authorities responsible for their implementation. The next question is whether the existing gaps will be filled by the inclusion of European standards in the legislation, subject to the political and financial commitment of the State, and if the Law will be applied in practice. At this stage, the Republic of Moldova is drafting a new legislative framework in the field of migration, which could improve the present situation in the country.

Получено в редакции: 6 июня 2022 г.

Принято к публикации: 23 августа 2022 г.

УДК: 351/354, 325.1, 323.2

Тенденции, факторы и государственная политика в сфере миграции в Республике Молдове

Светлана Русу, аспирант, МГИМО МИД России, Россия

E-mail: svetlana_167467@mail.ru

Ион Партаки, кандидат экономических наук, профессор, заведующий кафедрой
эконометрики и экономической статистики, Академия экономического образования
Молдавии, Республика Молдова

E-mail: ionpartachi@yahoo.fr

Елена Русу, Дипломатическая академия МИД России, Россия

E-mail: lenar9909@mail.ru

Аннотация: Статья посвящена анализу современного состояния государственной политики Республики Молдова в сфере миграции. Поскольку страна в основном является донором мигрантов, в стране действует ряд государственных органов, цель которых – контроль и обеспечение права на свободное передвижение как внутри страны, так и за ее пределами, а также содействие возвращению мигрантов. Среди основных причин миграции авторы выделяют бедность, высокий уровень безработицы, нестабильную политическую ситуацию и коррупция на государственном уровне, стремление улучшить качество жизни, переезд на жительство к родственникам или в целях получения образования.

Исследование опирается на системно-структурный анализ, сравнительный и формально-логический метод. В статье анализируются материалы и данные, которыми оперируют государственные учреждения Республики Молдова, а также международные организации.

Республика Молдова активно работает над внедрением принципов эффективного государственного управления в сфере миграции. На государственном уровне принят ряд законов, которые способствуют эффективному регулированию миграции в стране. При этом Республика Молдова сталкивается со рядом проблем: несмотря на значительный прогресс, предстоит еще много работы по миграционной политике на всех уровнях государственного управления. Граждане страны продолжают мигрировать, и лишь небольшой их процент возвращается на родину.

Ключевые слова: Республика Молдова, эмиграция, государственная политика, Европейский Союз, Российская Федерация, право

Статья основана на материалах доклада «Преобразование учреждений и государственного управления для создания более благоприятных условий на пути к 2030 году», подготовленного авторами в рамках 21-й сессии Комитет экспертов по государственному управлению при Экономическом и Социальном Совете ООН в январе 2022 г.

References

Ghencea B., Gudumac I. (2004). Labor Migration and Remittances in the Republic of Moldova. Moldova Microfinance Alliance. URL: http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00002327/01/Raport_Migration_Remittances_2.pdf

Mosneaga V. (2007). The Labour Migration of Moldovan Population: Trends and Effects. SOCIUS Working Papers, 3. URL: <https://socius.rc.iseg.ulisboa.pt/publicacoes/wp/wp200703.pdf>

Ecko K.P., Gorbunova G.D. (2017). Trudovaya migraciya v Respublike Moldova (Labor Migration in the Republic of Moldova). *Bulleten' Nacional'nogo nauchno-issledovatel'skogo instituta obshchestvennoy zdorov'ya imeni N.A. Semashko*, 2017, 1, 95–98. (In Russian)

Perchinskaya N., Kolesnikova T. (2018). Socialno-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Moldovy na sovremennom etape (Socio-economic Situation of Moldova at the Present Stage). *Rossiia i novyye gosudarstva Evrazii*, 4, 111–121. (In Russian)

Perchinskaya N.P., Pantya L.V. (2017). Nekotorye aspekty ucheta migratsionnykh potokov rabochei sily iz Respubliki Moldova. In *Rossiia: tendentsii i perspektivy razvitiya* (Some Aspects of Accounting for Labor Migration Flows from the Republic of Moldova. In *Russia: Trends and Development Prospects*), pp. 678–682.

Rusu S.V., Ryazantsev S.V. (2020). Prichiny i tsennostnyye motivatsii migrantov iz Moldovy v Rossiya i strany Yevropeyskogo Soyuz (Reasons and Value Motivations of Migrants from Moldova to Russia and European Union Countries). *Segodnya i zavtra rossiyskoy ekonomiki*, 101-102, 16–27. DOI: 10.26653/1993-4947-2020-101-102-02

Volkova, T.B. (2018). Gosudarstvennaya politika v sfere migratsii (State Policy in the Sphere of Migration). *Evraziiskaya advokatura*, 3(34), 95–97. (In Russian)

Yudina, T.N. (2007). Migratsiya: slovar osnovnykh terminov (Migration. A Glossary of Key Terms). Moscow: RGSU. (In Russian)

Литература на русском языке (Literature in Russian):

Ечко К.П., Горбунова Г.Д. (2017). Трудовая миграция в Республике Молдова // Бюллетень Национального научно-исследовательского института общественного здоровья имени Н.А. Семашко. №1. С. 95–98.

Перчинская Н., Колесникова Т. (2018). Социально-экономическое положение Молдовы на современном этапе // Россия и новые государства Евразии. № 4. С. 111–121. DOI: 10.20542/2073-4786-2018-4-111-121

Перчинская Н.П., Пантя Л.В. (2017). Некоторые аспекты учета миграционных потоков рабочей силы в Республике Молдова / Россия: тенденции и перспективы развития. Ежегодник. Отв. ред. В.И. Герасимов. С. 678–682.

Русу С.В., Рязанцев С.В. (2020). Причины и ценностные мотивации мигрантов из Молдовы в Россию и страны Европейского союза // Сегодня и завтра российской экономики. №101-102. С. 16–27. DOI: 10.26653/1993-4947-2020-101-102-02

Волкова Т.Б. (2018). Государственная политика в сфере миграции // Евразийская адвокатура. №3(34). С. 95–97.

Юдина Т.Н. (2007). Миграция: словарь основных терминов. М.: Изд-во РГСУ. 472 с.

Информация для авторов

Журнал «Управление и политика» принимает к публикации оригинальные и отличающиеся новизной и научной ценностью рукописи по политической теории, проблемам и трансформации политических институтов и процессов, вопросам политической идеологии и государственного управления.

Рукописи принимаются в электронном виде на сайте журнала, где также подробно изложены требования к подаче рукописей: www.gp-mgimo.ru

В журнал принимаются исследовательские статьи, теоретические статьи, книжные рецензии.

The requirements for a research article are the following:

- Представление статьи в журнал «Управление и политика» подразумевает, что: статья не была опубликована ранее в другом журнале, статья не находится на рассмотрении в другом журнале, все соавторы согласны с публикацией текущей версии статьи;

- объем без метадаанных – 40 тыс. – 80 тыс. знаков;
- Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx), 14 Times New Roman, 1.5 интервал;
- статья имеет следующую структуру:
 - ФИО автора и место работы (имя, степень, должность, полное наименование организации с почтовым адресом, e-mail) в отдельном файле .doc;
 - краткое название, отражающее ключевую проблему статьи;
 - аннотация (200-250 слов), которая должна содержать краткое изложение статьи и включать ключевые слова (8-10). Она должна содержать цель, исследовательский вопрос, методы и результаты исследования;
 - текст статьи должен быть логически разделен на несколько частей: введение (содержит цель статьи, исследовательский вопрос, объяснение, почему этот вопрос важен, обзор литературы); методология (методы исследования, теоретическая база, этапы исследования); результаты (результаты исследования представлены в логической форме); обсуждение (оценка результатов, их актуальность, важность и ограничения), заключение;
 - автор обязан сообщить редакции о потенциальном конфликте интересов, указав такую информацию. При отсутствии конфликта интересов автор добавляет в конце статьи следующую фразу: «Автор заявляет об отсутствии конфликта интересов»;
 - Рисунки и таблицы не должны быть отсканированы, и должны быть редактируемы. Картинки должны быть высокого качества и присылаться отдельно (форматы .jpg или .png). Рисунки и таблицы должны нумероваться и иметь отсылку к ним в тексте, а также источники данных. В рукописи должно быть указано, где следует разместить каждый рисунок/таблицу/рамку, например: <рисунок 1.1 здесь>. Изображения с низким разрешением 72 dpi (из Интернета) не принимаются. Ответственность за получение разрешения на использование изображения лежит на авторе. Автор несет исключительную ответственность за точность используемых

изображений и/или карт. Если рукопись содержит специальные символы (китайские, арабские, символы, математические символы и т.д.), то необходимо предоставить PDF-версию рукописи и указать используемые специальные шрифты;

- Список литературы должен быть составлен в алфавитном порядке. Он включает научную литературу, аналитические отчеты и статьи в научных журналах. DOI следует указывать в конце ссылки. Ссылки на статистические данные, отчеты, законодательные документы, интернет-ресурсы должны быть оформлены в виде сносок с полным описанием и URL-адресом в постраничных ссылках. В журнале приветствуются ссылки на надежные источники, научные статьи, опубликованные в авторитетных журналах.

Журнал использует стиль ссылок APA

примеры:

в тексте: (Иванов, 2021, с. 3-4) ... (Smith & Fox, 2021, pp. 3-4)

в списке литературы:

Smith, K., Fox, R. (2021). *Book in Political Science*. Publishing House. 312 p.

Smith, K., Fox, R. (2021). Article in Political Science. *Governance and Politics*, 1(1), 2-9.

Подробнее: <https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/references/examples>

Brief Author's Guide

Peer-reviewed and open-access journal *Governance and Politics* welcomes submissions of **original** and **outstanding** research manuscripts in the field of political science.

The Journal is focused on political theories, political institutions and processes, political ideology, public administration and governance.

The Journal is published by the School of Governance and Politics of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) and is of relevance to academia, practitioners and policymakers. Only manuscripts of sufficient quality, relevant research question and sound methodology that meet the aims and scope of *Governance and Politics* will be subject to a double-blind peer-review.

The requirements for a research article are the following:

- the submission of an article implies that it has not been published earlier in another journal or book, is not under consideration in another journal, has no more than three co-authors, all of whom agree with the publication of the submitted version of the article;
- length of the article without metadata: 40,000 – 80,000 symbols (with spaces);
- Microsoft Word format (.doc or .docx), 14 Times New Roman, 1.5 interval;
- the article has the following structure:
 - author's full name and affiliation (name, degree, occupation, ORCID, full affiliation with postal address, e-mail) in a separate doc file;
 - short title reflecting the key problem of the article;
 - abstract (200-250 words). The abstract should provide a brief summary of the paper and include all keywords (8-10). It should contain *the purpose, research question, methods, and results of the research*;
 - the text of the article should be logically divided into several integral parts: **introduction** (contains the aim of the article, research question, discussion on why this question is important, literature review); **methodology** (research methods, theoretical basis, stages of research); **results** (the results of research are presented in a logical way); **discussion** (assessment of the results, their relevance, importance and limitations), **conclusion**;
 - the author is obliged to inform the editors about a potential conflict of interest by indicating such information. *If there is no conflict of interest, the author adds the following phrase at the end of the article: The author declares the absence of conflict of interest*;
 - Figures and tables should not be scanned so that they could be edited. Pictures should be of high quality and sent separately (.jpg or .png). *Figures, tables and pictures should have number and reference in the text as well as a source of data. A manuscript should indicate where each figure/table/box should be placed, e.g. <figure 1.1 here>. Images with low resolution at 72dpi (internet sourced) are not accepted. It is the author's responsibility to obtain permission for the use of image. The author is solely responsible for the accuracy of the images and/or maps used. If manuscript contains special characters (Chinese, Arabic, Cyrillic, characters not generally used in Western European languages, symbols, mathematics etc.) then a PDF version of the manuscript needs to be submitted and the special fonts used need to be listed*;

- **References:** List of references should be composed alphabetically. It includes academic literature, analytical reports and articles in academic periodic journals. DOIs should be given in the end of a reference. References on statistics, reports, legislative documents, internet resources should be organized as footnotes with full description and URL.

The Journal uses the APA style of references:

examples:

in the text: (Smith & Fox, 2021, pp. 3-4)

in References:

Smith, K., Fox, R. (2021). **Book in Political Science**. Publishing House. 312 p.

Smith, K., Fox, R. (2021). Article in Political Science. *Governance and Politics*, 1(1), 2-9.

For more examples and references instructions:

<https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammar-guidelines/references/examples>

© МГИМО МИД России

СМИ зарегистрировано в Федеральной службе по надзору в сфере связи, информационных технологий и массовых коммуникаций 26 июля 2022 г., серия ПИ № ФС77-83595 (онлайн-версия, сетевое издание: 13 июля 2022 г., серия Эл № ФС77-83596)

Учредитель: Федеральное государственное автономное образовательное учреждение высшего образования «Московский государственный институт международных отношений (университет) Министерства иностранных дел Российской Федерации»

Адрес редакции: 119454, г. Москва, проспект Вернадского, д.76,
Факультет управления и политики,
+7 495 229-54-37
e-mail: gp@inno.mgimo.ru

Периодичность – 4 номера в год

Отпечатано в отделе оперативной полиграфии
и множительной техники МГИМО МИД России
Тираж 200 экз. / Объем 9,31 усл. п.л. / Заказ № ____

© Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University)
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

The Founder: Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University)
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

The Publisher Address: 119454, Moscow, Prospect Vernadskogo, 76,
School of Governance and Politics.
Phone/fax: +7 495 229-54-37
e-mail: gp@inno.mgimo.ru

Published by MGIMO University Press